SOCIAL FORCES

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POSTWAR POPULATION PROBLEMS*

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SOME day—possibly in the year 1944, perhaps in '45 or '49—there will be a peace table. Around it will be gathered the representatives of all the nations then at war. In the seats of the conquered (we feel certain) will be the delegates from Germany and Japan, in the harsh situation of having to accept the terms and arrangements proposed by their victorious late enemies. Among the victors, the representatives of four great powers will hold a dominating position—America, rich, efficient, its homeland undevasted; England, bulwarked by the long tradition of power and dominion and proud of its recent record of stubborn defense; China, vast and nebulous, but emerging rapidly into a stage of modernization and self-conscious unity; and Russia (whether with one or sixteen votes will make little difference), seared with the deepest scars of conflict, but proud, confident, and alert. The representatives of the United States will speak for some 135 million people; those of the British Empire for some 45 millions in Great Britain itself, 400 million in India (if they continue to speak for that vast population by the time this conference is held), and a score of millions from other portions of the Empire; those from China for the greatest single political unit of humanity in the world, still uncounted but aggregating somewhere around 450 million; and Russia with something like 185 million. In the hands of these negotiators will lie the destiny not only of these great peoples but also of the remaining 40 percent of the world's two billion human beings.

This peace conference will overshadow all the official gatherings of the past, alike for its historical

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significance, the number of individuals represented, the complexity of the problems involved, and its determinative bearing on human desitny. The magnitude of the task before it staggers the imagination and leaves the mentality of the ordinary individual reeling.

The mental approach of the majority of these individuals will almost certainly be primarily political. They will have been trained to think in terms of treaties, spheres of influence, mandates, state establishments, and all the paraphernalia of governmental administration. Let us hope that they will be so genuinely educated and so broad in their outlook, that they will appreciate and understand that political affairs are just one manifestation of the great basic human interests and relationships, and that any constructive solution of the problems before them which offers a hope for a lasting peace must be based upon considerations which are not ordinarily considered as definitely political. Let us also hope, parenthetically, that these individuals, and the powers that back them, will be almost superhumanly tolerant, adaptable, and flexible, for it is inevitable that whatever arrangement is agreed upon will be the most magnificent compromise in history.

Among these various non-political considerations, and indeed underlying and conditioning them all, will be the basic facts of population, considered both quantitatively and qualitatively. Practically speaking, the quantitative aspects will be the only ones to receive open discussion and frank consideration, and it is well that it should be so, for any infusion of qualitative considerations into these deliberations would not only rest upon very shaky scientific foundations, but would likewise almost certainly preclude any hope of amicable settlement. The peace conference, if it is to

be really effective, must act on the practical as-
sumption that one man is as good as another, even
if not, as the enthusiastic Irishman said, far better.

We may be sure that the peace commission will
be magnificently provided with experts in many
fields. There will be eminent specialists in geo-
graphy, transportation, finance, foreign trade,
history, political science, and so on down a long
line. It is a question of the gravest importance
whether there will be included a group of experts
in population who will be the intellectual peers of
their colleagues in other fields and who will be ac-
corded equal recognition by the responsible officials
themselves. While there are some signs that the
State Department of the United States is becom-
ing increasingly alert to the significance of the
population problems that will have to be faced,
there is as yet no assurance, at least in the knowl-
edge of the present speaker, that definite prepara-
tions are now being made to have this body of
scientific knowledge adequately represented, or
that the significance of the basic population fac-
tors is fully comprehended. Whether any of the
other powers involved is doing any better we can
only guess.

One thing is certain, the differences in the popu-
lation situation of the different countries of the
world, both great and small, will be glaringly ap-
parent to the peace negotiators. At least enough
progress has been made since the last World War
so that the basic facts of population and its dis-
tribution are readily available, and the significance
of population factors is at least approximately
understood. It is realized today that the dis-
tinction between the "have" and "have-not" na-
tions is not merely a matter of land area and nat-
ural resources, but is to some extent a matter of
density of population. Certain countries are
easily recognized even by the layman as being
heavily overcrowded, while in other lands there
appear to be great open spaces which are only
superficially utilized. The difference in the levels
of living of the various countries will also be pal-
pably obvious. If the spirit of democracy, race
equality, and world brotherhood which is one of the
few encouraging features of the war period carries
over into the peace negotiations, it will mean a
definite effort to relieve the suffering and distress
of the less fortunate lands, and to bring about some
degree of equalization of well-being for all of man-
kind. Just how much of sacrifice on the part of the
more fortunate peoples can be considered as a

practical factor in the solution is dubious. There
will unquestionably be many outbursts of fervid
oratory extolling the unity of mankind and brother-
ly love. But, when it comes down to concrete
questions of which nation is to give up what, the
radiant glow of altruism is likely to fade suddenly.
The real hope of amicable adjustments must rest
upon the possibility of working out solutions that
are scientific and constructive, but do not involve
too much self-abnegation on the part of any of the
more favorably situated nations.

The specific problems in which population facts
will play a central part may conveniently be
divided into three groups. First, the repatriation
or relocation of populations displaced in one way
or another by the exigencies of the war. Second,
the problems of alleviating the conditions that
arise from overgrowth, or overdensity, of popula-
tion. Third, the operation of population pressure
as a causal factor in international war.

The first group, for our present purposes, may be
summarily dismissed. The problems involved are
highly complicated. History offers no adequate
precedent for their solution, and even the basic
facts will not be ascertainable—they will not even
be actually developed—until the end of the war.

In considering the other two types of problems,
certain background facts need to be kept in mind.
Some of these, dealing with the contemporary size
of certain leading population groups, have already
been set forth. These need to be supplemented by
the broad outlines of population growth during the
past century and a half. About the year 1800 the
total population of the world numbered roughly
900 million. Today it is probably considerably
over 2 billion. There has been a much larger
aggregate increase of humanity in the past 140
years than in the whole previous span of its exist-
ence. Or, putting it otherwise, it took mankind
the long stretch of a million, or perhaps two million,
years to build up a population of less than one
billion, and then in the next century and a half it
considerably more than doubled. Without the
need of any mathematical computations, the
imagination alone is sufficient to present the appal-
ling consequences—indeed the actual impossibility
—of world population doubling again in the next
150 years and once more in the following similar
period and so on. Evidently something has hap-
pened since the beginning of the nineteenth cen-
tury that is definitely unique and cannot possibly
be duplicated in the future.

The growth of certain particular countries highlights the truth that this increase of world population, spectacular as it is, by no means demonstrates the full biological capacity of the human species to multiply. Taking the United States as an outstanding example, we may note that its population grew from about 4 million when the first census was taken in 1790 to about 134 million a century and a half later, or an increase of nearly thirty-fourfold. This was the natural and inevitable result of the planting of small nuclei of highly developed individuals with an efficient economic culture on the threshold of vast unexploited land areas.

At the same time, extraordinary, though less phenomenal, growth was taking place even in the densely crowded areas of ancient civilization. Taking Asia as a whole, it has been estimated that the increase of population in that continent between 1800 and 1933 was 519 million, which happens to be precisely the same figure as the total population of Europe in the latter year. The population of Japan has doubled in the seventy odd years of its contact with the outside world, and its rulers have deliberately adopted the policy of becoming the most rapidly growing people in the world, and are aiming at a total population of 100 million by the year 1960. Present military events may be placing temporary barriers to the achievement of this goal, but in themselves will never be adequate to prevent its realization. The population of India has increased by 52 million during the last 10-year intercensal period.

During this century and a half various nations, either by officially sponsored enterprises, or by sanctioning and supporting the migratory impulse of individuals, have sought to relieve population pressure at home and dispose of the surplus increments of their citizenry. Numerous recently established and sparsely populated nations have been glad enough to participate in these efforts by providing the necessary destinations. The action of the United States in placing definite numerical limitations upon foreign immigration marked the virtual end of this great expedient and put a period to a distinct phase of the cultural evolution of humanity. This action was the culmination of a series of social forces that had been developing for decades past and was crystalized by the realization that the impetus to migrate following World War I was so great that the actual trans-oceanic movement would be limited only by the carrying capacity of the available merchant vessels.

When the present hostilities quiet down, essentially this same situation will be duplicated on a vastly augmented scale. The differential between the devastated lands and the relatively unscathed areas will be greater than before. The racial and national complexities will be magnified, and the total number of individuals involved will be almost immeasurably augmented. The natural desire of suffering human beings to relieve their situation by escape will be augmented on this occasion more than on the last by the spirit of altruism, "racial democracy," to use Mr. Wallace's term, and world-wide equality. In the name of liberalism and humanitarianism emphatic demands will be presented,—indeed, they are already emerging in various quarters,—for the lowering of immigration barriers on the part of all the more sparsely settled countries of the world and the initiation of an era of free worldwide migration. It should be clear to any thinking person that the response to this demand is fraught with the most far-reaching consequences to humanity and ought to be governed by sound scientific principles. Here is where the peace commission needs to be provided with the best possible scientific information, and here is where sociology ought to be prepared to offer it.

Assuming that the principle of international altruism is to be accepted as the guide, and that altruism may be defined as a desire for the greatest good of the greatest number of people over the longest stretch of time, the desirable practical solutions revolve around the question of the consequences of migration upon the sending and receiving countries directly, and indirectly upon humanity as a whole. This is a subject that has been extensively studied, and vigorously debated, by economists and sociologists, and other students of human affairs, ever since the days of Benjamin Franklin. There are two outstanding basic theories. One is that emigration operates to check the growth of population and to relieve the evils of overpopulation to a degree roughly corresponding to the ratio of the moving elements to the total population, and that conversely immigration tends to accelerate the rate of growth of the receiving population in a corresponding way. The other theory holds that a steady, regular emigration, such as is likely to take place under ordinary conditions, has no effect whatever in reducing the rate of population growth of the sending country, and

in the receiving country, after the first stage of definite underpopulation is past, does not have any effect upon its numerical growth decade by decade.

It would not be appropriate to enter into a detailed examination or analysis of the arguments pro and con in this great field. Probably neither extreme is entirely correct. The evidence brought forth in the controversy and the arguments have never been entirely conclusive, and, to a surprising degree, have been vitiated by the common error of population experts in forgetting that the death rate is just as important a factor in the growth of population as the birth rate. However, the preponderance of evidence seems to support the doctrine that while emigration may retard the growth of population to some degree its effect is so slight as to be almost negligible in the case of large densely crowded populations, and at the other end it has only a minor effect in augmenting the growth of population in a receiving country which is already about as densely populated as its prevailing mores and the attitudes of its people make appropriate and desirable. While it may not be true that, as is frequently stated, the population of the United States is no greater today than it would have been if we had not had a single immigrant since 1820, still it can hardly be imagined that without immigration we should in 1920 have had a population of only 41,288,570 instead of the figure of 94,820,-915, which represents the computations upon which our quota regulations are based. Or, looking at it from the other side, can we suppose that the hundreds of thousands of emigrants who departed from Italy during the few years before World War I meant precisely that many fewer Italians, plus their descendants, to support the Fascist regime against which we are now struggling so bitterly?

To put the matter more concretely in the precise terms in which it will confront the peace commission, what hope is there of relieving the desperate situation in China, for example, by means of a carefully planned and supervised emigration movement? We know that China for centuries past has had a seriously redundant population, which has been kept within bounds by the operation of the familiar Malthusian positive checks. We know, for instance, that there has been a serious famine in some part of China on the average of about once a year for the last 2000 years. Can we imagine an emigration movement from China which would not only eradicate the necessity of these deaths by famine, but would also actually check the rate of aggregate population growth? Would an exodus of 10 million a year do it, or 20 million, or 50 million? It is difficult to propound a categorically convincing answer. But it seems highly improbable that any migration movement of a volume within the bounds of practicality would accomplish the result. That is the conclusion reached by the special Red Cross Commission which was sent over to China to study famine conditions in 1928 and '29. Its report states, in effect, that if all the ships that sail the seven seas were withdrawn from their regular routes and devoted henceforth exclusively to carrying emigrants out of China they could not keep up with the procession. What is true of China is equally true, *mutatis mutandi*, of India, Japan, or any other densely crowded country. The possibilities of biological increase, unrestricted by any deliberate social or individual regulatory measures, are more than adequate to make up for any gaps created by any realizable emigration movement.

And so, turning to the potential receiving countries, we may ask where are the lands that during the next half century would voluntarily receive any such contribution of outsiders as has been indicated? I say voluntarily, because it must be recognized that the right to determine who shall pass its boundary lines is one of the very last items of independence that will be relinquished by any autonomous state. Unless we envision a postwar world organization where the component groups will have practically abandoned all pretense at self-regulation, we cannot imagine a system of enforced hospitality to world wide migrants.

But assuming that certain nations, for whatever reasons, were willing to open their doors to unrestricted currents of foreign migrants, what would be the long-time effect upon those nations and upon humanity in general? The dominant motive for migration, particularly in a world that has adopted the principle of political justice, will be the search for better levels of living, as it has indeed been for the last century. Such a quest inevitably sets up a competition of standards in the receiving country which is highly prejudicial to the mode of existence of its people, whether natives or earlier immigrants. It has been demonstrated beyond any serious doubt that the ultimate consequence of such a process on a world-wide scale would be the progressive deterioration of the levels of living of the more favored countries until at last such a degree of universal destitution had been reached

that it was no longer worth while for the denizens of the most depressed country on earth to make the effort to move.

Such an outcome would represent the greatest calamity that ever afflicted mankind. The high levels of living of certain countries in the world today are the priceless heritage of peculiar conditions which can never be repeated. While they may seem to confer special advantages on certain nations they are nevertheless a boon and a blessing to all mankind. Once lost, it is doubtful whether they could ever be retrieved in any conceivable future stretch of human existence.

Scarcely anything is more vitally important than that the peace negotiators should realize that, far from being an expression of true liberalism, the attempt to relieve overcrowded countries through emigration measures would actually be one of the deadliest body blows ever imposed upon humanity. What, then, are the possibilities? What is to be done, what can be done to relieve the distress of the overcrowded countries? Among the remedies proposed, industrialization, that is to say the introduction of thoroughly modern methods of production, stands out prominently. Along with this go various proposals for agricultural improvement. While these advances are obviously desirable in themselves, and should be fostered by every reasonable means, it seems undeniable that they can offer no permanent alleviation. The level of living of a country represents the play of three great factors, its land resources, its economic culture, and its population. If improvements in either land resources or economic culture are accompanied by corresponding increments in population there can result no betterment of the level of living. The whole history of the last 150 years teaches us that this is precisely what must be expected in the absence of some definite and voluntary restrictions upon the biological increase of population. If the development of new land areas and the improvement of technical processes were in themselves competent to relieve human misery and establish high levels of living for the world as a whole, we should by now find ourselves in a state of material well-being where wars would be almost unthinkable, for we have been the benefactors of such an expansion in these fields as will never be repeated again. While it is doubtless true that there has been a general improvement in the level of living in many countries of the world since 1800 it is also no doubt true that in the year 1940 there was a

larger aggregate number of human beings hungry, and destitute, and terribly distressed than at any previous time in human experience. If the nineteenth century did not solve the problem of human well-being, we can scarcely expect any other century following the same pattern to produce the result.

In brief, then, we are forced to the perhaps unwelcome, and certainly pessimistic, conclusion that there can be little practical hope for the amelioration of human conditions the world over until in some way or other drastic and positive restraints have been placed upon the growth of population in practically all the countries of the world which have not already realized that development. This is not the time or place to enter into an elaborate discussion of how this is to be achieved. My sole purpose at present is to emphasize the fact that this hard remedy must be faced, and that those whose daily contact with sociological principles fits them to speak authoritatively in these matters must be on the alert to use every opportunity to drive this truth home wherever it can have any practical effect.

Turning now to the third question as to the causal relationship between population growth and war, it would seem that very little more needs to be said. While it would be futile to assert that overpopulation is the only cause of international war, it is almost equally unrealistic to deny that population considerations in the broad sense have been contributory factors in most of the great international wars of history, including the last two. Because of the complexity of modern social relationships, these factors frequently become obscured and masked by various secondary influences. Seldom today does any nation launch forth upon a war with the obvious and avowed intention to seize more land. It is true that many of Hitler's aggressions were quite obviously of this character. But more frequently population pressure and land hunger take their overt expressions in the form of struggles for natural resources, conflicts over trade routes, competition for foreign markets, and various other types of rivalry which in the last analysis reflect stringent home conditions on the part of the agressor nations. A people that is driven to desperation by hunger and the threat of starvation will fight unless it is already so inured to the experience of hardship, and so weakened thereby, that it lacks the spirit of aggression. A

nation that feels the urgent need for more land, and sees nowhere to get it, will fight for the products of land in one way or another, and nothing can stop it—except superior force. When one realizes that the duplication of the population history since 1800 would mean 4 billion people in the world in the year 2100, and 8 billion in the year 2250, it is impossible for even the most optimistically inclined to believe that such numbers could be supported by any available combination of natural resources and technological efficiency, or that nations so crowded could be induced by any system of political regulations or adjustments to live in peace and harmony with each other. Some practical, and practised, plan for the deliberate and drastic regulation of population growth emerges as the central and most indispensable feature of any program of postwar world reorganization.

CULTURE AND HUMAN SOCIETY

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IT IS impossible to understand human society without understanding human culture; for the social behavior of man, whether it is domestic, economic, political, legal, moral or religious, is dominated by the culture of his group. There is a qualitative difference between the social behavior of men and the social behavior of animals. It is the failure to recognize the importance of culture in human social life and of cultural evolution[1] as a distinct phase of evolution which has often led to the neglect of the distinctively human factors in human social behavior by the social sciences and to attempts to interpret such behavior practically in the same terms as might be used in interpreting the behavior of the animals below man. Most scientists in the nineteenth century after Darwin came to look upon man as a mere animal. This view gained such wide acceptance even in the social sciences that the assumption was often that human society is purely a product of nature; that uniform laws of nature differing only in complexity prevade both human and animal groups and that therefore the social sciences, especially sociology, differed from the natural sciences only in the complexity of their subject matter. It is the thesis of this article, however, that the sciences of human social behavior must be built upon the differential factor or factors which distinguish human life from the life of the animals below man, purely natural forces being regarded only as conditioning the work of the purely human factors.

[1] The word *evolution* is used in its broad scientific sense, meaning "orderly change," or "orderly development."

It is now universally conceded that the factor which marks off all human groups from animal groups is culture. Culture is the differential factor which distinguishes human groups, and without which it is impossible to understand the nature of human society and the development of human social life. Concretely, culture is tool-making, institution-making, and value-making.[2] In its broadest sense, culture consists of behavior patterns socially acquired and socially transmitted by means of symbols.[3] There is nothing in the rest of nature to compare with the communication of behavior patterns by means of symbols in human groups; for we must be careful to exclude from our concept of culture those cases of natural reaction socially or sympathetically excited among animals, such as when the fright of one animal gives rise to fright in another. We have culture only when individuals *learn to modify* their conduct through

[2] In anthropological language a *tool* is any physical device which extends or increases the power of the body, such as implements, weapons, machines. An *institution* is a way of living established by custom or by recognized legal authority. "A *symbol* is a thing, the value or meaning of which is bestowed upon it by those who use it." (See L. A. White, "The Symbol: The Origin and Basis of Human Behavior" in *Philosophy of Science*, Oct. 1940.)

[3] Prof. C. M. Case has properly said that not *all* socially transmitted behavior patterns are a part of culture, which consists essentially in the external storage, interchange, and transmission of personal and social experience by means of language and other symbols,—a process entirely unknown on any level of life below the human. (*American Journal of Sociology*, XXXII, May, 1927, p. 906.)

understanding the meaning of what is communicated to them by other individuals through the use of symbols. Culture, therefore, depends upon the interchange of experiences, and so upon symbols or language in some form, though verbal language is itself the primary form of culture. Cultural evolution is the development of what is ordinarily called "civilization," that is to say, the development of knowledge, skills, standards, and values which are utilized in the creation of tools, institutions,[4] and human social behavior.

All human groups make use of symbols to express and communicate meanings. As no animal makes use of symbols, there is a qualitative difference between human behavior and animal behavior. The difference is one of kind and not merely one of degree; for the meaning of a symbol is bestowed by the group which uses it. Man creates the symbol and uses it to control his own behavior. This no animal group does, so far as we know.[5] Many animals learn—acquire skill, by experience; but if in the animal world any individual does acquire special knowledge or skill or superior control over his environment, he does not possess the ability to communicate these attainments to his fellow group members to any appreciable extent, because he lacks the power to use

[4] Judd in his *Psychology of Social Institutions* (1926) tries to make the term *institutions* cover the same content which anthropologists have covered by the word *culture*. For example, Judd says, "the word institution covers the fact that by combined effort men have produced tools" (p. 3). This use of the term *institution* is unfortunate, as in the social sciences generally it has long had a much narrower and a very definite connotation. See Hobhouse, *Social Development*, pp. 48–50.

[5] The attempts to prove that some animal groups possess the rudiments of culture must be considered thus far to have failed. The most notorious of these attempts is the one to prove that the anthropoid apes have the rudiments of verbal language. The reader will find a full report of the investigations and experiments upon this problem in Professor Yerkes' books, *Chimpanzee Intelligence and Its Vocal Expressions* and *The Great Apes*. The net result of Yerkes' experiments seems to prove that the apes possess only emotional cries, and not true verbal language, which expresses concepts or ideas. A comparative psychologist, Prof. C. J. Warden, says, "Culture cannot be reduced to bodily mechanisms." Hence he denies that culture is a mere elaboration of the bio-social order, but regards it as a true "emergent." (*The Emergence of Human Culture*, p. 23.)

symbols, especially verbal language. Hence, in the animal world such experience affects only the behavior of individuals. But in the human world inter-communication has developed into verbal language, so that one individual has the power to communicate his knowledge, skill, and inventions to the fellow members of his group. Thus the behavior of the whole group is affected; and hence it results that human social behavior is dependent upon man's superior power of inter-communication, primarily upon verbal language. The animal remains cultureless simply because he lacks this superior power of inter-communication.[6] Hence in human society we have a new order of phenonema, the cultural order and cultural development.

Moreover, in human groups knowledge, values, and standards, hence inventions and achievements, are objectively stored in verbal language and other symbols, and thus a social heritage is established which can increase from generation to generation. This we call the tradition of the group. There is no evidence of group traditions in the animal world below man. Man's power to make and use symbols to store up his experience and to convey his ideas thus makes for him a means of control over his social behavior, from tool-making to institution-making, which no animal possesses. Therefore, this power to make and use symbols is the differential factor in human social behavior. It is an artificial factor in the sense that it is humanly created, and it so modifies the working of all purely natural forces in human life that human societies can be understood only as products of culture. Moreover, since it is an accumulative factor, it becomes increasingly important as the development of human groups proceeds. Men more and more come to live in a world of ideas. Even the use of tools is guided by ideas and traditions, because for man a tool is not merely a material object, but it is also an idea. Animals may use tools, but such behavior with the animal is merely sensory and neuro-muscular, not conceptual and symbolic. In other words, it is not behavior controlled by imagination and insight.

The culture of every human group is accordingly the result of a continuing linguistic tradition which enables each generation to build cumulatively upon

[6] *Cf.* Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution*, 2nd. ed (1915) p. 461: "The essential difference between the animal and human intelligence is a difference due to the development of the means of inter-communication." (*Cf.* L. A. White, *op. cit.*, p. 453.)

the achievements of the past. Again it must be emphasized that there is nothing among the lower animals to compare with this inter-communication from one individual to another of ideas and values through the use of symbols, and so the transference of learned behavior from one generation to another or from one group to another. Different social traditions are unique in human groups because language is a unique human achievement. Man is the only "time-binding" animal, as Korzybski would say. Hence, culture is fundamentally a continuity on the subjective side—a continuity of experience; for what makes culture is inter-communication, or the ability to diffuse and preserve ideas and values. It is thus "an experience deposit."

While the ability to form concepts or ideas and to communicate these to others through the mechanism of language is the basis of cultural evolution, the development of culture takes place through a succession of inventions.[7] But invention, whether physical or social, is impossible, barring accidents, without the formation of a pattern in the mind. An invention which is not a mere accident must be imagined in thought before it is executed. Even if an invention is accidental, its future utility must be perceived imaginatively. Man makes over his world in imagination before he deliberately undertakes to make it over in reality. An invention is, therefore, fundamentally a pattern formed in the mind of some individual before it becomes a physical tool or a social adjustment. But such a mental pattern must be diffused by inter-communication before it becomes a part of the culture or achievement of a human group. All group culture is therefore *learned* by inter-communication with one's fellows. Every new adjustment or invention is learned by the experimentation and insight of one or more inventive individuals in the group. Then it is learned through some means of inter-communication, usually by

verbal language, by the group as a whole, and in this way it becomes a part of the culture of the group.

This is not to deny that patterns of behavior in human society are often communicated visually. Imitative action, or "doing what we see others do," is common among some of the brutes. Yerkes has demonstrated that the apes imitate readily. But *imitative action does not produce culture*, because symbolic language of some sort is necessary for the communication of concepts and values; and the diffusion of concepts and values makes culture.

Let us illustrate by the case of a simple stone tool. Somewhere in the distant past, in some primitive human group, an individual learned, by accident[8] or intelligent planning, to make such a stone tool. If he was intelligent enough to understand the method by which the tool was made, and possessed some form of language, he was able to communicate the method of making the tool to other individuals of his group. Soon all the group were making and using similar stone tools. Individuals of superior ability then improved the pattern of the tools which were being made, and communicated their methods to other individuals, and thus tools of superior pattern were diffused throughout the group. This process was continued through the ages, leading to the accumulation of knowledge of methods and the gradual development of stone tools, then to simple metal tools, and finally to the most complex of modern machines.

Thus we see that culture, whether it is tool-making, ritual-making, institution-making, or idea-making, is all a process of inter-learning and of

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[7] "Culture is a vast social complex of human inventions." (Wissler in *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*, p. 87.) According to Warden, the basic mechanisms of culture are: (a) invention, (b) communication, and (c) social habituation. No development of culture can take place if any part of this three-fold mechanism is absent. There must be invention because the very essence of culture is artifice as contrasted with nature; there must be communication, so that inventions may be diffused and become traditional. (*The Emergence of Human Culture*, pp. 21–22.)

[8] For the large part which accident plays in the making of inventions and the development of culture see later chapters dealing with the development of particular phases of culture. Accident undoubtedly is a very important factor in the development of culture, but it is important only because culture is developed by a learning process—only because men *learn* from accidents. As my colleague, Professor Howard E. Jensen, has well said: "It may be true that many of man's most important discoveries and inventions occurred by chance ... but it is often overlooked that the chance happened to a man, and to an unusual man at that. The same chance must have happened myriads of time to animals and other men with no cultural results until some man noticed it, abstracted the essential elements from the total occurrence, repeated them, and *taught* his fellows." (P. 344 of *Social Progress and Christian Ideals*, edited by W. P. King.)

inter-communication by means of symbols.[9] It is built up, to be sure, upon the natural endowments of man. Its foundations are laid in the life of the animals below man; but individual and social evolution has not gone far enough among the brutes actually to produce culture. The wonders of a hive of bees, a hill of ants, or a colony of beavers are truly "social," that is, they are produced by group life and involve "comradeship," or conscious inter-stimulation and response, but they are not "cultural." The organization achieved by such animal communities is not, so far as we know, on a cultural plane, but has been produced wholly by the action of purely organic factors, such as variation, heredity, and selection, with perhaps the addition of some slight amount of habituation. Thus social evolution in its beginning, that is, in animal groups, is dominated by the factors of organic evolution, and no new principle or direction is produced which results in a more or less independent evolutional series. Everything in animal group life remains quite rigidly determined by the organic necessities of nutrition, reproduction, and defense. The food process, the reproductive process, and defense against enemies are practically the only factors which need to be taken into consideration to understand the group life of the animals below man. Biological-geographical determinism will easily cover all of the facts of their social life.

As Professor Tozzer says,

The ants are social only in the biological sense. Their activities are indeed marvelous, their industry stupendous, but each movement is predestined by their organic constitution. They learn nothing new ... No influence of a non-organic nature is ever felt. Human society is of an entirely different order. Take a couple of any eggs of the right sex—unhatched eggs, freshly laid. Blot out every individual and every other egg of the species. Give the pair a little attention as regards warmth, moisture, protection, and food. The whole of ant "society," every one of the abilities, powers, accomplishments, and activities of the species, each "thought" that it has ever had, will be reproduced, and reproduced without diminution, in one generation.[10]

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[9] The term "inter-learning" was first introduced by Dr. G. Spiller in his work, *The Origin and Nature of Man* (pp. 98, 99 and chap. V), published in 1931. It is a happy term to express the psychological process involved in the diffusion and transmission of culture.

[10] Tozzer, *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, p. 13.

Professor Tozzer rightly concludes:

The social insects are a purely biological group, and nothing more; man is a biological group and something so much more that the purely physical is of comparatively little importance in his cultural life.[11]

In other words, man has developed a new type of social life, a type which is dominated by acquired habits, acquired intelligence, and acquired values; a type, in other words, which is dominated by culture. A mutation has taken place in social evolution, and human social evolution begins to be an evolution of culture. This has been admirably expressed by Professor Kroeber when he says:

One might compare the inception of civilization to the end of the process of slowly heating water. The expansion of the liquid goes on a long time. Its alteration can be observed by the thermometer as well as in bulk, in its solvent power, as well as in its internal agitation. But it remains water. Finally, however, the boiling point is attained. Steam is produced; the rate of enlargement of volume is increased a thousand fold; and in place of a glistening, percolating fluid, a volatile gas diffuses invisibly. Neither the laws of physics nor those of chemistry are violated; nature is not set aside; but yet a saltation has taken place.[12]

Thus cultural evolution is a product of social evolution and is a distinct phase of universal evolution.[13] Variation, heredity, and selection fur-

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[11] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[12] *American Anthropologist* (N.S.), XIX, 20 (April–June, 1917).

[13] Of the preparation in organic evolution for the coming of cultural evolution, Herrick strikingly remarks: "Somewhere in the history of primate evolution, during the course of progressive elaboration of the apparatus of cortical associations, sufficient complexity of tissue and plasticity of organization was attained to facilitate rapid learning, the retention of memories of single experiences and the abstraction from these of certain features common to all of them, and finally the integration of these common features into *symbolic* patterns. *Symbolic thinking is a new kind of function*, though the steps by which it was fashioned can probably be traced ...

"The revolutionary nature of the change in behavior patterns colligated with the appearance of *symbolic* thinking can hardly be exaggerated.

"*We have not the slightest evidence that these powers are possessed in any degree by any of the lowest mammals*, though we can see, very dimly, their sources and can trace some of the stages in their elaboration." (*Brains of Rats and Men*, pp. 350, 351.)

nish only its beginnings and foundations. In mankind a new type of social life has emerged, a type which is dominated by acquired habits, acquired intelligence, and acquired values, all largely based upon experience. Moreover, these are nearly all acquired socially, by men learning from one another, by inter-communication. The process of inter-communication assumes accordingly a significance in the social life of men, not perceptible in any subhuman group. Inter-learning becomes the basis for group behavior, for that stored-up experience of the group which we call culture. As this process is selective as well as accumulative, upon it are built not only the higher developments of human culture but all group culture whatsoever. It is what makes possible the diffusion of culture, and also its convergence through natural and rational selection. *Man is, therefore, not only an animal that lives by learning, but by collective learning.*

This collective learning, it may be well to recall and to re-emphasize, would be almost impossible without the use of verbal language to form a social tradition in the group.[14] Animal societies never accumulate what individual animals may learn, because they cannot communicate freely to one another and form a group tradition. Hence, human society *as human* began only when the first abstraction of the human brain was symbolized by vocal speech and communicated in a human group. Language is not only coeval with man, but from the beginning has been the chief means of his learning freely from his fellows, and so of his learning social adjustments within his group as well as adjustments to physical nature. Hence, mechanical invention is not the basis of culture, but the use of

symbols to communicate meanings and concepts. Human intelligence is social in its expression before it expresses itself mechanically. Human social life, accordingly, centers more about the use of symbols and the communication of ideas than it does about mechanical inventions and the use of physical tools.

All of these foundations for human cultural development were, of course, built up on the natural endowments of man. These natural endowments came to man through his organic evolution. In the animals below man the neural and mental development of the individual did not go far enough to make very definite forms of inter-communication and inter-learning possible.[15] In other words, individual development in the world of life below man did not go far enough to produce culture. But in mankind higher neural and mental development has made possible verbal language, tool-making, institution-making, custom, morals, religion, art, science. No animal species developed any of these. It is a mistake to consider any of these instruments or forms of culture as late developments in human social evolution. They have all characterized human social life from the beginning. They must be ascribed, therefore, to the endowments produced by organic evolution which created man. Hence, from the standpoint of evolution, culture presents itself as a mutation, and as the differential factor which must always be used to explain scientifically distinctive human social developments.

It would, of course, be wrong to claim that pre-cultural and non-cultural elements are not present in the social life of man. Human groups are not only the carriers of culture, but also the medium

[14] In 1917 Dr. T. J. McCormack, in a striking article entitled, "In the Beginning Was the Word," (published in *School and Home Education*, September, 1918) said of verbal language: "In its widest sense as a tangible, intelligible symbol enveloping and carrying the abstract concept, it is man's dominant intellectual tool, man's distinctive and characteristic mechanism for the comprehension and control of life and nature. Not only does it transcend infinitely the reach and the power of the physical tool for the direction of the mind and the reconstruction of nature and society, but also it embraces and includes by its very essence the functions of the physical tool, and hence is primal and typical in its (cultural) significance." In the same spirit, Judd (*op. cit.*, p. 187) said in 1929: "All inventions, except possibly the most primitive tools, imply the existence of a fairly well-developed language."

[15] As a student of comparative psychology, C. J. Warden says: "There is no reason to believe that any mammal possesses the means of communicating new patterns of thought and action to his group. . . . The societal patterns of mammalian life are purely bio-social in character. These patterns are phylogenetic in origin and rest upon hereditary mechanisms. Doubtless practice plays an important role in the more complex patterns of behavior in the young. In the monkeys and apes, this process may be furthered by imitation and related forms of social facilitation. There is no reason to believe, however, that inventions are socialized and passed on to the young by social habituations. The lack of an effective means of communication within the group would seem to exclude the possibility of a *tradition* of any sort." (*Op. cit.*, pp. 63, 66, 67.)

in which culture develops and has its being. Accordingly there are certain conditions of human groups and certain laws of human behavior within which the cultural process goes on. These conditions and laws are universal and hence are not created by culture, but are the basis of culture. Such, for example, is the fact of communication among the members of a human group. Communication is the vehicle of culture, but, as it exists in undeveloped forms below the human level, it is manifestly not a part of culture, but a social fact which underlies culture. But in human groups the chief form of communication is verbal language, which is a product as well as a vehicle of culture.

Again, cooperation and the division of labor, which are so important in all human groups, are also present in animal communities and cannot be considered purely products of culture, although they are indefinitely modified by culture. Human creativeness itself is not a product of culture, even though it is stimulated and directed by it.[16] Anything which is plainly evident in the association of animals below man must be considered non-cultural. Many of the facts connected with birth, death, the growth of population, race, food, geographic environment, and natural selection in human society, are important social facts, but they are primarily non-cultural, though all are capable of being greatly modified by culture.[17] We might take as a final example family life and sex relations among human beings. In themselves these are not cultural facts, since similar conditions are found in the animals below man. In all human groups, however, they have become profoundly modified by culture, and hence the exact form of family life and sex relationship which we find in a

given group is always a product of the culture of the group, even though the family is the most biological of all human institutions.

We may recognize that the biological constitutes the foundation upon which the cultural superstructure is built, even though the cultural cannot be reduced to the biological. Biologically determined innate propensities, or instinctive tendencies, should not be denied, but they do not explain the forms of human social life. Their expression is ordinarily determined by the culture of the group. It may be that at times these are evident in the human social process, and under conditions of exceptional emotional excitement or stimulation of the animal impulses, we are perhaps justified in ascribing a large role to man's native propensities. But these animal-like phases of human social behavior are exceptional in times of peace and are most in evidence in the lower or abnormal stages of cultural development. A psychologist like Warden is justified in concluding that "the whole pattern of human life, from the cradle to the grave, is cast in a cultural mold from which there is no escape. The specific pattern varies widely from tribe to tribe, but the process itself is universal."[18]

Moreover, it is well to remember that native propensities are in themselves static, while the human social process is dynamic and constantly changing. This criticism applies also to all theories which ascribe a large role to purely geographical, ecological, or other physical factors in the human social process. These also are static, and we have every reason to believe are increasingly controlled by cultural factors. For example, it is impossible to deny that culture is conditioned by geographical factors. They not only furnish materials for physical tools, but stimuli for cultural development in certain directions, and limitations upon cultural development in other directions. Materialistic interpretations of cultural development, if limited to such problems, are of course to be welcomed. But for the most part, such interpretations mark only the beginning of a scientific understanding of human social behavior.

We must conclude, therefore, that even the most elementary forms of human association are modified by culture, and that culture itself is a primary fact for the understanding of human social life. It may be asserted that there are forms of human interaction or association which are not modified by

[16] See Alexander Goldenweiser's *Anthropology*, chap. VIII. Among American anthropologists, Goldenweiser has especially emphasized the importance of the creative individual as a factor in culture. See his striking statement in the *American Anthropologist*, XIX, 447: "The civilization stream is not merely carried, but is also unrelentingly fed by its component individuals." Wissler also says in *Recent Developments in the Social Sciences*, p. 87: "The inventive process resides in individual organisms; so far as we know it is a function of the individual organism."

[17] It is hardly necessary to point out that it is these non-cultural social facts which form the "stock in trade" of many economists and other social scientists who wish to assimilate the social sciences to the "natural sciences."

[18] *Op. cit.*, p. 8.

culture. But we find that human groups of every kind follow the general pattern laid down by their culture; and hence even the most elementary forms of human social interaction vary in different civilizations. If this is so, then the concrete forms and processes of human society are *learned* and not transmitted in a purely natural way. *They are all learned adjustments* and hence they vary from group to group and from age to age, within the limits, of course, set by human nature and other natural conditions. All measurements of human social behavior and tendencies are bound, therefore, to vary with time and place. They vary because cultural development, and so human social development, proceeds through learning processes. All qualitative reasoning regarding human social behavior must also start from this fact if it is to be scientifically valid. It is necessary at the very beginning in the social sciences, therefore, to recognize the *difference between the natural and the cultural.*

It is also necessary to emphasize that the development and transmission of culture through the use of symbols necessarily involves subjective or mental processes.[19] Mere continuity of habits in a group does not result in culture. The essential factor is the building of a group tradition through inter-communication. Anthropologists and sociologists have been somewhat divided on the question of whether, in the transmission of culture, the relatively unconscious element of habit, or custom, should be emphasized or the relatively conscious element of communication and tradition. These two terms, custom and tradition, express roughly the objective and subjective aspects of culture. Those social scientists who would emphasize custom usually regard custom as the more or less unconscious growths from habit. It is true, of course, that there is a large element of unconscious habituation in human societies; but it is also true that most human social habits, or customs, would lose their meaning unless supported by group traditions. If we regard tradition as the term which covers the handing down of knowledge, ideas, beliefs, sentiments and values, by verbal language and other symbols, then to all thinkers except extreme behaviorists, these ele-

ments in culture play the essential part. Professor R. H. Lowie, anthropologist, does not hesitate to say that by culture he means "the whole of social tradition"; while Professor Clark Wissler, another anthropologist, asserts that culture "is a core of ideas and beliefs," and even that "language plays the fundamental role in all human social phenomena."

According to this view, in human social life it is tradition which plays the main part. Tradition and custom go together, but in human interactions, it is tradition in the sense of knowledge, ideas, beliefs, sentiments and values which sustains and maintains custom, even if it is not always responsible for its origin. By inter-learning, as Dr. Spiller says, knowledge, ideas and values are diffused throughout a group and control social behavior. Therefore, we find in all peoples group traditions controlling the forms of the family, of industry, of government and law, of art, of morals, of science and philosophy, and of religion. Tradition thus sums up the subjective side of culture, and the growing tradition of a group has been frequently compared with the growing mind of the individual. If we mean by "mind" nothing more than the sum of mental processes, and if we consider tradition as a process rather than a content, tradition is, indeed, a sort of objective mind, stored up in the language and other symbols of the group by which all the members of the group ordinarily guide their behavior.

We come, therefore, to the conclusion that group tradition is the fundamental and primary element in human group behavior.[20] Any attempt to understand human social life without reference to this fundamental element in group culture is a scientific error. But the development of group tradition is dominantly a psychological process. The social behavior and social adjustments which result from the group tradition vary according to what is thought and what is learned. It would seem that inasmuch as the social traditions of groups may vary indefinitely, the social behavior and social adjustments in human groups might likewise so vary and that there could be, and would be, no monotypical evolution of culture.

[19] "It is continuity, on the subjective side rather than on the objective, that is essential." (L. A. White, "On the Use of Tools by Primates," in *The Journal of Comparative Psychology*, 34, No. 3, p. 374.)

[20] *Cf.* the writer's paper on "Culture As An Elementary Factor in Human Social Life," presented to the International Congress of Sociology, held in Brussels, Belgium, August, 1935, and published in the autumn number of *Social Science*, 1935.

That this is substantially correct is evidenced by the fact that we find all sorts of cultures living under approximately the same external conditions. We find, for example, warlike and non-warlike, autocratic and democratic, polygynous and monogamous, human societies with practically the same biological and geographical conditions. All analogies between organic evolution and cultural evolution are, therefore, superficial and misleading. It is probably for this reason that many anthropologists have wished to dispense with the term evolution altogether, and it must be admitted that its use has led to many errors in the social sciences. Organic evolution proceeds by the automatic processes of variation, heredity, and selection. Cultural development, on the other hand, proceeds by invention, by the diffusion of inventions, by means of communication, and by the "traditionalization" of the processes involved in the making and the use of inventions. Thus the process of cultural development is one of diffusion of knowledge, ideas, sentiments and values by inter-learning and inter-communication, and results in collective learning and collective adjustments.

It follows from what has just been said that if everything cultural has to be learned or acquired by individuals, there may, under certain conditions, be great leaps in cultural acquirements. Thus a child born in a savage society where only the simplest stone tools are used may, if removed and brought up in a highly civilized group, learn the use of the most complicated machines and indeed acquire the whole culture of his adopted group, including all of its traditions. For the child's ability to learn and utilize culture depends only upon normal human capacity. There is no evidence that any specific ability to assimilate and utilize a culture is born in any child. Neither does a child in acquiring a high culture have to pass through all the stages by which that culture was reached. As in the example just cited, any child afforded the proper environment may begin at once to learn the highest culture which man has achieved. It would seem, therefore, that there are no steps in the development of culture, and hence that the term cultural evolution is a misnomer. A more correct conclusion, however, would be, *culture evolves by laws of its own, and it is only indirectly affected by the laws of organic evolution.*

But we have already stated that the develop-ment of culture is essentially a learning process. If this is so, *there are inevitable stages of learning, of achieving control, since there are psychological stages in the process of learning.* For example, hardly anyone would dispute that a pre-literate stage of culture must precede the literate stage; or that the making of graphic symbols of objects or ideas must preceded the development of written language. Again, there is hardly any doubt that the development of physical tools followed a fixed pattern which involved step-by-step learning. All the evidence seems to show that man first fashioned tools of wood, shell, and bone; then he learned how to make chipped stone tools, with step-by-step improvements, out of the few kinds of stone that would easily chip; then he learned to make polished stone tools out of many kinds of stone; then finally he learned the very difficult process of smelting ores to make metal tools of many kinds. If some one should argue that this learning pattern would be destroyed on a planet where no stone that would chip existed, such criticism would show complete misunderstanding of the theory that human culture develops through human learning; for all learning is conditioned by both outer and inner factors.

It follows that cultural evolution is controlled not only by the nature of the processes of learning and invention, but also is conditioned by the materials and the physical environment which nature affords. The mistake of many students of cultural evolution in the nineteenth century was to suppose that there was just one typical line of concrete development in culture. But the advance of anthropological science, studying the cultures of the peoples of the world, has left this idea without any standing. We must recognize at the very beginning that *in human history there has been no single line in the evolution of cultures.* On the contrary, there have been many divergent evolutions in culture. To use a common figure, the cultures of the peoples of the world have diverged much like the fingers of the hand. They can be said to have a common goal, to continue the figure, only as the nails on the fingers of the hand may be said to represent a common goal.

But the matter is not so simple as the above statement implies. There is also the possibility of the convergence of cultures through the action of rational and natural selection. All cultures are selective as well as accumulative, because all cultures aim at some sort of control over life-processes

and conditions. While it is true that cultures develop by trial and error[21] methods, yet learning by tested experience and by the use of scientific methods is bound to produce convergence in the existing cultures of the world. This is shown particularly in the realm of material culture; but it is bound in time to have a similar effect in the realms of government and law, scientific knowledge, morals, education, and even religion. Our world is too small to have more than one fundamental material civilization; and if a longer period of time is allowed for its development, the same is true of our non-material culture. The very development of culture through learning processes, no matter how many errors may be made in attempts at adjustment, implies therefore an increasing intelligent control of culture in the development of human social life. Cultural evolution, as the human phase of social evolution, is not free to take any development which man's fancy may dictate. It must develop within the bounds set by group efficiency and survival. To this extent cultural evolution is controlled by organic evolution on the one hand and by social evolution on the other. It is a process which goes on within the framework of these two antecedent evolutions. A culture which oversteps these bounds is just as liable to be eliminated in the competition of life as a species of plant or animal unadapted to its environment is liable to be eliminated by natural selection. Nevertheless, since culture develops in groups largely through trial and error learning, errors in cultural development are very common, and their elimination by means of natural selection is relatively rare, at least within recorded human history. Errors in culture, if corrected at all, are usually corrected by the increase of intelligence in the group, that is, by the further development of culture itself. These matters can be made plain, however, only by considering the detailed facts of culture history.

If culture dominates the social life of man and if culture includes the whole mass of social behavior which men learn from the fellow members of their groups, then our conclusion must be that cultural anthropology is fundamental to all the other social sciences. This is not denying that all the social sciences have a biological and a psychological background. It is only to assert that all studies of human social behavior, whether they are called

history, economics, politics, or sociology, can develop as sciences only through the understanding of the processes of cultural development. This holds for economics and politics not less than for sociology. All of these studies are sciences of culture, not of nature. It may, indeed, at times be difficult to distinguish these sciences from cultural anthropology, the fundamental science of culture. It is especially difficult to make any sharp line between cultural anthropology and sociology, seeing that both sciences have claimed all of human social behavior as their fields. Traditionally, cultural anthropology has occupied itself with the culture of pre-literate peoples, those without historical records, especially with so-called "savages." This was due to its desire to understand all of culture, which, it was felt, would be possible only through understanding social origins and early development. Sociologists, on the other hand, have concerned themselves more with the customs, institutions, and social behavior of present civilized peoples. But the problems in these two fields manifestly overlap. Moreover, if cultural anthropology deals with the total culture of man, as many anthropologists are now claiming, no logical separation of these two disciplines is possible. It is probably for this reason that Huxley and Haddon say that anthropology "has become continuous with Sociology which discusses the social evolution of man"[22] and that Professor Kimball Young said in 1934: "Doubtless in time cultural anthropology and sociology will be united in one common discipline."[23] At any rate, it is safe to conclude that here, as so often, we have merely a division of labor between scientific students rather than a logical separation of scientific fields.

If the development of culture dominates all of human societies, then the evolution of all forms of human social behavior must be studied *historically* in order to understand these forms scientifically; for the processes of human history are dominantly processes of the development of culture. The historical method of study of such processes becomes the primary method, especially comparative history. But, on the other hand, we must remember that all culture is a product of the human mind. Back of all historical interpretation, therefore, must be the method of psychological analysis, because every bit of culture has been produced by the human mind to control social con-

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[21] "Error" is used in a relative sense; in the sense in which it is used in the scientific expression "trial and error."

[22] *We Europeans*, p. 34.

[23] *An Introductory Sociology*, p. XIV.

ditions and behavior. Culture, accordingly, is *an historico-psychological product*. So, also, is every tradition, every custom, and every institution. There is no need, therefore, of any conflict between the historical and functional methods of studying culture. Both are necessary if there is to be any scientific understanding.

On the other hand, the methods of experiment and of exact measurement employed in the natural sciences give little promise in the study of cultural development. Anyone who thoroughly understands the relativity of all cultural and social forms to processes of learning and environmental conditions would hardly argue that quantitative measurements can do much more in the study of culture than help us to determine tendencies of various phases of culture at a given time and place. However, many things in human life can be studied only as tendencies. We can record facts here and there, over perhaps long periods of time, and thus get the direction of movements, even though we cannot observe their beginnings or their ends. This study of trends, or tendencies, in culture is surely a legitimate study in both cultural anthropology and in sociology and constitutes one of the most interesting phases of those sciences; for the development of the culture of any human group will largely determine the direction of its social evolution.

The development of culture is, accordingly, not only the differential trait of human society; but as it is the human phase of social evolution, it is the controlling factor in the development and in most of the behavior of human groups. On the practical side, moreover, the social sciences as sciences of social adjustment will no longer study human society as if it were a machine of the gods which we can only describe but not control. For if social forms and institutions have been made by culture, they have been made by man, and the human sciences will show how they can be modified by man to human advantage.

REGIONALISM AND PERMANENT PEACE

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REGIONAL theory offers a practical means whereby the peace for which we are now fighting may be made both just and permanent. That, in the fewest possible words, is the thesis this paper will attempt to support.

It must be added at once, however, that regional principles may be used to achieve a just and permanent peace only if they are implemented by men of detailed knowledge and broad understanding from such fields as anthropology, economics, geography, history, political science, and sociology working in closest collaboration with statesmen who are more interested in setting up a stable world organization than in securing immediate advantages for their own particular classes, races, or nations. That this will be done is, of course, a dubious assumption. But to argue that it will not be done is not to demonstrate that it cannot be done. Indeed, to judge by the frequency with which regionalism is invoked in the already abundant literature of peace planning, it seems very probable that some sincere efforts will be made to use this idea. If these efforts are to be successful they must result in the extension of democracy to the sphere of relationships between nations; a situation in which the widest divergencies are permitted—even encouraged—so long as they do not vitiate fundamental principles which are agreed upon as minimum essentials of a stable social order. This, it is submitted, is the middle way which escapes the dangers of rampant imperialism on the one hand and of chaotic anarchy born of the principle of absolute national sovereignty on the other. And this, also, is the essence of regional theory.

Recently Joyce O. Hertzler[1] has summarized what to his mind appear to be the basic requirements for peace in a less-than-global area:

I. *Peace in an area, whatever its size, is a matter of order and security.*
II. *Order* and security rest upon some final authority armed with *coercive power*.

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[1] "Some Basic Sociological Postulates Underlying World Organization and Peace," *Social Forces*, XXII (December, 1943), 125.

III. *Authority* functions through a *minimal amount of essential social machinery*, a framework of organizations and institutions.

IV. The *effectiveness of the machinery* rests upon a substantial *supporting opinion and will*.

While Professor Hertzler limits his formulation to areas of less than global extent, the present writer would argue that if they are sound on that basis—and I believe them to be sound—they will also apply to world-wide situations. That is, sound social theory stated in terms of fundamentals is not limited in its applicability to one particular time or place. But this is not to argue that consideration of time and place are not essential to sound social theory, as will be made clear later.

Presumably Professor Hertzler did not formulate these postulates in terms of regional theory. But had he done so he hardly could have achieved a statement more exactly in accord with the principles of regionalism as they have been stated by recognized writers in the field.

Regionalism as it has evolved through the contributions of many scholars from many fields, holds that security can be achieved only through order and that order is attained only through recognizing regions of whatever size and for whatever purpose as being parts of integrated wholes. This in turn leads to the premise that the whole is superior to the part and thus has authority over the part. But regional theory also stresses the strength to be attained through diversity and therefore emphasizes the minimal nature of the restrictions to be imposed by the whole. Finally, since regionalism is based squarely on the concept of the folk it follows as a matter of course that such an arrangement will automatically secure a maximum of supporting opinion and will. The folk are seen as bearers of the basic culture, as the widest extension of the primary group; and therefore as the antithesis of the coercive, over-organized, and over-institutionalized totalitarianism which has upset the peace of the world.

Regionalism sees the differing areas always from the point of view of the whole; in the past we have looked at the world from the point of view of the nations. On the world scale, there is a strict analogy between chauvinistic and militaristic nationalism, on the one hand, and sectionalism on the intranational level, on the other. Hence it may be well to repeat here the distinctions between regionalism and sectionalism as set forth elsewhere

and to apply them to the international world scene.

In the first place, we have pointed out, regionalism envisages the nation [or world] first, making the national [international] culture and welfare the final arbiter. It is, therefore, essentially a co-operative concern. On the other hand, sectionalism [chauvinism] sees the region first and the nation [world] afterwards. In the second place sectionalism emphasizes the autonomy inherent in political boundaries and state sovereignties. It emphasizes technical legislation, provincial interests, local loyalties. Over against the co-operating group of states region it sets up a confederation of states "with common interests menaced by federal [international] action." Where sectionalism features separateness, regionalism connotes component and constituent parts of the larger national [international] culture. Another way to look at sectionalism is to liken it to cultural inbreeding, whereas regionalism is line-breeding. The most common illustration of this terminology is probably found in the criticism of educational institutions for too much "inbreeding," that is, utilizing their own graduates almost exclusively. [Of perhaps more immediate application here, chauvinistic nationalism would insist that whatever is *of* a particular region or nation is, because of that fact, *better*. Regionalism would insist that the good qualities of a culture be preserved, but also that they be amplified and added to by judicious cross fertilization with other cultures.]

Inherent in the new concept and practice, by the very nature of its regional, interregional and national co-operative processes, in the fourth place, is the implication of more of the designed and planned society in regionalism than in sectionalism, which is the group respondent to individualism. Finally, one of the most critical aspects of sectionalism is that it must have its counterpart in a potential and, in the full flowering of its development, an inevitable coercive federalism [world-wide super-state] which is contrary to the stated ideals of American [or international] democracy.[2]

It may well be that the time has arrived when we should expand to international scope the judgment of Woodrow Wilson who led us to victory in the first phase of this conflict and who saw the hopes of the world for permanent peace dashed when sectionalistic nationalism subbornly refused to accept the responsibility it had incurred. "Any man," said Wilson, "who revives the issue of sectionalism in this country [in our time?]

[2] Howard W. Odum and Harry Estill Moore, *American Regionalism* (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938), pp. 42–43.

is unworthy of the government of the nation; he shows himself a provincial; he shows that he himself does not know the various sections of his own country; he shows that he has shut his heart up in a little province and that those who do not see the special interests of that province are to him sectional, while he alone is national. That is the depth of unpatriotic feeling."[3]

From the time of Polybius social theorists have pointed out the mutual interdependence of those portions of the world which are in direct communication with each other. At least since the appearance of Graham Wallas' *Great Society*, composed of a constellation of distinct but interrelated units, this concept has been accepted by social scientists generally. Perhaps out of the travail of the present world-wide conflagration we shall be persuaded to implement this theory. At the very least never again will it be possible for any informed person to fail to realize that there are no parts of the world, even tiny atolls of the South Seas, which are not important to the peaceful organization of the world society.

If it be true that we *are* now members of a world society,—for better or for worse makes little difference,—then it would seem to be imperative policy to recognize that fact and to adopt a cooperative attitude as regards our fellow-members. We have tried the conflict-competition pattern for century after century, always to find ourselves back again at the suicidal business of warfare.

We have featured separateness and national sovereignty and autonomy with little success. Might it not be possible that becoming component and constituent parts of a world order offers sufficient hope of success to deserve a sincere trial?

Becoming such a part of a world order does not mean giving up those distinctive characteristics which we prize so dearly. Every other region also has its own set of distinctive culture traits which it is equally anxious to preserve. And just as the only possible way to defend our right of free speech is to guarantee such a right to others, so the only way to preserve our distinctiveness is to guarantee to others that we will not impose our culture upon them. But just as social organization inevitably means the curbing of rank egotism, so does international order inevitably mean the curbing of nationalistic arrogance—on our own part as well

as on the part of the other fellow. The concept of order is unthinkable without reference to some higher, ordering power or principle. Thus national anarchy and selfish imperialism both create situations in which stable peace is impossible. In between lies the path of both wisdom and expediency. This middle pathway would mean, in practice, that there would need to be some force stronger than any of the constituent parts. As Hertzler has pointed out, order and security rest upon some final authority armed with coercive force.[4] This would probably mean the erection of some international institution which would, in critical situations, be able to supersede in authority the national-state government; and which would be amply able to enforce its dictates. In other times, following the regional principle of diversity, such force would not be used.

If it be objected that such an international organization would mean impairment of national sovereignty, it need only be recalled what every statesman has known for generations; that no nation is free, actually, to pursue its own course with no regard for other nations. The whole body of international law is acknowledgment of that fact and of our desire for an effective curb on such unsocial conduct. The only addition such an organization would require would be the addition of a referee to see that the rules of the game were observed.

In this way our distinctive qualities would not be imperiled; on the contrary they would be encouraged to develop to their fullest power and beauty so that they might form more useful or attractive elements which might be grafted onto the line-bred culture of other regions. Always the region would have the option of accepting or rejecting a particular culture trait, material or nonmaterial, according to whether or not it would fit onto the parent stock and whether or not it would add to the desirable qualities of that stock.

This, of course, also means more planning and more design in our international affairs. Or, better put, it means a guarantee that plans will not be knocked awry by the unpredictable and uncontrollable activity of some other nation. Actually, of course, our diplomats have been as busy planning the future of our nations as have our business men. The principal difference would seem to be that diplomats have failed wo work out any international arrangement nearly so effective

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[3] Quoted by Howard W. Odum in *Southern Regions of the United States*, 3d printing (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943), p. 257.

[4] Letter dated March 26, 1943.

as some of the international cartels set up and operated by the business men.

But it is very easy to over-emphasize the coercive function of such an international organization. Actually it is chauvinistic nationalism, not regional cooperation, which leaves us only the choice between rigid authority imposed from without and world conflict which destroys the things we have struggled for through centuries and threatens to engulf our society wholly and precipitate us into another dark ages. Either fate is frightening; but neither is necessary. Where overweening nationalism leads in practice to dictatorship which ignores geographic, economic, and cultural differences through which societies fit themselves into the areas they occupy, and so, into the world matrix, and thus leads inevitably to excessive coercion and regimentation, regionalism leads to a decentralized, but united, administration which preserves the unique possibilities of differing regions and thereby benefits the whole. The regional principle is that of union, but not uniformity. In our own nation it is evident that much of our strength has come from the diversity of the regional population stocks, patterns of economic organization, social systems, and philosophies of life. These divergencies have been the basis of social experimentation and have actuated a healthy interchange of practices and ideas. Thus we have been able to secure benefits of trial and error processes while minimizing the risk and cost of such procedure.

Given the fact of mutual interdependence between nations and regions, it may be pointed out that some areas have become dominant because of their possession of certain natural recourses and philosophies which are absent in other regions. This is of course true and there is nothing in regional theory which objects to this situation so long as it does not impair the efficiency of the whole. Because of the presence or absence of such factors, there are and will continue to be dominant and colonial regions tied together through a division of labor which may benefit all. The very fact of dominance and of colonial status is itself evidence of strong ties of interdependence. And this set of relationships has created a situation in which autonomy is a somewhat ridiculous, no matter how beautiful, dream. These regions form part of an integral whole, whether this fact is recognized in any formal organization or not; the lack of formal recognition merely means that the colonial region is effectively denied the measure of

influence it would exert if such organization were formalized. Conversely, the welfare of the whole is inevitably tied up with that of the component regions.

The plight of Europe furnishes poignant proof of the necessity of regional integration, on the one hand, and the impossibility of creating absolute uniformity on the other. The fate of Vienna under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, which cut off this metropolis from its hinterland in the Balkans, is a more recent analogue to what happened to Constantinople under similar treatment centuries before. The fate of Italy is a fine example of the force of isolation. These cities and the nations they represent are dependent for their very life upon access to the products of other regions. It is clear that our political boundaries have been placed in accordance with principles which do not make possible autonomous existence.

At the same time these states have become the focus of traditions and other social values which make their destruction impossible. The history of the Czechs and the Poles who kept alive and fiercely burning sentiments of nationalism through centuries of political domination, the persistence of regional awareness and a determination to give expression to that feeling in Spain, in France, and in Ireland all indicate the futility of any attempt to create absolute uniformity. During the present war the multitude of reports of almost incredible opposition to the conqueror on the part of the patriots of occupied countries makes it appear highly doubtful whether even with absolute external military victory such areas could be held without incessant struggle. The problem, then, becomes one of balance between these two forces. This was expressed on the intranational level some years ago:

The states we have with us always. They are the warp and the woof of the federal fabric. They are the multiples of a cumulative nation. . . . They are articulate individualities, jealous of their rights, prideful of their heritage, conscious of their autonomy. . . . Yet the Federation of States, with its inevitable increasing range of power in an expanding and complex urban industrial America [world?] we have equally and increasingly with us, constantly revivifying the problem of balance between central and local control in democratic society. It must be clear that the old state sufficiency and states' rights can no longer be effective; no more can the complete dominance of central power.

Hence, logically, comes this buffer of regional arrangements to seek equilibrium between centralization of

power and the doctrine and practice of states rights, both of which still retain great vitality in the American order. . . . Not only, however, is the theory of the state and local control a part of the American system, but it inheres in the social objectives of democracy to develop, conserve and give representation to each demotic unit of culture. It is a part of the doctrine of equality which applies to local group units as well as to individuals.[5]

That Odum would agree to the extension of this statement to a world-wide rather than national area is indicated in one of his latest discussions:

The major sociological implications of regionalism are found in the study of regional societies as component and constituent units of total society and in the consequent programs of regional balance and interaction processes. This application of regionalism may be made with equal scientific accuracy to a total national or continental society with its delineated regions and the synthesis of their culture into the total integrated society or to world society, with its regional delineations and programs for world planning.[6]

The practical problem, then, becomes one of uniting the traditional folk elements with the necessary agreement on fundamental principles which may not be violated with impunity. It is submitted that only through making the widest allowances for perpetuation of folk values, only through the practice of wise compromise and wide tolerance, can this task be effected. Most of us demand some tangible unit to which we can attach our loyalties; for which we are willing to make the sacrifices which order demands. As yet few if any of us can give such attachment to the ideal of internationalism. To destroy the visible symbols of our nationality, if not of our nation, would be to leave us adrift. The region, as the focus and the expression of our own ways of life, is an essential to our sense of social well-being; and probably will continue to play that role for decades or centuries. It is the only sound basis for a supporting public opinion and the will to join in international enterprises on which we may call with any certainty of favorable response.

Thus the problem of a permanent peace becomes one of conserving and utilizing existing loyalties while avoiding the pitfalls of rampant nationalism and imperialism. No attempt is here made to present a blueprint in terms of which this task

might be accomplished. Drawing such a blueprint is a task for collaboration of learned men from the various social science with statesmen, who are much more than mere politicians. It would be presumptuous indeed for me to essay such a feat. Yet there are some guideposts which may be pointed out for the consideration of those who may be called upon to make the attempt.

It is not entirely coincidental, I am sure, that the four great nations now leading the fight against totalitarianism are all patterned more or less closely on the regional line. They are all unions of diverse elements. In each these diversities are recognized and tolerated, if not always encouraged. In each the principle of allowing the maximum of autonomy consistent with effective federal action has been given formal acquiesence and has found a considerable tolerance in practice. Since these nations represent widely differing geographic, historical, ethnic, religious, and political conditions, their experience would seem to indicate that the principle common to them might well be expected to work in other areas with still other conditions.

There are fairly well established and recognized major regions into which the surface of the earth is customarily divided. There also exist experimental works on the indices with which regions may be mapped with a fair degree of accuracy. Both of these facts might be used effectively by the peace planners.

There is, of course, danger that these regions will be delimited and administered in accordance with the older principle of balance of power: that the peace planners will attempt to erect a series of superstates of approximately equal strength. But this would be a direct contradiction of the fundamental tenet of regionalism; that the region must always be seen as part of a more inclusive whole. And it is this principle which makes of not too great importance the sizes of the various regions. In crowded continents, as in Europe, regional administrative units would undoubtedly be smaller than in sparsely inhabited areas, such as Australia. The criterion is not that of autonomy, but that of cultural homogeneity; so that size and strength are matters of not too great import.

The simple truth is that there is no fool-proof way in which we may insure a permanent peace. Certainly the application of regional theory would be fraught with grave difficulties. But with the experience of the United Nations as a basis these difficulties ought not to be insuperable to men of good will—plus wisdom.

[5] Odum and Moore, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-243.
[6] Howard W. Odum, "Sociology in the Contemporary World of Today and Tomorrow," *Social Forces*, XXI (May, 1943), 393.

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR ON THE SOUTH AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POSTWAR DEVELOPMENTS*

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FOR over two years now America has been at war. During those two years the nation has moved forward so fast and on so many fronts that the impossible has become commonplace. Nowhere has the impact of war been felt more drastically than in the South. Due to conditions arising out of the war, the South has undergone more economic changes in two years than in any previous fifty.

What have been the results of war on the South and its people? On the one hand the results have been highly beneficial. The South has been more prosperous than she has ever been before. Employment is at an all-time high. Salaries and wages are at an unprecedentedly high level. Everybody who wants to work has a job and is able to take home more dollars a week to increase his purchasing power and living standards. In 1940 about 5,025,500 workers were employed in the States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The upsurge of war industries caused that figure to grow to an estimated 5,515,000 at the beginning of 1944, with about 1,500,000 engaged in direct war work.

By the same token, unemployment is at an all-time low, having decreased in this region from 626,000 in 1940 to 80,000 at the present time. This number is composed principally of people in the process of moving from one job to another, and unemployables due to age and severe physical handicaps.

The South's income is higher than ever before, total wage disbursements having gone to $738,-500,977 in the second quarter of 1943, as compared with $308,923,727 in the corresponding quarter of 1940, representing an increase of 139 percent. During the same period the average weekly wage increased from $18.60 to $30.73.

These figures, compiled by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, omit the smallest concerns but constitute approximately an 80 percent sample of all non-agricultural employment in business and industry. The second quarter of 1940 was used as a base for comparative figures, since this was the last period prior to the defense emergency and reflects the average wage as it had been for a year or more past.

One of the reasons for the average worker's increase in per capita income is that he had been constantly employed at long hours and receiving, in many cases, extra overtime pay. Another reason is the establishment of new war industries which, as a rule, employ larger proportions of skilled labor and pay higher wages than the prewar industries of the South. It must be considered, too, that the industries most responsible for the upward trend in wage averages—such industries as shipbuilding, aircraft and munitions—are the ones most evidently slated for postwar declines.

The whole story of the effect of the war on business and industry in the South cannot be fully told until it becomes history, and facts and figures are no longer military secrets. In round figures, however, war supply and facility contracts (prime contracts over $50,000) aggregating $7,046,109,000 have been let in the States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee from the beginning of the war through December 31, 1943. To refute the suggestion advanced from some quarters that the end of the war is in sight, the $6,232,000 worth of prime war supply contracts let in these same States during one week in February, 1944 (February 9 to 16) will furnish some idea of the enormous war activity still in progress. The industries that account for the greatest number of these contracts are iron and steel, textiles, munitions and chemicals.

At first glance, these factors appear as bright prospects, but there is ample cause for anxiety lest this war-inspired prosperity prove only temporary. For while industrial activity and facilities have increased tremendously, there will be great difficulty in maintaining these gains after the war. When the shooting is over the plants responsible for the current boom will shut down entirely, or production will be sharply curtailed. And a glance at the record shows there is heavy concentration of this

type of industry and activity. The South is packed with Army camps, and shipbuilding, airplane and munitions plants further account for much of our industrial development. None of these offers a rosy future as a peacetime investment.

So far as the present industrial situation is concerned, the figures speak for themselves. An analysis of the South's quota of $7,046,109,000 in war contracts, mentioned earlier, is revealing. This amount represents only 4.3 percent of the national total of supply and facility contracts, but is *16.1* percent of the Nation's non-industrial facility contracts, and these primarily are military installations—camps, cantonments, supply depots and the like.

Only a blind optimist could fail to see that drastic readjustments will inevitably come with the close of the war. Camps will be abandoned, or their populations promptly reduced. Workers will be let out of shipyards, plane factories and powder plants will decrease production—perhaps be relocated. In face of this prospect, it becomes important to give study and thought as to how these plants and establishments can be utilized—what portion of the South's wartime industry is convertible to peacetime production.

The industrialization of an agricultural region was one of the South's unique war problems. A large number of industrial plants have had to be developed in small towns and middle-sized cities, and considerable population has had to be shifted from somewhere else and moved into these communities. The rapidly increasing industrial tempo, with the consequent ever-growing demands for labor, has created problems which communities have not always had the facilities to handle.

A rapidly shifting population, both as migration into the region and as movement within its borders, has vastly complicated these problems. In this region there have been increases of from 50 to 100 percent in population in many communities.

Mobile, Alabama, was our Number One problem for awhile. Between 1940 and 1943, civilian population in Mobile increased by 65 percent—the greatest percentage increase in population of any metropolitan area in the nation during that period. Acute community problems and dislocations were inevitable, and the demand for services and facilities far outran the local ability to supply them. At Pascagoula, Mississippi, the people now working at the Ingalls Shipyard greatly outnumber the entire prewar population of that city.

Panama City, Florida, a town of about 12,000 had to do its best to accommodate the 55,000 which the shipyards and military establishments brought to it. Charleston, South Carolina, Brunswick, Georgia, and other places have been confronted with similar situations. In cities of a million or more population, additional workers can be absorbed without too much difficulty, but when you add 50,000 workers to a city of 100,000, or 10,000 to a city of 10,000, or 12,000 to a town of 5,000, a crisis is produced. Shortages develop in housing, schools, and transportation. Critical public utilities such as water works, sanitary installations, and hospitals are overstrained. In such communities are found constant and serious threats to health, while the problems of welfare are varied and never-ending.

It has been necessary for the War Manpower Commission to certify to the need for more houses in at least 200 communities within this region. And in no instance was this certification made unless it was absolutely necessary. We also have recommended the establishment of adequate medical, dental, and nursing facilities, hospital and sanitary facilities, and educational programs designed to prevent illness among workers and their families. An effort has been made for canteens, cafeterias, and other in-plant eating facilities that will insure nutritious meals during working hours for all shifts; and the provision of heating, lighting, and sanitary facilities to promote the welfare of workers.

When the war came, the South's resources had to be used, if the nation's industrial mobilization was to be complete. We had the resources, the geographic location, the climate, and the many, strong, willing human beings, but strong backs and perspiring brows are not substitutes for trained technical ability. What we lacked were the engineers, the production line men, trained machine operators, the skilled mechanics, and other trained and professional groups.

The system of education and training developed by the emergency is writing off that lack. It would be difficult indeed to estimate the value of the war training agencies in the war program, nor should the training and skills provided earlier by the NYA and the CCC be overlooked in such an estimate. Since the beginning of the war, the Bureau of Training of the War Manpower Commission, the State Departments of Education, in schools and colleges, through apprentice training,

vocational training, training-within-industry, and Rural War Production training have trained hundreds of thousands of Americans to do all manner of new tasks, from helping run a drill press to handling a tank.

America has found in this war that the ability of the Nation to produce, depends not just on its manufacturing facilities, but upon the skill of its people. That takes into account not only the chemists, the engineers, the highly trained technicians and scientists, but the men with "know how"—men who can take a new job and master it, men who understand work at the bench and lathe, men who know how to read blueprints. The war industries are both effecting and demanding more skills and will leave a valuable deposit, the lack of which heretofore has hindered our industrial development. This backlog of skilled and semi-skilled labor, of craftsmen and technicians, never available before, will be a reservoir on which to draw in the postwar period, for the industries we so sorely need to manufacture and process the South's natural resources.

The postwar South, therefore, will be far ahead of the prewar South in the possession of two prime assets toward further industrialization—new plants (some of which undoubtedly can be converted to the manufacture of peacetime goods) and a large supply of skilled workmen who can operate these plants. The job before us at the end of the war will be to work out methods by which these plants and these workers can be utilized in the processing of the South's abundant raw materials into finished products. God has been good to the South. It is rich with the gifts of nature—superior climate, forests, water, and minerals. It is the nation's major storehouse of raw materials.

The first and major need, I believe, is for research which will enable the region to take greater advantage of these resources. Despite the crying need for this type of program, the South has been unfortunately lacking in scientific and industrial research.

We seem to have overlooked the fact that modern industry is the child of research. The Mellon Institute of Industrial Research—a magnificent organization—has had about 97 percent success in getting the answer to the problems which they attack. General Motors is built on research. The entire South can flourish by research, but Harvard is not going to do that research for us;

nor is General Motors. We shall have to do it ourselves. It is to be hoped that the State Planning boards, the industrial and agricultural commissions and other public and private planning agencies will make adequate provision for research activities in their particular postwar plans.

Wherever research has been applied in the South, the results have been enormous. The work done by Dr. Herty in developing paper from pine pulp probably brought about the greatest industrial revolution in this region since the invention of the cotton gin. Almost overnight the pulpwood industry began a trek to the South and the U. S. Forest Service told us months ago that more than 200 million dollars had been invested in paper plants in the South.

It is of interest that an effort is now being made in Congress to provide a fund for research to develop commercial uses for scrub oak and other inferior southern hardwoods. We have 40 percent of the nation's forests in the region, and the proper study and development of this resource could go a long way toward taking us "out of the woods."

Camphor supplies an interesting illustration of what can be done through forest research. Long a natural monopoly of Japan, the price of camphor rose during World War I from about 40 cents a pound to ten times that figure, but camphor was needed for medicine and needed in the manufacture of plastics and film, and so a method for producing synthetic camphor was perfected. Today, the United States can supply its own requirements from the gum turpentine of pine trees.

Already we are doing amazing things with peanuts and soybeans, sweet potatoes, and other southern products. If the South could spend hundreds of thousands of dollars in a great research organization over the next several years, the results would be immeasurable in the productivity and prosperity of the region.

The upsurge of industry which the war has brought to the South has shown us clearly the need for a better balance between agriculture and industry, and we should strive for that balance in peacetime. However, the South is and will continue to be overwhelmingly a farming region. We can grow everything here from peanuts to palm trees. Southern climate, soil and rainfall are not being altered by the war. What the war has changed is the character of our agriculture. War demands for more meat, milk, fruit and vege-

tables, and other food and feed crops are accentuating a trend to produce farm products other than cotton and tobacco as a source of cash income.

Cotton and tobacco are still important crops, but southern farmers are developing substitutes for one-crop farming. They are not only raising cattle, hogs, and poultry in record breaking numbers, but they have taken up dairying. They are growing enormous quantities of peanuts, potatoes and other vegetables which mean much to the entire region, not only in terms of greater cash and permanent income, but in terms of improved nutriment and better health.

At a conference on postwar planning recently held at Vanderbilt University, Cason J. Callaway, a great Georgian, who has made a spectacular success of applying principles of business and industrial production to farming, emphasized the need for food processing plants in the South. In deploring the little effort that had been made to process our major food crops, Mr. Callaway pointed out that, since these crops mainly are perishable, "they either must be dumped on the market at a dumping price, or else they must be processed. Many crops that would be profitable for the South cannot be sold in the form in which they are harvested or gathered, except at a dumping price; they require processing machinery, canning, freezing or dehydration, even more than cotton requires the spinning and weaving and finishing plant. And, just as the establishment of the textile processing industry brought, along with its utilization of the cotton crop, the additional advantages to this section of invested capital, payrolls, interest, and the profit accruing from value added by manufacture, so can the establishment of industries to process other farm products bring more of these same contributions to the further economic enrichment of our section."

Mr. Callaway named three other improvements which he said were vital to the advancement of southern agriculture in the postwar period: long-term commercial credits, use of machinery for working crops, and greater efforts toward soil improvements. I think we all agree with Mr. Callaway's assertion that long-term credit is the responsibility of business and commerce.

I have a feeling that the men who make things, whether they grow potatoes, or saw lumber or make pottery, or draw blueprints, should have the highest degree of cooperation and help to make those things. My feeling on that fact is very definite as it concerns the farmer. "The farm problem" is not simply a problem for the farmer— it is everyone's problem. To ignore that is to perish. We are only beginning to wake up to how basic a fact that is. Metropolitan-minded economists who think only in terms of paper credit, money, and industrial processes will have to recognize this fact or start tightening their belts.

As the war goes on and the world grows hungrier, food becomes a vital instrument of war. It is also in these times a potent diplomatic argument. If agriculture perishes as a healthy and prosperous activity, if it disappears as a vital process of our society, scientists can only hold a post-mortem on it. But they, too, will be hungry. It is essential to our program of victory and the maintenance of peace, aside from any humanitarian aspect of the case, that food in adequate quantities must be furnished for the United States and our Allies. That there will be acute food shortages to call for all that farmers can produce for a year or two after the war seems evident. But what then?

The effect of the war on the southern farmer has not been an unmixed blessing. The large supply of labor once available for agriculture has been sharply cut by the demand for labor in war industries. To some extent this loss has been compensated by machinery. The migration to urban areas which depleted the farmer's labor supply has increased the demand for his product and brought him higher prices. After the war, the farmer may anticipate relief from acute labor shortage—but the prospect of general unemployment and diminishing purchasing power makes the outlook less encouraging as to prices and markets.

Debt is one of the things that always has aggravated times of depression for the farmer. Indications now are that farmers are taking advantage of high prices to pay off mortgages and debts, which makes the prospects brighter.

The future prosperity of investment bankers, business men, and industrial workers in the South will depend in good part on the prosperity of southern farmers. Certainly every avenue should be explored and every possible effort made to cushion the shock for them in the postwar years.

In peacetime our farmers need nothing so much as industry to absorb surplus products and to keep more money in the South by processing more

southern things. This implies that employment will be properly distributed through all the elements in the economy. The over-all and basic problem in the postwar period will be that of bridging a gap from war production to production for peace, which boils down in its simplest terms to the problem of keeping people employed. A better balancing of agriculture and industry can be made the basis for an economy of steady production, steady jobs, and regular incomes for workers, which will be the basis of security for all of us and our communities. And that is something which we in the South should be thinking hard about.

Of course the thing we have to do now is to solve the war problem, but we should be planning on what we will do at the end of this emergency. In view of all the facts, the South, more than any other region, should be considering constructive plans to minimize the traditional postwar slump during the reconversion period.

The major portion of our contracts is of a temporary nature and, even if we can plan wisely enough to convert many of them to peacetime production, retooling and reconversion will take time. While that is going on, the plants will be closed and unemployment is inevitable. There will be not only the social, economic, and physical ills incident to the relocation and readjustment of millions of war workers, but there will be the problem of the returning soldiers. Even if the men in the armed services are returned to civilian life gradually over a long period there still will be a heavy unemployment burden created by the closing or tapering off of our vast number of war plants.

I am sure you will agree that the demobilization of the armed forces and their re-employment in civilian life is one of the major postwar tasks of responsible governmental and private agencies. In fact, a number of Federal agencies are committed to seeing that the veteran is reestablished in civilian life. The War Manpower Commission already has in operation a definite working program for integrating the returning soldier into the industrial life of the region. In every United States Employment Service office there is a special veterans placement officer who has immediate contact with all job openings and all employers of the community.

This office is charged with rendering all possible help to the veteran—to give him the whole picture of the services and facilities available to him, and to put him in touch with all agencies, private and public, who can assist him.

Our responsibility to the disabled veteran is especially great. A grateful country will not forget the price these men have paid for freedom. It should be remembered also that they can't eat medals. They want something more than a laurel wreath. The prime peace plan of the returning soldier is a *job back home*. We are all anxious to see a widening horizon of job opportunities for these men.

The transition from war to peace will not be as dramatic as its counterpart of war mobilization, but the changes it will bring will be fully as significant as those caused by war. They may be even more painful. In the absence of planning, the economic dislocation created by the present war can completely overshadow the disruption which followed the first World War. One of the most helpful methods of looking ahead is to look back. On this basis we can best attempt to put ourselves in a position to avoid many of the usual consequences of war. We have the lesson of the 1919 slump and shouldn't make all the same mistakes twice.

The shift from a wartime to a civilian economy is not likely to occur all at once this time. It is more likely to be a flow of integrated developments. The restoration of peacetime production in one part of the economy will be related to what is happening elsewhere in the economy, the whole process moving together. The mechanism set up to do the war jobs should be a mighty aid in this transition. The methods developed, the organization, and the data gathered can be applied in reverse for unwinding the machinery. If we translate the knowledge and experience gained through mobilization into vigorous and united action, our postwar tasks will be much easier.

We have amazed no one more than ourselves at what we have been able to accomplish in this war. We have found that when every shoulder is put to to the wheel practically nothing is impossible. Under great odds and in hard situations, our fighting men have withstood steel and flame with a spirit and determination which adds greater glory to the magnificent history of our fighting forces.

On the home front, our war production program, superimposed upon a continuing civilian production, runs to a total of something like $146,900,000,-000. We are sending through lend-lease food

enough and munitions enough to turn the tide on many fronts. We are maintaining the longest supply line in the history of logistics—half-way around the world to Australia and a quarter the way around to Africa and Italy. The Fighting South is doing its share of the job.

These things have been accomplished through the collective effort of government, business, labor, and agriculture, all cooperating toward a common objective. We have been united in one high purpose bigger than any of us. The spirit of cooperation is the pulsing power that has pushed the war program forward. It is a powerful force which can operate for our postwar benefit. The new spirit of cooperation is spreading through top agencies of government in Washington and to Main streets all over the country. All over the Nation, management is sitting across the table from labor trying to find ways to do a better job.

This management-labor-government unity is something of which I have first-hand knowledge. The War Manpower Commission from its inception has sought the full cooperation of labor, management, and agriculture all along the line in its operations. There is a national Labor-Management Committee which advises the headquarters office, the regional offices are advised by a Regional Labor-Management Committee, and each area director is advised by an area committee. Each of these groups is composed of equal representatives from labor and from management. They advise and cooperate with manpower officials in developing and administering manpower programs to meet local conditions, and no WMC policy nor program in this region is established without their concurrence.

As my work carries me over the States in this region, one of the most encouraging things I encounter is the way these committees work. A stranger walking into one of these sessions would have a hard time deciding which men represent which faction. If a committee disagrees, as often as not, you find management and labor intermingled on opposite sides of the fence. The potentialities of this trend, if carried over into peacetime, are without limit; if we can keep this force working, no problem will be too big to lick.

The job ahead of the South in providing full postwar employment along with full production and ample markets and prices is certainly big enough to call for the mobilization of our collective effort.

Social planning is inherent in all of our postwar programs. We have made some rapid strides and transitions in the South in the fields of health and welfare during the war. Better housing, extensions of health facilities, programs for wholesome recreation, have been developed in many communities as a result of the pressing needs of war. These, too, must be converted to the uses of peace and extended to provide for the proper conservation, development, and use of the South's human resources. But the social gains, which are the aims of all enlightened peoples, can be permanent only when grounded in an economy that will support them. We must go forward on all fronts if our progress is to be real and lasting.

Now is the time for the South to develop its own resources, to improve farming, dairying, livestock raising; to promote its own industries; to improve educational facilities and training for all citizens; to promote better health and better living conditions for all. This is a task for intensive study, broad vision and leadership—not for government alone, but for parents, teachers, clergymen, and all those who provide spiritual, moral, and intellectual guidance.

Now in its period of postwar planning is the time for the South to take stock—to profit from past mistakes. This long has been a region from which to take huge quantities of raw material and ship them back as finished products. We confined our industry to the extraction of raw materials and to the simple first processes of production which can be performed by unskilled labor and which add little value to the product. We then shipped the goods to other regions for finishing by the skilled labor which added most of the value to the product. One of the most striking examples of this that comes to my mind is how little we have done in the field of ceramics—and yet we have untold wealth in clay, especially here in Georgia, great mines of it, just waiting for men to build factories on the site.

When the war is done and the skills and the tools and the resources can be synchronized, the South will have boundless opportunities for such things as these. The majority of us have seemed to think that we were too poor to build our own industries. Perhaps we have been too concerned with the spectacular promotions which promised overnight prosperity. Our postwar planning must take a practical approach. We should plan to do

the best with what we have. Community projects, such as food processing plants, sweet potato curing houses, canneries, the mechanized poultry plants such as are now being established, the securing of purebred cattle, the production of sufficient feedstuffs to support an increased dairy and livestock industry, farmers markets and exchanges are matters important in plans for the future.

We learned when we were plunged into war, the frightful cost of *not planning*. We should have the foresight to begin to plan for peacetime and the better world for which we are fighting. It is a matter of encouragement that work seems to be going on at all levels in this essential task of postwar planning. Practically every State has some kind of organized planning group and many cities have begun to map postwar programs, as well as put aside funds to carry them out.

A strong national group known as the Committee for Economic Development, is actively at work with business and industry to assist these groups in making plans to insure high levels of employment and productivity when peace comes.

To sum up, there are many things which need to be weighed in considering the postwar prospects of the South. The huge industrial expansion in war industries is sure to affect the region profoundly. There will be great economic and social stresses. In the light of all the facts we should be prepared for a depression.

There are many things to brighten the picture, however. We shall enter the first phase of the postwar period with a mighty vacuum of deferred demands and a tremendous buying power. People will want to spend more for consumer goods and

services than ever before. We need to develop a system of consumer education to direct the wise spending of unaccustomed wealth. If we start bidding up prices before we get through and create a wild boom, we shall not have more goods, we shall just have less money. We need to be taught that if we try to spend our excess income all at once, we will only be throwing it away.

There will be enormous peacetime demand for construction, private and public, for plant replacements, and for repairs which could not be made during the war. Based on the development of the automobile, airplane, and radio immediately after the last war, we can expect amazing developments in new industries, such as chemurgy, plastics, radar, light metals, dehydration, quick-freezing, and others.

There will be opportunities through the opening of new markets for export, and the South will have many advantages for shipping direct to South America any products manufactured in the region.

Opportunities in vast quantities and in infinite variety will be waiting to employ our resources, our skills and training. We will have the capacity for high production, for the development of manufacturing and marketing techniques such as we have never had before. These will not materialize by themselves. We must plan and work for them. But there is vision and ingenuity and leadership here. We must use these qualities in drafting the blueprint for the postwar South.

And I have a conviction that the postwar facts are likely to be built more upon the courage, the character, and the work of the southern people than upon the plans men draw on paper.

The Department of Publicity of Temple University has released the following:

Dr. Negley K. Teeters, widely-known criminologist and assistant professor of sociology at Temple University, has returned to the campus from a four-month tour of Central and South American countries where he studied the penal systems and prisons. Dr. Teeters visited Panama, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru, Chile, Argentina and Brazil. He received authorization from the State Department for the tour.

In discussing the trip Dr. Teeters said that the officials of the countries he visited were eager to exchange information with those handling the penal problems in the United States. "They are most anxious to learn our methods for the handling of criminals and in solving the problem of juvenile delinquency," Dr. Teeters said. "South America doesn't have a crime problem such as exists in the United States, for there are no organized gangs. The biggest problem they face is the elimination of petty stealing. "The penal systems of the Central and South American countries run from antiquated to good, and Brazil and Argentina have the most progressive methods not only in handling criminals but also in the matter of construction."

THE PRESENT STATUS OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH*

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THERE is fairly widespread agreement that race relations in the South have deteriorated in character since the beginning of the war. This, of course, is popular agreement based upon the assumption that quiescence and absence of racial tensions are a major, if not exclusive, index to the most wholesome race relations. The thesis of this paper is that the emotional disturbances of the present period, involving racial issues, are symptoms of accelerated social changes, and that these changes are wholesome, even if their temporary racial effects are bad.

Where there is preoccupation with race and relative racial positions in the social system of the region, it is inevitable that many factors which are essentially non-racial in character will be invested with dangerous racial implications, and it is equally likely that many underlying elements responsible for the new stress on race will be overlooked.

Total war is a cataclysmic national event that shakes and loosens many traditions form their deep moorings, whether these traditions are economic, religious, racial or romantic. The impersonal and direct imperatives of sudden war cannot trace a careful path around the embedded orthodoxies of race any more than can a flood or earthquake. When these racial traditions have been disturbed, when the comfortable patterns of living have been broken or warped, a sense of insecurity is inevitable. New guides to behavior must be worked out, new situations must be met and solved by reference to new or at least altered values. The race problem in such situations becomes more personal, and in becoming more personal it becomes more emotional.

Several major crises induced by the war should be noted here as a background for understanding what is happening to race relations. There was, as is everywhere evident, a prompt necessity for accelerating mechanical production in the South, as in the rest of the Nation. Although the South is primarily agricultural it shared richly in the ap-

propriations for cantonments, shipyards, munitions plants, and these were located in or near the cities. A result was the uprooting and migration of hundreds of thousands of workers to the industrial production centers. They carried their personal backgrounds with them and sought, as would be natural, to find a new basis of community, without risking the personal security incident to losing the values of these backgrounds. This alone was a personal and an industrial revolution of great significance crowded into a brief period. The major training camps for the ten million or more troops are in the South, and there is more current mobility than this country has ever before experienced. The demands for manpower have pressed hard again the old established racial occupational cleavages; the high wages, together with the national minimum wage legislation, have disturbed another traditional racial differential. New occupations have been created without racial definition. The familiar Negro domestic, unprotected by employment legislation, and long underpaid according to national standards, has disappeared into the new war industries, leaving a trail of dismay and bitter resentment among housewives. New economic and military hierarchies have intruded into the social system. There has been an inescapable penetration of more and more national regulation into the region in the form of soldiers' family allowances, civilian defense measures, army regulations.

These objective changes have been moving hand in hand with changes in southern agriculture. The country has yielded millions of its population to the city and, at the same time increased its production with fewer hands, thereby closing the door to the return of may of the emigres. More important still, these changes have been accompanied by a necessary emphasis upon the American creed of democracy as the ideological support of the total war effort.

This campaign for democracy and the rights of the common man the world over has had unique effects in the sourthern region where the principle has encountered historical difficulties when applied

inferentially to the Negro population. It has, however, been taken hopefully, if not seriously, by the Negroes. The harbingers of danger to the traditional racial patterns have appeared in the form of: (a) extensions of various types of New Deal legislation into the South; (b) national campaigns for the abolition of the poll tax; (c) campaigns for the broadening of the social security laws which would affect most directly the southern region in the agricultural and domestic service fields, and the Negro worker; (d) court decisions virtually compelling the equalization of educational expenditures for whites and Negroes; (e) persistent attempts to attach anti-discrimination riders on Federal bills; and (f) the President's Fair Employment Practice Committee, and similar measures.

These measures have appeared to the South to force racial adjustments on a new level ahead of public readiness for such changes, and a result has been resistance to this pressure from the outside, impatience with outside interference, re-assertion of the regional policy of racial segregation, and a determination to handle the regional racial problem under conditions imposed by the region itself.

Over recent months we have been observing points of racial tension in the southern region. Between March 1st and December 31st we noted 111 racial incidents in the South of sufficient importance to be given attention in the national press. In order of numerical importance they were as follows: (1) incidents growing out of new racial contacts in industrial employment; (2) incidents associated with congestion in various modes of public transportation; (3) incidents associated with crimes committed or suspected, and the police handling of these situations; (4) incidents involving conflicts between Negro service men and civilian or military police, or other civilians; (5) incidents involving Negro status, with respect to civil rights, the racial etiquette; (6) other incidents, including attempts of Negroes to vote, migrate, move into a non-Negro area; challenge of white status, and lynching.

The most serious of the employment incidents was, of course, the Mobile affair, in which an attempt to introduce essential Negro workers on new shipbuilding jobs met resistance from white workers. Attitudes regarding labor are less tolerant in the southern region than in some other sections of the country, and the issues of race and labor constitute in themselves a complex of new

problems seeking redefinition. The highest temperatures have been registered in the areas of greatest labor demand. The demands of production schedules, under the stress of the war emergency, have tended to overcome popular resistance to the altering of caste lines in general occupational fields, and there has been recently increased racial accommodation in the war plants. In most instances the principle of segregation, actual or token, has been preserved, both with respect to physical contact on the jobs and higher and lower grades of work.

The point of most frequent physical contact between whites and Negroes is in transportation, and more minor clashes have occurred in these relationships than in any other. The new conditions of population congestion, shortage of carriers, the use of raw personnel replacements for the more experienced drivers and conductors, and the flexible and frequently undeterminable limits of racial segregation on public carriers tend to reduce the *customary* patterns of segregation to highly volatile issues of *personal* status in racial situations. So complex has this situation become that Mr. Virginius Dabney, Editor of the Richmond, Virginia *Times-Dispatch* has advocated for Virginia the abolition of the separation on the carriers in the State, because they only confuse without actually preserving the original intent of those laws to separate the races.

Where there is at the same time inadequacy of carrier space and a racial etiquette that demands first service for white passengers, it is inevitable that there should be numerous and various challenges by Negroes of the etiquette, if they are to travel at all. Moreover, the minor patterns of the etiquette vary widely among cities, and mistakes are easy to make and may be interpreted as deliberate flaunting of the principle of segregation and of the dictum of proper racial respect. This has frequently been the issue in racial conflict situations involving Negro soldiers from the North who have been sent to the South for military training. The arming or deputizing of bus drivers in these situations seems to have proved an inadequate solution of the difficulty.

Crimes and the police handling of such situations as appear to have racial significance have very often reflected fears on the part of the police that unruly Negroes would get out of the racial as well as legal controls. This is not a new problem, but an old one greatly accentuated by war con-

ditions. Ordinary crimes of Negroes against Negroes, normally high, have not held any important or new implications for race relations. It has been observed, however, in a growing number of southern cities—twenty-one, according to our records—that the use of Negro police has salutary effects.

The presence of northern Negro service men in the small southern towns near their camps has been fairly generally resented by the white population, and there have been numerous unsuccessful efforts to influence the Army to train these Negroes in the North. It is understandable how problems would arise with the sudden pressure of Negro soldiers on leave against the narrow recreational limits of the Negro quarter of a small southern town. The community fears of violence on the part of Negroes, in resentment of unfamiliar practices, have been justified in several cases, and the Negro violence has been all too often anticipated by a demonstration of white violence.

Other examples of recent racial clashes in the South have followed fairly familiar patterns. Of importance to underlying racial sentiment and tensions, although not directly always responsible for overt conflict, is the widespread experience of white middle-class households with their Negro domestic servants. The inconvenience of being without the familiar Negro domestics has proved to be one of the most intimate effects of the war in many households. Some of these domestics have gone temporarily to better paying war jobs, some have been able, as a result of family allowances from soldiers, to stay at home and care for their own households, and some have just quit work. Although this is a contingency to be expected in war time, it has become one of the most serious barriers to interracial tolerance and good will. This basically economic movement has been invested with the deepest private and political fears and disaffections of the southern white middle-class, and has been the occasion of a vast array of unwholesome rumors.

The problem of race is definitely and acutely in the focus of attention throughout the South, and in such a way as to give emphasis to the greatest range of disaffections, fears, resentments, and gloomy future prospects. It is reflected in the articulateness of the racial fundamentalists in Congress whose reaction to the "New Deal" government, to the President and his wife are associated emotionally with their concern for preserving the racial *status quo*. It is further reflected in the gratuitous but emphatic resolutions of the South Carolina Legislature regarding the manifest destiny of the white race, and in the determination of one Congressman that American soldiers should not see a statement by two well-known anthropologists, quoting the scores on intelligence tests made by southern white and northern Negro recruits in the last war which were originally published by the Surgeon General of the Army.

While the Negro in the South has made many types of adjustment to the southern cultural pattern, there seems to be general agreement, and a great deal of objective evidence that his attitude is increasingly becoming one of protest. A recent poll by the Denver Opinion Research Center, as well as the Negro press itself, bears this out. This is a natural result of his increasing contacts with the outside world, especially through the schools, but also through modern means of communication, notably the press and the radio. Much has been made of the fact that the southern cultural pattern is actually a caste system, and with respect to the mental attitude of southern whites, and the historical adjustment of the majority of Negroes it has been substantially a caste. A true caste system, however, is based on the acceptance of each individual of his place in the system, which is rigid and cannot be changed. This caste theory is ruled out in the American South by the basic democratic philosophy of the American system of government, and the American creed, to which the section also adheres in principle. This philosophy has power enough in the South to make it impossible to exclude the Negro altogether from opportunities for education and self-advancement. As long as this is so, the perpetuation of a caste system becomes impossible, and the gradual extension of the feeling of protest against discrimination and segregation becomes inevitable.

This protest, of course, is expressed in a variety of ways, depending upon the educational background, economic position, and character of the individual. Negro leaders in the South have sometimes accepted segregation while calling for equality of opportunity and an end to discrimination. There is some evidence, however, that this point of view is fundamentally a matter of expediency rather than conviction. The signers of the Durham declaration of October 20, 1942, who are regarded as conservative by many segments of Negro opinion, stated, "We are fundamentally op-

posed to the principle and practice of compulsory segregation in our American society," although they indicated a common sense willingness to work in the southern bi-racial system to help achieve an ultimate democratic society.

There can be little doubt that the development of this Negro protest reaction has been stimulated by the war and situations arising out of the war, but there seems little question that, even without the war, education, increasing means of communication, and social and economic changes would have produced the same results in the long run.

The mass of southern Negroes naturally do not express their protest in any such conscious terms, although race consciousness is increasing. Protest may be expressed in a variety of forms, ranging from withdrawal and self-segregation to inefficiency on the job, or aggressive manners. In the more isolated areas where education and social and economic change have had least effect there may be very little feeling of protest on the part of the Negro, and this gives a semblance of justification to the conviction that the old patterns were harmonious and thus more acceptable. This situation, however, is probably a function of mental and physical isolation which cannot long be maintained in a dynamic society. It should be noted that migration itself, which often occurs from just such areas as these, is a form of protest.

We have, then, in the South, on the one hand, a situation in which the great majority of southern Negroes are becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the present pattern of race relations and want a change, and, on the other hand, the great majority of southern whites, while certainly not altogether satisfied with things as they are, seem unable to contemplate the possibility of change in any fundamental sense. Working on the side of fundamental change are the basic tenets of the American creed, together with the forces of a society which is still dynamic, despite occasional indications that it may be becoming more static. On the side of the *status quo* stand custom and habit—the folkways, as well as local and regional laws—the stateways; police authority, and, most important, the mental attitude of the white South.

There is another factor in the southern racial situation, the effects of which are currently the subject of much bitter dispute. It is the attitude of northern whites and northern Negroes. There can be no doubt that northern liberals, spurred by the racial implications raised by the Second World War, are taking an increasing interest in the problem of race relations, and in the South as the source of many of the racial attitudes and established patterns of adjustment. Criticism from an outside source is never palatable and is deeply resented. It is entirely possible that the South will do more to raise the standards of race relations on its own authority than under the prodding of northern liberals. However, it seems doubtful whether, as some assert, it is entirely the North that is driving the South into an intransigent attitude. Given the basic local interpretation of the South's position, it appears that northern criticism affects not so much the attitude itself as the violence of its expression.

The real doubt is that the region believes its own racial postulates as deeply as it believes in the fundamental implications of the American creed. It is, in fact, no longer intellectually respectable to hold on to the postulates that originally determined the present patterns of racial behavior.

Similarly, it is felt that the statements and activities of northern whites and northern Negroes are responsible for the protest attitude of southern Negroes. There can be little doubt that these are accelerating factors. But the interpretation already given of the increasing dissatisfaction of southern Negroes points to the conclusion that this would be an inevitable development even without outside influence. The articulate northern Negro is not a member of a distinct race; typically either he was born in the South or his parents were born there. He is a southern Negro, with enough experience to know that a different pattern is possible, and is living in an environment where he can express extreme opinions with some degree of safety. His influence is therefore not so much an outside influence as an extension of the personality of the southern Negro.

It has been suggested in this paper that the racial climate is at present bad, but that the overall trend is wholesome and promising. There are indications of forces other than disruption at work in the total situation:

(a) In spite of the tensions, threats, abuses, and limitation of the racial system, large scale racial violence has seldom occurred and gives no indication of occurring, although the frictions and antagonisms threaten to continue indefinitely. Lynchings have almost entirely disappeared, in large part through the efforts of the South itself, and particularly the southern women.

(b) The pressure of population over the long period is being relaxed by the migration of both whites and Negroes to the North and West.

(c) Constant improvements in education are changing the character of race relations by gradually removing one of the sources of personal insecurity.

(d) The increased industrialization and unionization of the region has been, in a vital if unexpected way, increasing the number and character of racial contacts between whites and Negroes in the most numerous population class. The necessities for labor and class solidarity in a common interest are bringing about, as an incident of the association, the first large scale erosion of many racial customs and traditions.

In an evaluation of this same problem four years ago, attention was called to the natural evolution of race relations towards a more democratic pattern as a result of economic and social factors inherent in our society. An increasing trend toward class solidarity was pointed to, as exemplified, for instance, in the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union, which cuts across long established bi-racial caste relationships to establish new interracial class relationships. This seemed to be working toward a new and more flexible pattern. These trends are still in evidence as, for example, in the mine and smelter workers in Birmingham, Alabama, who have not only formed unions in which whites and Negroes participate on an equal basis, but have pressed for up-grading of Negroes on the same basis as whites, in the face of the protests of more conservative local groups.

There are at least 500,000 Negroes in unions in the South and many of these unions are considering for the first time the value of effective co-relations as a basis for workers' security in the region and in the Nation. Church groups over the South are giving new and increasing study to the problem, and in local situations are acting to modify the harsher angles of racial incompatibility.

White youth in the colleges and churches, where there is any desire to break the bonds of their provincialism and get into the larger intellectual currents of the Nation, seem less disposed than their elders to devote their lives and energies to fighting against currents of enlightened change. Some colleges of the region are finding a new prestige value in a socially liberal view of the region's economic and human resources.

One of the most significant developments of recent years is the organization of the Southern Regional Council composed of representative white and Negro leadership of the region, which is focussing its attention upon the broader issues of social and regional economy in which the question of race has had a place along with the lagging attitudes in agriculture, labor, and political statesmanship.

It is increasingly evident that the relation of the southern region to the rest of the world will be influenced and affected by the region's ability to handle satisfactorily its own problem of a racial minority, in a new conception of world democracy in which small peoples are promised security in their basic human rights.

What is most important in all of these considerations is the underlying, even if disturbing, conviction that is growing, and that is being documented by responsible scholars of the region, that the soundest development of the region is in the direction of its total development, and the welfare of all its people.

As for the Negro in this situation, despite a considerable handicap in education, economic stability, and cultural level, there is the conviction that, in an ultimate sense, his cause is consistent with the overall trend of the national philosophy and the economic future of the Nation.

Many white Southerners, perhaps the majority, are concerned about race relations, and anxious to do something about them if it does not involve changing the fundamental pattern. This has resulted in a great deal of sincere effort which has borne fruit in better education for the Negro, better facilities, and increased understanding. However, it should be pointed out that activities such as these may tend in the long run to increase rather than decrease tension. For, as improved opportunities raise the cultural level of the Negro, increase his awareness of himself and his relation to society, he will become less, rather than more, satisfied with the inferior position involved in enforced segregation and the discrimination which is invariably associated with segregation.

There are indications of a disposition to improve social and economic conditions in the direction of "separate but equal" facilities, within certain limits. It is felt, however, that this will involve a long period of time, even though some of these adjustments, as, for example, equalization of teachers' salaries are being accomplished within a

shorter period than was anticipated. But as
differentials are removed there is left less zest for
segregation in all aspects of civic life. Further, as
the educational and economic status of Negroes
improves there is, paradoxically, more apparent
racial solidarity among them, which tends to en-
courage self-segregation.

What conclusions, we might ask, can be drawn
from these currents of change? Is it that op-
portunities for Negroes should be further restricted
so that they will not develop self-respect and
awareness of their own rights as American citizens?
Thinking Southerners do not advocate this, and it
is doubtful whether such a policy, even if system-
atically attempted, could be successfully put into
effect. General ameliorative programs designed
to develop the economy and social organization of
the South as a whole are certainly desirable, and
would mitigate many sources of friction. But

these again would have the effect of raising the
status of the Negro along with that of the southern
population as a whole, and of placing him in con-
flict with the traditional conceptions of caste.
It would seem, therefore, that the most fruitful
avenue of inquiry, as far as the future of race re-
lations is concerned, is to seek some acceptable
methods of revising the racial attitudes and be-
liefs of the white South, and overcoming the edu-
cational and cultural lag in both the Negro groups
and certain elements of the white population.

We shall probably have in the South for some
time yet what Dr. Robert E. Park described as a
process which involves the "accommodation of a
moving equilibrium of diverse groups." The ob-
jective will be that of attaining the most satis-
factory and useful ends that are consistent with
the interests of the groups in conflict, and with the
total welfare of the region and the Nation.

THE URBAN STATUS OF RURAL MIGRANTS*

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INTRODUCTION

THE *Reason for the Study*. American
studies of rural-urban migration have
been based mainly on data obtained in
rural communities. This is due in part to the
sponsorship of agricultural experiment stations
and governmental research units charged with
work in agriculture. Although several hypoth-
eses, notably those concerning the intellectual
selectivity of rural migration, are still inadequately
tested by the data currently available, a more
conspicuous lack of knowledge concerns the urban
fate of rural migrants. The rise of mass produc-
tion in American industry still has not discredited
in popular opinion the American myth-of-the-hero,
by which we expect to find that the man-who-
makes-good was reared on a farm. In some urban
communities, however, the rural migrant is held
in low esteem and is too frequently assumed to be
maladjusted, a poor citizen, or a client of the social
worker. A middle but equivocal position has been

taken by students of the level of living, wishing to
equate rural and urban statuses. With what class
of city dwellers shall the farmer be compared:
lower, middle or upper? Sometimes the answer,
implied if not asserted directly, is that farmers
are comparable to middle class urbanites. The
structural heterogeneity of both the rural and ur-
ban societies is overlooked.

These are only some of the reasons for a study of
the rural migrant in the city. Effects of rural-
urban migration upon the urban community are
commonly thought to include such items as the in-
fusion of urban culture with rural values, including
those of individualism and democratic ideals; the
maintenance of an open class structure in urban
society; maintenance in the city of such institu-
tional forms as those of family and church; re-
sistance to the urban trend toward diminished
fertility; replenishment of the urban labor force;
some accumulation of wealth formerly possessed
by country people; and even aggravation of some
community problems by migrants who are not
assimilated. Specific studies of what happens to
the migrant himself, however, are few.

This paper reports a partial analysis of data

gathered in 1942 by the Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station in the city of Lexington, Kentucky. Schedules were obtained for 297 households,[1] to supplement previous field investigations in rural communities. The choice of Lexington was not, however, because it had any special importance as a destination for migrants from communities previously studied.[2]

The Community of Lexington. Lexington is the third largest city in Kentucky. In 1940 its population was 49,000 but the real community included a contiguous population of about 15,000. By census class these were rural-nonfarm people; by social characteristics they were urban. Twenty-six percent of Lexington's people were Negro, and only one percent were white people of foreign birth. Lexington is "the heart of the Bluegrass," lying at the center of one of the main southern "islands of prosperity," an agricultural area of fertile soil. To the north and west there are no large cities between Lexington and Covington or Louisville, each 85 miles away. To the east it is more than 100 miles to Ashland; to the Southeast and Southwest, society is rural clear to Knoxville and Nashville, each more than 200 miles away. Lexington is, therefore, a trade center—a market town and center of distribution, definitely non-industrial in economic character. Three-fourths of its men in 1940 were in the labor force.[3] Broad occupational classes in order of size were clerical, craftsmen, operatives, service workers, proprietors, and laborers. There were only 300 more laborers than professional persons, and more than half the male laborers were Negro. Among women, of whom one-third were in the labor force, the occupations were mainly domestic service (with Negro women predominant), clerical, service other than domestic, and professional. With extremes of both poverty

[1] This report stresses a comparison of farm-reared with urban-reared household heads and their families; because the heads of 19 households were reared in rural nonfarm places, and place of rearing was unknown for two others, they are omitted from this analysis, which treats data from 274 cases.

[2] I. A. Spaulding and H. W. Beers, *Mobility and Fertility Rates of Rural Families in Robertson and Johnson Counties, Kentucky, 1918–1941,* Ky. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bul. 451 (1943). R. M. Williams and H. W. Beers, *Attitudes Toward Rural Migration and Family Life in Johnson and Robertson Counties, Kentucky, 1941,* Ky. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bul. 452 (1943).

[3] Census data for the incorporated city; suburban residents not included.

and wealth among her people, Lexington is a community of mixed tradition.

Lines of agrarian aristocracy, heritages from both the Confederacy and the Union, a reputation as the world's largest loose-leaf tobacco market and as the seat of the State's University—these and several other factors characterize the city as being in some respects unique rather than representative of any urban type. However, it is a community that has grown and is maintained largely through rural migration. Its people are at various levels of income and in various social strata. It seemed in these respects especially suitable for the development and testing of hypotheses about the urban status of rural migrants. Within the community, areas homogeneous in land-use, race of occupants and average monthly rental were outlined. A five percent sample of households was drawn at random in 16 neighborhoods which together had nearly the same percentage distribution of dwelling units by rental value as did the entire city. To simplify analysis the 16 neighborhoods were recombined on the basis of similarity into five classes.

COMPARISON OF RURAL MIGRANTS AND CITY NATIVES

Economic Position: Rent. Fifty-seven percent of the householders[4] in the sample of Lexington residents were reared on farms (Table 1). Rural migrants were found at all levels of income as indicated by monthly rental. Their proportions were smallest among families of wealth, but even in that group 40 percent of the householders had been reared in the country.[5] The proportion of those who were farm-reared, however, was just twice that large (80 percent) in the poverty income group (rental under $10). In the $10–19 rental group, 65 percent; in the $20–29 group, 59 percent; and in the $30–39 group 46 percent of the householders were farm-reared. The evidence is clear that, to the extent that monthly rental reflects economic status and social class, farm migrants have entered all the urban classes or strata, but they are represented twice as frequently in the lowest as in the highest class.

Economic Position: Rent and Income. Within

[4] Householder is here used to mean the head of a household.

[5] Place of rearing is known also for the other members of all households, but only data for heads are analyzed in this paper.

three of the economic classes or strata (as indicated by neighborhood groups), however, the position of farm-reared householders was somewhat below that of those who were urban-reared (Table 2). In the other two groups it was higher. Average family income for urban-reared householders exceeds that for those who were farm-reared in the poverty class (rental under $10), in the $20–29 class, the $30–39 class, and even in the highest rental class. For some reason not here apparent, the farm-reared heads had a higher income than their urban neighbors in two rental classes, those from $10–19 and $30–39. It is important to note also that the highest average income is about five times the lowest average income in both the farm and the urban-reared groups.

TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDERS BY FARM AND URBAN
REARING, FIVE NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS,
LEXINGTON, 1942

NEIGHBOR-HOOD GROUPS*	NUMBER			PERCENT		
	Total	Farm reared	Urban reared	Total	Farm reared	Urban reared
Total	274	155	119	100	57	43
I	20	16	4	100	80	20
II	48	31	17	100	65	35
III	123	73	50	100	59	41
IV	35	16	19	100	46	54
V	48	19	29	100	40	60

* The neighborhood groups are distinguished by average monthly rental as follows:

I. Under $10   III. $20–29   V. $40 and over
II. $10–19   IV. $30–39

Education. The average education of farm-reared householders was less than that of their urban-reared neighbors.[6] Nearly one-third (31 percent) of the former had less than an eighth grade education. Only one-seventh (14 percent) of the urban-reared householders were without at least eight grades of schooling. Seventy-one percent of the city-reared but only 47 percent of the country-reared representatives had gone beyond the eighth grade; the proportion of persons with college training was twice as great among those with city as among those with country origin.

The previously mentioned income advantage of

[6] Tables adequately explained in the text are omitted to conserve space. Readers having use for detailed distributions may have copies from the authors upon request.

those with urban-rearing is now seen to be matched with an advantage in education. This suggests that educational handicaps to country migrants persist throughout their later careers in the city. Educational differentials may prove to account for much of the rural-migrant versus city-native class differential. It is significant to note in passing, however, that nearly equal proportions of farm and urban-reared people, five and six percent respectively, in Lexington, which is a University town, had received more than four years of college training.

Age. The 155 farm-reared householders included a slightly smaller proportion of persons under 35 or even 45 years in age than did the 119 who were reared in cities. The former group averaged a little older, therefore, than did the latter group. It is evident from this that the

TABLE 2

AVERAGE INCOME OF FAMILIES WITH FARM AND URBAN
REARED HOUSEHOLDERS IN FIVE NEIGHBORHOOD
GROUPS, LEXINGTON, 1942

NEIGHBORHOOD GROUPS	TOTAL	FARM-REARED	URBAN-REARED
Total	$1,812	$1,757	$1,976
I	609	521	741
II	1,481	1,672	1,289
III	1,685	1,541	1,827
IV	2,441	2,639	2,144
V	3,356	2,788	3,572

relative income and education advantage of the urban-reared householders cannot be due to greater age, for they were younger than those in the country-reared sample. Only 12 percent of the former, but 19 percent of the latter were 65 or more years old.

Size of Family. More of the farm-reared than of the urban-reared householders had large families. One-fifth of the former, but only one-eighth of the latter had families of seven or more persons. Conversely, only 39 percent of the former, but half of the latter had families with one to three persons. The slightly older age distribution of the farm-reared householders may have accounted for part of the larger average size of their families, but it is unlikely that it could have accounted for the total difference between the two groups. In this finding, there is some support for the hypothesis that rural migrants in the city have higher fertility than city natives.

Householders with farm and city-rearing have now been compared by income, education, age and size of family. The next phase of this study examines selected opinions. Interviewers memorized a list of questions designed to elicit opinion, asked these questions in conversation with each informant, and recorded answers after leaving the scene of the interview.[7] Several of the opinion questions asked of Lexington informants are identical or comparable with questions asked in earlier studies in rural communities.[8] In the following discussion, therefore, four groups of informants will be examined comparatively: first, rural residents of Johnson County, in a mountainous area of Eastern Kentucky; second, rural residents of Robertson County in the Outer Bluegrass section of Kentucky; third, rural-reared residents of Lexington;[9] and fourth, urban-reared residents of Lexington.

Community Rating. In order that there might be some indication of social adjustment in the community the following question was asked, "What do you think of this community as a place to bring up children?" A rating of excellent was expressed by half of the rural residents (Johnson and Robertson Counties) but by less than one-fourth of the city dwellers (Lexington). The more temperate rating of good was expressed more frequently in the city than in the country. Among city informants there was no significant difference between the farm-reared group and that of urban origin. The proportion of city informants who rated their community of residence as fair was twice as large as the proportion of rural people, and the rating of poor was expressed by more urbanites than farmers.

There was some difference between the city and country samples in their reasons for favorable rating of their own community. Friendliness, cooperation, and hospitality were mentioned a little more frequently by country than by city people.

[7] For a more detailed statement of the procedure used in this opinion study, see H. W. Beers, et al, *Community Land-use Planning Committees*, Ky. Agr. Exp. Sta. Bul. 417, p. 191 ff. (1941).

[8] Cf. Spaulding, *op. cit.*

[9] Householders with both rural nonfarm and rural farm-rearing are included. In all tabulations reported above the heads with rural nonfarm-rearing were excluded.

Schools, transportation facilities, and churches, however, were mentioned somewhat more frequently by the city informants. Peaceful, respectable people were specified by more than one-fourth of the farm residents, but by hardly more than one-twentieth of the city residents. Among the urban informants there was no significant separation of farm from urban-reared groups. The greatest difference between the two country counties and the city groups is in the much larger proportion of the latter who gave no reasons whatsoever to explain their rating of the local community.

These findings imply a somewhat stronger identification with their community among the residents of the rural counties than among those of Lexington. They imply also a somewhat greater prevalence of inter-personal values among the rural residents and of institutional-facility values among the urban residents.

Opinions Comparing Present and Former Communities of Residence. How did people who had moved value their present community of residence in comparison with their former home? In answer to the question, "Did you like it here better?" most informants in each of the four groups replied, "Yes." In Johnson County, however, the percentage of affirmative replies was only a little more than half (55 percent); nearly three-fourths of the farm-reared Lexington residents preferred their present to their former residence. In this group more than in any of the other three, those who had moved liked their present location better than their community of former residence. Conversely, only two out of ten farm-reared Lexington residents replied, "No," indicating some degree of disappointment or disillusionment as a result of their move. Nearly one-third of the urban-reared informants gave a negative response. This implied satisfaction with the effect of their move to the city was further indicated by the fact that 32 percent of the farm-reared Lexingtonians reported liking the schools and churches of their present community better than those which they had formerly known. This was more than twice the proportion of similar responses in Johnson and Robertson Counties and was significantly larger than the proportion of urban-reared Lexingtonians who offered this response.

Both in Lexington and in the country communities informants were asked whether the rural migrants like the people they meet in the city.

Noncommittal responses were less frequent among the urban than farm group, and the former were also more unanimous in their judgment that rural migrants do like city people. Approximately 8 out of 10 offered this response in Lexington, but only from 5 to 7 out of 10 in the country counties so responded.

Mobility and Social Participation. The proportion of informants who reported a change in frequency with which they visited friends and neighbors after moving was greater in Johnson and Robertson Counties than in Lexington. Just half the informants in Lexington reported no change in this practice and there was no significant difference between the farm and city-reared groups.

Change of residence in the city, however, apparently reduced the frequency of church attendance more than did a change of residence in Johnson and Robertson Counties. Only 6 or 7 percent of the Lexington informants reported increased frequency of church attendance after moving to their present residence; 35 and 36 percent reported decreased frequency. In Johnson and Robertson Counties, however, 29 and 22 percent of the informants, respectively, claimed more frequent attendance after moving. These data indicated that movement from farm to city tends to reduce the frequency of church attendance.

When asked about frequency of participation in clubs, committee gatherings and similar events, 31 percent of the farm-reared Lexington informants reported decreased frequency after moving to their present residence. However, the proportion was nearly as large (27 percent) among urban-reared Lexingtonians. Mobility within the rural counties did not have this retarding effect on participation; 18 percent in Johnson and 11 percent in Robertson reported less frequent activity after moving than before. Perhaps the most interesting feature of these replies is the large proportion of informants in each of the four groups who reported no participation in clubs or community gatherings, either in the old community or in the new. There was one important difference between the farm and urban-reared Lexingtonians in that nearly half of the former, but hardly one-third of the latter, reported no club or community participation in either place. It is clear that the urban-reared city dwellers were the most active of all four classes of informants in the kind of "interest group" and community participation toward which this question was directed.

Opinions Evaluating Education. The urban informants, both those of rural and those of urban origin, expressed more favorable opinions concerning the general effect of high school upon children than did the country informants. The opinion of one-half of the Johnson County people was definitely favorable; only a little more than one-fourth of the Robertson County informants expressed a definitely favorable judgment of high school training, but in Lexington the ratio of definitely favorable to all other opinions was 3 to 5.

In the reasons advanced for a favorable judgment of high school training there was one interesting difference between the rural and urban informants. Fewer than ten percent of the former, but slightly more than 20 percent of the latter credited high school training with increasing the social competence of people. In the country sample most informants who favored education did so because it "helps get jobs"; this reason was expressed five times as often as "increased social competence." In the city these two reasons were named with almost equal frequency, although, there was again no difference between the farm-reared and the urban-reared informants. In these rural communities, social competence was not affected by formal education but getting a job with pay was definitely affected. In the city, education was more often judged important because of its effect on social position.

Obedience of Children. One difference between the rural and urban informants was in their judgment of the obedience of children. Only three percent of the responses in Robertson and Johnson Counties credit children with "minding their parents" as well now as they did when informants were "growing up." The persistence of this rural attitude is shown by the fact that 11 percent of the farm-reared Lexingtonians expressed their belief that children now are as obedient as formerly. Eighteen percent of the urban-reared Lexingtonians, however, six times the proportion observed in the rural counties, expressed a favorable estimate of present day obedience. It is here implied that the impact of social change upon both the concept and the fact of obedience has been greater in the country than in the city.

Opinions Concerning Change in Family Size. When asked for their opinion concerning the trends in size of family, both the country and city informants agreed that families of today are smaller

than they were a generation ago. In three of the groups, 80 percent or more of the informants reported this view: only in Johnson County was the proportion as low as 68 percent. The reasons offered for decline in size of family, however, were different. City informants, and especially those of urban origin mentioned higher standards of living more frequently than the country informants of Johnson and Robertson Counties. The farm-reared Lexingtonians more frequently than the informants of any other group specified the increased cost of rearing a family. The city informants also gave more weight (in terms of more frequent mention) than did the country families to extra-family activities.

Evaluations of Change in Living Levels and Satisfaction. One of the most interesting differences in opinion between the city and country groups was their rating of present day levels of living in contrast to the levels they knew when young. In Johnson and Robertson counties, respectively, 48 percent and 42 percent of the informants considered people now to be "better off" than was the previous generation. In Lexington, however, 60 percent of the informants considered present day levels to be higher, and there was no difference between the farm and urban-reared groups in this judgment. Conversely, the proportion of replies that people were "worse off" was only half as great among Lexington informants as among those in the two rural counties. The farm-reared residents of Lexington, however, in much larger proportion (72 percent) than informants in

the other three groups reported that people now are less satisfied. Fifty-seven percent of the urban-reared Lexington people offered this negative reply. Apparently, in the memory of these city people who were reared in the country the contrast between current levels of satisfaction and those in retrospect seemed greater than it did to the members of any of the other three groups. Life in the city brought consciousness of higher levels of consumption but lessened satisfaction, and there was implication of a greater gap between the two in the city than in the country.

CONCLUSIONS

Rural migrants in Lexington, Kentucky constitute large proportions of the population at each economic level, although their representation is greatest at the lowest level. With education and income somewhat below that of their urban-reared neighbors, they report general approval of their community and especially of its institutions, they report decrease in some forms of social participation; they are completely convinced that high school education is important; they are more conscious than any of the three groups with which they were compared, both of increased levels of living in this generation and of decreased levels of satisfaction. The present study is not large enough in scope to permit unqualified assertion of its findings, but it helps to sift the various hypotheses about the urban status of rural migrants, and it represents a kind of research that might well be developed in subsequent studies and in other places.

THE SOUTHERN SOCIOLOGICAL SOCIETY

Chairmen for 1944 of standing committees of the Southern Sociological Society are: Lorin Thompson, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Research; Guy B. Johnson, Southern Regional Council, Atlanta, Publications; Lessie T. Fleming, University of Georgia, Athens, Membership; Dorothy Jones, Winthrop College, Rock Hill, South Carolina, Resolutions. Howard E. Jensen is *ex officio* chairman of the Committee on Public Welfare and Social Work, and Wayland Hayes continues to serve as chairman of the Commission on the Teaching of Sociology. The President of the Society is *ex officio* in charge of developing the program for the annual meetings. Sociologists and friends of sociology are invited to communicate with these chairmen about matters pertinent to their committee assignments. The maintenance of membership in the Society and the wartime continuation of interest in its program bodes well for sociology in the South after the war. The Society is cognizant of its responsibility to both the profession and the people of the Region, and its program for the meetings in April, 1945 will be arranged under the influence of this dual obligation.

HOWARD W. BEERS,
President.

A POSTWAR POPULATION POLICY FOR THE SOUTHEAST*

HOWARD J. BONSER

University of Tennessee

INTRODUCTION

IF THE Southeast is to be a desirable place to live in the postwar world it needs, among other things, a definite policy, both State and national, with respect to population. This report considers a population policy to be a definite course or method of procedure regarding population, especially with respect to numbers, distribution, and quality of stock. As such it concerns itself with those factors closely allied with population change in a democratic country, namely: family, individual initiative, urbanization, and industrialization.

The Southeast as used here embraces the nine States east of the Mississippi river as far north as Virginia and Kentucky inclusive[1]; however, since so much in this region is influenced by national conditions, it is impossible to consider a population policy for the Southeast without also taking into account national policy.

I suspect the central aim of any population policy should be the maximum welfare of the people now and for future generations. Specific aims might be: (1) to establish and maintain an optimum balance of total population to resources for the region and nation; (2) to distribute population where resources are—or vice versa; (3) to maintain and improve quality of stocks; (4) to preserve the American family as a strong social unit; (5) to raise standards of living and cultural levels; and (6) to maintain our democratic system, individual ini-

* Read before the eighth annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, April 1, 1944.

[1] The States included as Southeast in this report are Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi.

tiative, and private enterprise. Means used to make the policy effective, if they are acceptable, need be consistent with established mores and customs. No measures are tenable in a democratic country that hamper freedom of action or choice. Elements of compulsion, or of denying privileges to one group or class that are accorded to another are indefensible in a free society such as we boast. The postwar period falls within two phases, the immediate postwar period covering the transition from war to peace economy, extending over possibly two to four years depending upon rapidity of reconversion, and the more remote or long-time period.

IMMEDIATE POSTWAR PLANS

In order to visualise the immediate postwar problem it is desirable to consider some recent phases of population change arising out of the war effort along with those of long time standing. Chief among the war induced population shifts are the rapid growth of centers of war activity such as Mobile, Alabama; the shipbuilding centers of Virginia; the area around Washington, D. C.; southern Florida; and others (Figure 1), with accompanying decreased civilian population in other areas of the Southeast—primarily rural areas. Rural youth, who during the 20's migrated to northern cities, were "dammed up" on farms during the 30's, are now manning war industries and guns. This shift was probably the most extensive rural-urban migration experienced in the Southeast in so short a time. Relatively few rural counties in the nine Southeastern States have not experienced a decline in civilian population between April 1940, and November 1943 (the time of registration for war ration book #4).

From a population standpoint there are four

main emergency jobs to be done in the immediate postwar period: (1) absorb members of the armed services into civilian employment; (2) absorb as many as possible of the men now in war industries into peace-time industry; (3) make it possible for women now doing war work to rear families; and (4) to avoid a general back-to-the-land movement.

I believe that popular feeling at the present time is for private industry geared to the profit motive to dominate reconversion. Some public assistance, however, is likely to be needed to speed the transition, regulate unfair practices, and guide it into proper channels. How can the above measures be

FIG. 1. POPULATION CENTERS GAINING 20,000 OR MORE CIVILIAN POPULATION, APRIL 1940–NOVEMBER 1943*

attained? There is some hope in the Tennessee Valley area of future electric power rates being so savorable as to attract industries. Fabrication of raw materials into finished goods such as manufacturing implements and automobiles near the Birmingham area has also been advanced as possible means for industrial expansion. Then there are light industries in the Piedmont, possible magnesium recovery from Gulf Coastal waters, and others that might develop. Also, if the South American republics develop industrially, the Southeast should be in a favored position for trading with them. However, should industrial and commercial activi-

* Civilian population changes in contiguous counties' U. S. Census 1940 and registration for War Ration Book #4, November 1943.

ties fail to develop in the Southeast, a back-to-the-land movement should be avoided. While data are insufficient to be sure of from what farming situations came most of the former farm people now in war industries and armed services, it appears from the sketchy data available in Tennessee that poor agricultural counties (*i.e.*, those having the lowest economic returns per farm and highest in public relief disbursements during the 30's) lost proportionately more people to war industries during the last three years than did more fertile agricultural counties. If this is generally true in the Southeast (and I suspect that it is) then opportunities for war workers or ex-service men of attaining reasonable living conditions by going "back-to-the-farm" are meager indeed. It would be far better from the standpoint of their own welfare, and for that of the Southeast as a whole, should they migrate to areas of greater opportunity.

LONG-TIME PLANS

Some of the important long time population problems needing consideration are: (1) the declining birth rates in urban centers; (2) excess of births over deaths in the rural areas, especially the Southeast; (3) out-migration of working age people from rural areas as a result of the above; (4) an aging population; (5) the ailing of king cotton with consequent decreased resources base; (6) depletion of natural resources; and (7) low levels of living.

From the long time standpoint research is needed in population and in resources. More needs to be known about cultural factors and such things as birth rates, migration, postponed marriages, etc. To what degree do bans on divorce and on birth control discourage marriage? How do such factors as house room; mixed marriages; stability of income; community improvements such as parks, nurseries, etc.; and other cultural factors affect the number of children born?[2]

Fundamental research is needed to evaluate our developed and potential resources; and the optimum population desired from the standpoint of resources, national security, and standards of liv-

[2] See P. H. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser, "Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XXI (July 1943), 221–280, for a study of some of these factors in Indianapolis, Indiana.

See Alva Myrdal, *Nation and Family* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1941), pp. 105–107, for a discussion of this situation under Swedish conditions.

ing. A thorough classification of natural resources including farm and timber lands on the basis of present and potential use is fundamental to any action programs. Without some such guide no intelligent action is possible with respect to desirable numbers of people or migration. Then there is constant investigational work needed on the feasibility of industrialization, farm intensification, new farm enterprises, etc., in areas where population now presses heavily on resources.

Procedures for developing industry in areas of unused resources are not in the purview of this report. Suffice it to say that business men's organizations have in the past successfully promoted industry in places such as Kingsport, Tennessee. Mississippi's "Balance Agriculture With Industry" plan has also worked. It appears that programs usually have been successful when real opportunities have existed. The greatest dangers lurk in places of insufficient opportunities. Gradual industrial development in the Southeast over a period of years encourages us to believe that this may be increasingly helpful in the future, especially in some sections. A population policy should encourage part time farming to accompany industrial employment. This is doubly important in connection with marginal or seasonal industries where periods of unemployment can be expected.

Programs for producing more food at home have met with encouraging response so far. They have usually resulted in the family's living better, in shifting purchases womewhat, but withal producing better nourished children. Furthering these programs should be a definite part of a population policy for this region.

We need be cognizant of cotton decline as a cash crop (especially short staple cotton grown in the uplands), of timber exhaustion in much of the Southeast, and soil depletion with continued low levels of living. If and where satisfactory adjustments demand fewer people, out-migration should be encouraged and directed. However, this will always be frowned upon by popular opinion, will lag in adjustment, and therefore should be looked upon as a temporary expedient.

Needed programs to accompany previous methods mentioned are those aimed at strengthening the family unit by making conditions favorable to more even rates of population replacement, namely: limitation of births to the number that parents can adequately feed and educate, especially in our so-called rural problem areas; and a corresponding increase for families now with few or no children, e.g., in urban areas not now furnishing their own replacements.

I realize that there are conflicting opinions regarding the effectiveness of planned family size as a means of controlling population. Certainly it cannot be done by depending on disseminating knowledge of procreation via the gutter. Repeal of legislation is necessary in some cases to permit our medical and educational staffs to really educate; and to enable druggists to label supplies with directions for use. Our campaigns to stamp out infantile paralysis and tuberculosis are making remarkable progress. Can any one imagine the success that might have resulted if mails refused to carry any description of the nature or treatment of the diseases, or if in some States, they could be treated only under partial disguise such as "chest hygiene"? Certainly a sound population policy must accept this situation realistically and educate first for sensible attitudes towards the whole problem. More adequate health service in the hinterlands is necessary. More doctors, and more nurses are necessary. If these are too expensive to afford, so that a large segment of children must continue to be ushered into the world by midwives, then let us license midwives; school them in certain techniques and use of certain supplies of which they ought to know; and make it part of their duties to be sure that parents of children they deliver have the wherewithal to *choose* when future children shall be born.

Such a program of controlled parenthood if successful should reduce the number of excessively large families in both rural and urban areas (especially in rural). In doing so the need for out-migration from rural areas would be lessened, dysgenic reproduction would be somewhat taken care of inasmuch as unwanted children in unfit families, now tending to be large, would be lessened, greater opportunities for child development made possible, and more satisfying family adjustments made—both economic and psychological.

Simultaneous with this program is needed another aimed to stimulate the moderate size family. For lack of a better term I shall call it a 3-child family—three children in all normal families being estimated as about the proper number to compensate for childless families through sterility, for a reasonable number of celibates, and at the same time maintain a slowly increasing population

(further research is needed as to what is the optimum population).

The public interest in future citizens calls for a removal of present barriers to child bearing, especially in the cities. Such costs as prenatal care; maternity hospitalization (or even midwifery); pediatric care; cost of home nursing during the mother's convalescence; and, in the case of working mothers, loss of time from work, should be compensated for. The $300 to $500 involved in securing these needed services now forces many potential mothers to choose between either dispensing with some needed services, thereby accepting unnecessary health risks (or even life), or of refusing to have children. Whether to furnish services in cash or in kind is a problem of administrative expediency, except in some instances where cash grants might not supply the service (e.g., maternity hospitalization). Other details such as whether payment for the working mother's loss of time should be made through the present unemployment insurance scheme or by a separate agency are details of administration rather than policy and need not be discussed here.

Another element now militating against children, especially in cities, is housing. Normal peace-time advertisements such as "For Rent—5 Room Duplex—No Children" tell part of the story of declining urban birth rates. Maybe housing authorities have the answer to the problem; I don't. Certain countries have embarked upon housing programs to furnish larger houses for large families at rentals within their income. Certainly means of securing the additional space necessary for children should be part of our population policy.

No population policy is complete without some attention to international exchange of people. Immigration is usually a temporary expedient. Should quotas be relaxed following the war, it is doubtful if many immigrants would care to come to the Southeast. On the basis of past performance they immigrate either to new areas or to old areas experiencing new development. It is also doubtful if emigration alone can permanently relieve distressed conditions in over-populated countries. The real solution for them, as for us, lies in adjusting population and resources.

RURAL COMMUNITY ADJUSTMENTS TO RECENT POPULATION SHIFTS IN SELECTED AREAS OF THE SOUTHEAST*

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INTRODUCTION

THE period 1940–43 has witnessed a volume of internal migration previously unparalleled in the United States. The outstanding feature of this migration has been its direction —into the armed forces and industry. By and large the migration has involved individuals rather than families although the number in the latter group has no doubt been increasingly significant as both industry and selective service have dipped deeper into the "Manpower Barrel." Crowded conditions in industrial centers, concomitant high rents and services, a general concensus that the migration will be temporary only, all have contributed, along with other factors, to the widespread belief that the family had best be left behind.

Although some fairly reliable estimates have been made of the volume and direction of this migration, little attention has been given to determining its specific sources. Census releases based on issuance of war ration books to individuals give fairly satisfactory estimates of the areas involved but nothing of the composition of the migrants in terms of race, occupation, sex, and other equally important factors. This, obviously, is less of a problem in terms of the armed forces but a tremendously important one in terms of an equally large or larger group that has moved into cities and war industry areas.

RECENT POPULATION TRENDS IN THE SOUTHEAST

The shift of population into nonagricultural employment during the war period (exclusive of the armed forces) has been proportionately greater in the South than the remainder of the Nation. According to estimates of the Bureau of Labor

Statistics, nonagricultural employment in the Southeast increased by more than 600,000 persons between October 1939 and the same month in 1942.[1] This was an increase of slightly more than 34 percent or 12 percent more than for the Nation as a whole. In each of the five Southeastern States included here the rate of increase in nonagricultural employment was greater than the Nation. The range of increase was from 50 percent in Alabama to 26.9 percent in Mississippi.

Its loss was approximately 145,000 or 10.8 percent.[2] Obviously, losses from the rural-farm population did not necessarily move directly into the increasing industrial population. In fact, there is considerable evidence that a sizeable portion of employables who have left farms during the war crisis have moved first at least into jobs in the smaller towns vacated by those who left the small towns for the city.[3]

The net migration has been more severe in terms

FIG. 1. PERMANENT RESIDENCES OF 2508 EMPLOYEES OF A WAR INDUSTRY PLANT IN ALABAMA, 1942*
● 10 people.   Source: Office of Civilian Defense, unpublished.

The effects of the increase in nonagricultural employment on agriculture is evident in estimates of shifts in the rural-farm population from 1940 to 1942. From April 1, 1940 to January 1, 1942 the rural-farm population of the five Southeastern States included in this study decreased by almost half a million or 7.5 percent. As it led the region in nonagricultural employment gain, Alabama led the other States in loss in rural-farm population.

* Excluding those (1244) giving Alabama as permanent residence.
[1] The Southeast, as used in this paper, includes the five States of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina.

of numbers on the rural than on the city population. Although the five Southeastern States lost a net of approximately 144 thousand persons between 1940 and 1943 the metropolitan population gained

[2] Source for figures on rural farm population the Annual Estimates of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics. Changes between 1942 and 1943 were very small as compared with 1941–42 changes.
[3] Preston Valien, "Social and Economic Implications of Migration for the Negro in the Present Social Order," Quarterly Review of Higher Education Among Negroes, X, No. 2 (April 1942); also unpublished Rural Trends Studies, Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

some 399 thousand. Thus the non-metropolitan population of the States lost a minimum of some 550 thousand—more people than in any city of the Southeast.[4] These figures become even more significant if Florida is omitted since it gained (for the State as a whole) some 188 thousand, the only State not showing a net loss for the period.

The volume of this war migration in the Southeast is not revealed by a net figure. Figure 1 shows that people are not only leaving the Southeast but are coming into it as well. There may have been a particularly large influx of skilled workers. Of 2,508 persons employed by an Alabama war indus-

highly rural has lost a significant number of people during the war period. This is shown clearly in Table 1 where the counties are arranged in groups according to percentage rural-farm in 1940 and decreases in population 1940–43. Of the group of counties under 10 percent rural-farm in 1940, the decrease in population was only 2.3 percent, while in counties reporting 80 percent or more of the population as rural-farm the decrease was 13.6 percent.

There is considerable evidence to support the thesis that a sizeable portion of the migrants have moved from the more clearly defined agricultural

TABLE 1

AVERAGE AND PERCENTAGE DECREASE IN POPULATION OF COUNTIES IN SOUTHEAST FOR WAR PERIOD 1940–43, BY PERCENT POPULATIONS OF COUNTIES WERE REPORTED AS RURAL-FARM IN 1940

PERCENT RURAL-FARM IN 1940	NUMBER OF COUNTIES	DECREASE IN POPULATION 1940–1943	
		Average	Percent
Under 10	3	−487	−2.3
10–19	8	−808	−6.7
20–29	15	−1,457	−6.9
30–39	15	−1,514	−6.1
40–49	26	−2,148	−7.2
50–59	45	−2,205	−9.0
60–69	77	−2,462	−11.6
70–79	98	−2,388	−12.0
80–over	56	−2,469	−13.6

Source: Bureau of Census and Bureau of Agricultural Economics.

TABLE 2

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANGE IN CIVILIAN POPULATION, BY GROUPS OF COUNTIES, 1940–43, AND THE PERCENTAGE OF ALL FARM OPERATORS WHO WERE TENANTS IN 1940

PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CIVILIAN POPULATION 1940–43	COUNTIES BY PERCENTAGE OF TENANCY IN 1940							
	Under 25		25–49		50–74		75–over	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Increases								
All........	30	52	21	22	28	12	0	—
Decreases								
Under 5..	10	18	11	11	16	7	4	10
5– 9..	7	12	21	22	54	24	17	45
10–14..	4	7	23	24	73	32	9	24
15–19..	3	5	13	13	43	19	8	21
20–24..	2	4	7	7	12	5	0	—
25–over	1	2	1	1	3	1	0	—
Total ...	57	100	97	100	229	100	38	100

try in 1942, less than half (49.7 percent) gave Alabama as their permanent place of residence.

In order to determine further the likelihood that farm people are playing a significant role in this migration, a correlation coefficient was run on all counties in the five States in order to determine the relation, if any, between population change (1940–43) and the percentage of the county's population that was reported as rural-farm in 1940. The relationship was found to be negative and rather significant——.64. In other words, the probability is high that any county in the Southeast that is

problem areas of the Southeast.[5] If, as is the case in Table 2, counties of the Southeast are arranged according to 1940–43 changes in population and percentage of county farm operators who were tenants in 1940, it is evident that a rather definite relationship exists between the two phenomena. Among the 57 counties reporting an incidence of tenancy less than 25 percent in 1940, more than half of the counties showed increases in population

[4] Metropolitan population is defined here as defined in Population Series P-3, No. 38, issued by Bureau of Census, 1943, i.e., city population plus entire county population where at least half of county population is in a metropolitan district in 1940.

[5] See Carl C. Taylor, Helen W. Wheeler, and E. L. Kirkpatrick, "Disadvantaged Classes in American Agriculture," Social Research Report No. VIII, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, USDA (Washington, 1938).

between 1940 and 1943. On the other hand, in counties where the incidence of tenancy was 75 percent and more, none of the counties showed increases in population.

A level of living index has frequently been used to measure the general agricultural well-being of an area.[6] If such an index is arranged in accordance with the 1940–43 population shifts the interesting relationships appear as shown in Table 3. In counties indicating a rural level of living index equal to that of the United States or better (100 or

TABLE 3

CHANGES IN CIVILIAN POPULATION BY GROUPS OF SOUTHEASTERN COUNTIES, 1940–43, AS RELATED TO COMPUTED LEVEL OF LIVING INDEXES FOR COUNTIES IN 1940

(U. S. = 100)

PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CIVILIAN POPULATION 1940–43	COUNTIES WITH LEVEL OF LIVING INDEXES:							
	Under 50		50–79		80–99		100–over	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Increases								
All........	3	20	36	12	28	33	11	79
Decreases								
Under 5..	1	7	24	8	15	18	1	7
5– 9..	4	26	79	25	14	17	2	14
10–14..	1	7	96	31	13	16	0	—
15–19..	6	40	52	17	9	11	0	—
20–24..	0	—	17	5	4	5	0	—
25–over	0	—	5	2	0	—	0	—
Total ...	15	100	309	100	83	100	14	100

more) almost 80 percent of the counties showed increases in population as compared with only 20 percent of those with indexes under 50 and a little above 11 percent for those counties with level of living indexes from 50 to 79. Counties in the five States with indexes of 100 and over showed no decreases of more than 9 percent, while approximately 50 percent of all counties with indexes of less than 80 showed decreases of 10 percent or

[6] See Margaret Jarman Hagood, "Rural Level of Living Indexes for Counties of the United States," 1940, Washington: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1943. Also C. E. Lively and Conrad Taeuber. "Rural Migration in the United States," Research Monogram XIX, Works Progress Administration. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1939, p. 73–74.

more. Although limited data preclude any positive conclusion as to whether or not it is the economically "poorer" leaving, it is at least evident that the poorer counties are contributing a disproportionately large share of the migrants.

Numerous articles have pointed out recently the limited demand for Negro workers in present war industries.[7] Figures available on migration indicate that if this is true there is at least a great demand for Negroes to replace those workers who

TABLE 4

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHANGE IN CIVILIAN POPULATION OF SOUTHEASTERN COUNTIES 1940–43 AND PERCENTAGE COUNTY POPULATIONS WERE NEGRO IN 1940

PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN CIVILIAN POPULATION 1940–43	PERCENT OF COUNTIES' POPULATION NEGRO IN 1940*							
	Under 25		25–49.9		50–74.9		75–over	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Increases								
All.....	28	22.6	35	20.3	15	13.5	0	—
Decreases								
Under 5	14	11.3	18	10.5	8	7.2	1	7.1
5– 9	19	15.3	38	22.1	37	33.4	6	42.9
10–14	36	29.0	40	23.3	32	28.8	1	7.1
15–19	17	13.7	32	18.6	12	10.8	6	42.9
20–24	8	6.5	7	4.0	6	5.4	0	—
25–over	2	1.6	2	1.2	1	.9	0	—
Total.	124	100.0	172	100.0	111	100.0	14	100.0

* One county showed no Negroes in population in 1940 Census.

have taken up stands on the assembly line. Counties with heavy Negro population seemingly have lost more heavily than others. (See Table 4.) None of the counties with populations 75 percent Negro and more in 1940 show gains in the period 1940–43. In fact, 43 percent of those counties decreased by 15–19 percent during this period. On the other hand, 22.6 percent of counties with Negro populations under 25 percent of the total increased in population during the 1940–43 period. These and other available figures indicate that the current

[7] Preston Valien, op. cit., also Robert T. McMillan. "Boom Migration: Incidence and Aftermath," Rural Sociology, 7, No. 2 (June 1942), p. 149.

Negro migration from the South is considerably more substantial than has been assumed.[8] In fact, it may be that, in addition to the many jobs created for Negroes through the movement of whites into better paying jobs, barriers to Negro employment in certain war jobs are breaking down to a limited extent as has been true for the Spanish-American group of the Southwest.[9]

RURAL COMMUNITY ADJUSTMENTS TO RECENT POPULATION SHIFTS IN SELECTED AREAS OF THE SOUTHEAST

There can be no doubt that results of the recent and continuous exodus of people from the rural areas of the South are far-reaching. Obviously the effects of this migration vary tremendously from place to place, depending on a multitude of factors such as: volume of migration, its distance, direction, and degree of selection. Each of these factors, and many others, may precipitate change and in many instances have obviously done so. Many such changes are merely in process with indeterminate results. Others have reached a peak and are leveling off into something that would be permanently desirable for the Southeast. This is particularly true in the Southeast with respect to the relation between population and resources. The present ratio is more favorable perhaps than could have been predicted by students of population a decade ago.[10]

Along with the many tangible changes that have come about as a result of the war have come others equally intense, if less obvious, in the rural community. Some of these changes are little past the amorphous stage, hence, it is too early to know their extent or to predict with a great deal of accuracy, their likelihood of remaining after the war. In fact, a great deal more needs to be known about

them before maximum use can be made of them in planning for the postwar period. However, the period of observation has been sufficiently long and ample evidence has been collected to warrant considerable confidence in establishing certain recent community changes that may well be expected to last.[11] In summary these changes are as follows:

1. Information available indicates that the war migration has been primarily an urban one. While the Southeastern area as a whole has lost population, the urban population of the area has increased.

2. There is considerable evidence to support the thesis that the heaviest out-migration has been from the so-called "rural problem areas."

3. It seems that the war migration has been less selective as to race than has frequently been assumed. Although industrial employment has been discriminatory in employing certain racial groups, those which have been discriminated against, for example the Negroes, apparently are moving into jobs formerly held by those who have moved "up" into more skilled and higher paying employment.

4. The dearth of farm labor, and concomitant higher wages, has apparently contributed toward an improvement in the socio-economic status of Negroes and less articulate whites. This has set in motion a series of events which are modifying many intergroup relationships.

5. Out-migration in numerous rural areas has tremendously affected rural schools. Teachers have gone to more highly paid jobs, enrollments have dropped, while, frequently, schools have adjusted their work terms to conform with peak labor needs.

6. Rural church attendance has decreased while the financial status of most has increased.

7. Rural health and medical services have de-

[8] See Preston Valien, *op. cit.*, also A Monthly Summary of Events and Trends in Race Relations, Social Science Institute, Nashville: Fisk University, 1, No. 4 (November 1943) p. 12.

[9] Chas. P. Loomis, "Wartime Migration from the Rural Spanish-Speaking Villages of New Mexico," *Rural Sociology*, 7, No. 4 (Dec. 1942).

[10] National Resources Committee, *The Problems of a Changing Population*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1938, Chap. 2; also Carter Goodrich, et al., *Migration and Economic Opportunity*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1936; also Carl C. Taylor and Conrad Taeuber, "Constructive Rural Farm Population Policies," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, XVI, No. 3 (July 1938).

[11] Most of the data for these observations have been collected by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics in a "Rural Life Trends" study currently being conducted in six counties in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi. Such counties have been visited at about 3-month intervals, the sixth visit having been completed during the latter months of 1943. None of the data for this project has yet been published.

It should be remembered that migration is only a factor in bringing about changes discussed. Its importance in different instances will vary from the governing factor to one subordinate to several others. In any case, its influence cannot be completely isolated.

creased in most rural communities. Physicians, dentists, and nurses have migrated to the armed forces, to industrial areas, and to cities.

8. Intra-group dependence has increased in rural areas generally. Farmers are borrowing more equipment, swapping more labor than before the war.

9. The war situation has improved town-country relationships. In many rural communities townspeople have been given considerable credit for helping to relieve acute labor shortages created by an outmigration of people in the most effective working ages.

10. There is little to indicate that rural recreational patterns have been altered a great deal. The drain of young people out of rural communities seems to be forcing rural youth to come into the towns more in order to associate with persons in their own age group.

11. Farmers generally are thinking about the postwar situation. Possibilities for employment of returning soldiers and war workers is the paramount consideration.

IMPACT OF WAR ON POPULATION TRENDS IN VIRGINIA*

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SINCE 1940 Virginia, along with other States, has experienced some significant shifts in its population. It is rather difficult to compare population changes for the entire population on the same basis as was possible before the war. A large number of military camps, posts, and installations in Virginia have made it desirable to separate so far as possible the civilian population from the military. Since the requirements of war make it desirable not to disclose the size and distribution of the military population, this segment of the population will not be discussed. Since 1940 the civilian population of the State has increased by 210,604, or about 8 percent. Of this increase approximately 122,000 represents the excess of births minus deaths. The remaining 88,600 represents the net civilian migration into Virginia since 1940.

About July 1943 the estimated increase in civilian population was 241,216 as compared with November 1943, estimated at 210,604. This change in a period of six months is due to the further withdrawal of men into the armed forces and a decline in total employment in the State. The major area of employment decline has been in construction. It would appear therefore, that Virginia has closely approached its war-time peak of population unless further expansions of war industries, not contemplated at present, should take

place. Further shifts in population will depend on changes in the employment pattern.

The major increases in Virginia's population have been chiefly in three urban areas—the Arlington-Alexandria-Fairfax Area, with an increase of 70,691, or 56 percent; the Hampton Roads Area, with an increase of 192,653, or 60 percent; and the Richmond-Petersburg-Hopewell Area, with an increase of about 20,000, or 5.9 percent. Other gains and losses around the State in the cities and counties are shown on the accompanying map. The map shows quite clearly that the rural counties of the state have experienced a considerable decline in population since 1940. The current population figures based on the registrations for ration book no. 4 do not afford a satisfactory means of computing precisely the change in the rural and urban segments of the population. However, if one may be indulged a bit of speculation from available data, a number of developments appear to be reasonably clear.

The increase in the urban population of Virginia has been at the expense of the rural-farm and rural-nonfarm decreases. The war apparently has shown no great change in the general pattern of population development in Virginia since 1920. In 1920 the rural-farm population comprised 45.9 percent of the total population; by 1940 this percentage had dropped to 36.7 percent; and at the present time it is estimated to be about 32.5 percent. This represents an estimated loss of approximately 60,000 people from the rural-farm population of

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* Read before the eighth annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, April 1, 1944.

POPULATION CHANGES
BY COUNTIES & CITIES, VIRGINIA
APRIL 1940   JANUARY 1944

LOSS OF MORE THAN 10 %
LOSS OF 5 % TO 10 %
LESS THAN 5% CHANGE
GAIN OF 5 % TO 10%
GAIN OF 10% TO 20%
GAIN OF MORE THAN 20%

Virginia since 1940. This compares with a loss of similar size between 1920 and 1930 for this segment of the population.

The rural-nonfarm population has also probably declined since 1940. In 1920 the rural-nonfarm population was 24.9 percent of the total for the State. In 1930 it represented 28.4 percent and in 1940 it was 28 percent. Our estimate of the 1944 proportion is 24 percent, or a loss of approximately 65,000 from the smaller towns and villages of the State.

The urban population of the State has of course gained as a result of the rural-farm and rural-non-farm losses. The urban increase is estimated at at least 300,000. A comparison of the proportion of the population classified as urban since 1920 is as follows: 1920, 29.2 percent; 1930, 32.4 percent; 1940, 35.3 percent; and 1944, 43.5 percent.

The chief factors underlying these changes in the distribution of the population since the war have been the enlistment and induction of men into the armed forces and the expansion of war industries, chiefly in urban areas. The absolute decrease in the rural population (farm and nonfarm) between 1940 and the beginning of 1944 was about 88,000. The corresponding estimates of natural increase and of inductions and enlistments were 95,000 and 102,000 ; respectively. The estimated net loss in the rural population four and over was thus 183,000. After allowing for those in the armed forces (102,000) the balance of 81,000 consists of a large proportion of women under 35 who have migrated from rural Virginia. The most significant factor in these population changes is the fact that so large a number of adults have left the rural areas. Whether or not they will return is a matter which will be discussed in later paragraphs. The increase in the urban areas of the State has been chiefly from in-migration. Again estimating the proportion of the urban increase which is due to the in-migration it would be about 90 percent, and as a result of natural increase, but 10 percent. To interpret the meaning of the recent changes in population for the postwar period it is a complex undertaking. However, there seems to be a number of elements which are likely to have considerable influence after the war.

1. Agricultural production for war needs is now at a peak level and is being accomplished with fewer agricultural workers.

2. Farm machinery, as it becomes increasingly available, will permit increased production in agricul-

ture with fewer farm workers. This prospect is bright for the larger farm operators who are responsible at the present time for the bulk of commercial production, but it creates a very bleak prospect for the smaller producer and the subsistence farmers to survive the struggle for existence on the farm.

Thus the major economic problem is to appraise as far as possible the employment outlook for the remainder of the war, as well as the postwar period. The basic factor underlying population shifts is a change in the pattern of employment opportunity. Perhaps the following generalizations will serve as a basis for discussion of economic and population changes, namely, employment, both as to type and kind (the basis of production), changes in response to shifts in the patterns of consumption. Since 1940 the major consumer has been the war effort. Other factors which will influence economic development in the future will depend on the influence of the war on consumption habits. Again what changes may be expected in the distribution of employment if our foreign policy encourages an expansion of foreign trade? Such an expansion would seem to be one of the most vital factors in the maintenance of future peace, but on the other hand there is little doubt that such a development will likely influence our pattern of industry.

Following the war the conversion of war industries to peace-time production will alter employment prospects in Virginia in the following fields: shipbuilding, manufacture of explosives, civilian services in connection with military camps, posts and stations. The prospect of maintaining the present level of employment in shipbuilding or of converting such establishments to the production of other products is little more than a pious hope. As a result the large increases in population which occurred in the Hampton Roads Area will present a very serious readjustment problem unless there are sufficient opportunities for employment to absorb a considerable proportion of those who have migrated to the area since 1940. It is doubtful if any considerable proportion of the population in this area will just migrate of its own accord. As a factor in all migration, relative economic opportunities influence the pattern of migration, thus clear cut plans for the future of this area are difficult to sketch even in broad form at this point.

Other areas of Virginia, such as those adjacent to Washington, Fort Belvoir, Camps Alfred P. Hill, Lee, and Pickett, Quantico Marine Base, the Yorktown Naval Development, Fort Eustis, and Lang-

ley Field will undergo considerable adjustment. Their future is closely bound up with the future peace-time plans of the Army and the Navy. With regard to the expansions which have occurred around camps near small towns and in rural areas the most immediate prospect for an expansion of postwar employment lies in the reestablishment of tourist trade in these areas. In most instances this will be considerably less than the services now provided the service men in the neighboring military establishments. On the other hand some facilities bought for the armed services, if not needed for military purposes after the war, can be adapted to manufacturing, trade, and distribution activities if they can be justified from an economic point of view. The types of establishments to which I refer are the large ASF and Quartermaster Depots, Ordnance plants, and the like.

Finally, we may expect that by and large the same factors will influence the population after the war as has been the case in the past. The future pattern of employment will be influenced by:

(1) the size and character of postwar markets; (2) the extent to which new facilities bought for war purposes at public expense are abandoned or used. If these new facilities are used after the war they will encourage the expansion of some communities at the expense of others. It becomes a question of national importance as to what will be the wise policy in this regard. Is it advisable to write off the large sums of public money which have gone into the expansion and development of war industries and war camps and abandon them, or would it be wiser to safeguard the public's investment and convert such facilities to production needs of the postwar period? In all probability our solution to this problem will be a mixed one but it would appear that some general policy with respect to this problem is needed. Such policies, whatever they may be, will be one of the most important influences in the redistribution of population in the future, not only in Virginia, but in the Nation.

DWIGHT SANDERSON
1878-1944

Dwight Sanderson, former President of the American Sociological Society and of the Rural Sociological Society and distinguished rural sociologist, died at his home, Elmcote, in Ithaca, New York on September 27, 1944.

Dwight Sanderson retired from active service in Cornell University as professor and head of the department of Rural Sociology on October 15, 1943, after 25 years of service. He had been the head of this department from its inception and was chiefly responsible for its growth and development. He came to Cornell in 1918 to become its first professor of rural sociology. He was not unfamiliar with the University. A year after receiving his B.S. degree at Michigan Agricultural College in 1897, he became a student here and received his second B.S. in Agriculture, specializing in entomology, in 1898.

From 1898 to 1917, he served in several positions in the field of entomology in Maryland, Delaware, Texas, New Hampshire and West Virginia, in 1904 becoming professor of zoology and state entomologist at New Hampshire State College. That he was a successful teacher, research worker, and administrator in this field is evidenced by the responsible positions which he held and the long list of entomological writings which he produced. These included four books and more than 50 articles on entomological problems. During these years, he served as president of the Association of Economic Entomologists.

In 1907 Dr. Sanderson began a period of service as an agricultural college administrator, first as director of the Agricultural Experiment Station at New Hampshire. In 1910 he went to West Virginia as dean of the college of agriculture, a position which he held until 1915. In this period he became interested in the study of the human problems of rural life, and in 1917 he entered the University of Chicago to take graduate work in sociology. He received the Doctor of Philosophy degree in sociology at Chicago University in 1921 and immediately returned to Cornell.

The beginnings of the department of rural sociology at Cornell were humble. It was a new and uncharted field of work. For several years, Professor Sanderson and one other colleague did all the teaching and research work. Soon he was able to add an extension worker, then an additional teacher and research colleague. In those early days he began research projects in the delineation of the rural community, and it was in this area that he made his most important contribution to rural sociology.

First there was produced by him and his graduate students, a series of monographs on the rural community. About the same time a series of his editorial writings were combined and published as *The Farmer and His Community*. He next wrote a volume, *The Rural Community*; this was followed by a volume on *Rural Community Organization* in collaboration with his colleague, Robert A. Polson. Later he produced *Rural Sociology and Rural Social Organization*, a textbook in rural sociology.

FAMILISM THE FOUNDATION OF CHINESE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

CHENG CH'ENG-K'UN

University of Washington

Long before the collapse of the Manchu Monarchy in 1911, the social organization in China was founded on a large family system. This system exercised such a powerful influence that it completely dominated the thoughts and actions of the Chinese people. It taught them the necessity of cooperation, courtesy, patience, and self-control in family relationship. It bred in them a sense of filial obligation toward their parents and respect for their elders. It inculcated in their minds the supreme importance of working for the honor and glorification of the family name. It caused them "to sweep snow in front of their own door, and not to bother about the frost on the roofs of their neighbors." It aroused in them family consciousness and not national consciousness, and made them eager to fight for the protection of the graveyards of their ancestors and reluctant to shoulder arms in defense of their country. No satisfactory understanding of China and her present titanic problems of adjustment can be attained without an analysis of the deep-rooted influence of this system of social organization from which the Chinese people are emerging to play their part in the postwar reconstruction of the world.

How did this large family system come to play such a vital part in the organization of the Chinese nation? It all started more than four thousand years ago when that country was still largely wild and unexplored. There were impenetrable jungles, ravaging floods, and ferocious animals. The people were mostly nomads without fixed habitations and without uniform codes of conduct.[1] At that time the advantages of farming had just come to the attention of the government. Emperor Shun recognized that the cooperation demanded in settled agriculture could be achieved only through standardization of human relationships. As a measure of insuring success in this new form of economic enterprise, he, therefore, laid down "Wu Tien" or "the five canons" for the purpose of regulating the relations between sovereign and subject, father and son, elder and younger brothers, husband and wife, and between friends.[2] Of these five canons, three were directly connected with the family, and of the three, filial piety or devotion to and respect for one's parents was the most rigidly and widely applied.

According to one of the legendary accounts which Chinese school children used to learn by heart, when Emperor Yao was looking for a worthy successor, he chose Shun mainly because Shun was known to have served his cruel stepmother and unprincipled father with the most sincere devotion. On several occasions, so the story goes, his parents plotted to kill him. At one time, they ordered him to repair a granary of the family, and when he had climbed into the loft, they set fire to the building. At another time, they commanded him to dig a well, and when he was deep underground, they tried to bury him alive. But each time the young man miraculously escaped injury. In spite of these and similar plots against his life, Shun continued to be a devoted and dutiful son uninfluenced by the majesty of his sovereign power.[3]

After more than ten centuries of application,

[1] *Meng Tse* or *Book of Mencius*, Bk. III, Pt. II, Ch. IX.

[2] *Shu Ching* or *Book of History*, Pt. II, Bk. I.
[3] *Meng Tse* or *Book of Mencius*, Bk. V, Pt. I, Ch. II.

filial piety became firmly entrenched in the social order of China. It was upheld by law and sanctioned by philosophers. In Book II of the epoch-making document, *The Constitution of Chow*, supposedly written by the famous Duke of Chow somewhere around the 11th century, B.C., it is stipulated that filial piety is the first of the six proper modes of conduct to be taught to the people and that the punishment of the unfilial is the first of the eight laws of punishment.[4] In *Hsiao Ching* or *Classic of Filial Piety*, which is assigned to Confucius and one of his outstanding disciples, Tseng Ts'an, it is also stipulated that there are three thousand offenses against which the five punishments[5] are directed, and none of them is greater than being unfilial.[6]

What was filial piety as applied by the Chinese people? In a country like China where "society" as an idea of human organization did not exist and where nationalism was never greatly developed because of her rarely challenged position, filial piety acquired a great variety of applications. Most of these applications were made and maintained as a result of the approbative evaluations of Confucius, Mencius, and other philosophers of their times. Filial obedience has been recognized the world over as an important virtue of man. But, in China, it was carried to the extreme. Chinese children were not allowed to talk back to their parents, to ignore their commands or thwart their wishes. They were discouraged from criticizing the acts of their father and mother even if these acts were heinous and wicked. Confucius once said: "A man may gently remonstrate with his parents. But if he sees that he has failed to change their opinion, he should maintain an attitude of deference and not oppose them."[7]

Obedience was not the only application of filial piety in China. The Chinese people also served their parents with great devotion and respect.[8] They honored them and supported them and would not do anything which was disgraceful to them.[9] They believed that while parents were alive, a good son should not wander too far afield.[10] They considered a man filial if he followed the footsteps of his parents and did not deviate from their ways.[11] They thought that if either parent was slain, a good son should sleep on a bedding of straw with his buckler under his head, and dedicate himself whole-heartedly to vengeance as long as he and his enemy were under the same sky.[12] They maintained that the highest achievement of true filial piety was to serve, by means of sacrificial offerings, "those now dead as if they were living."[13] All these applications can be compounded into a simple statement made by Confucius. One day Meng I Tzu, a young nobleman from the State of Lu, asked the Master about the treatment of parents. The Master said: "Never disobey!" Later when Fan Ch'ih (a disciple) was driving Confucius' carriage for him, the Master recounted his conversation with Men I Tzu. Fan Ch'ih wanted to know what he meant by "Never disobey!" The Master said: "When the parents are alive, serve them with propriety; when they die, bury them according to propriety; and sacrifice to them according to propriety."[14]

Furthermore, a filial son in China would take very good care of himself because his body was given to him by his parents.[15] Also he should not show such attachment to his wife and children as to neglect "the nourishment of his parents."[16] Above all, he should have offspring to carry on the name of his family. Once, in his discussion of the last-mentioned subject, Mencius enumerated three things which were unfilial, namely: to be without posterity, to encourage parents in unrighteousness, and to desist from giving them succour in their poverty and old age. Of the three, in the opinion of the philosopher, to be without posterity was the most unfilial.[17]

In this great variety of applications, filial piety

[4] K. C. Wu, *Ancient Chinese Political Theories*, pp. 55 and 59.

[5] Branding, cutting off the nose, cutting off the feet, castration, and death. Reference to these punishments may be found in *Shu Ching* or *Book of History*, Pt. V., Bk. XXVII.

[6] *Hsiao Ching* or *Classic of Filial Piety*, Ch. XI.

[7] *Lun Yu* or The *Analects of Confucius*, Bk. IV, Ch. XVIII.

[8] *Meng Tse* or *Book of Mencius*, Bk. IV, Pt. I, Ch. XIX.

[9] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. XXI, Sec. II.

[10] *Lun Yu* or *The Analects of Confucius*, Bk. IV, Ch. XIX.

[11] *Ibid.*, Bk. I, Ch. XI.

[12] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. II, Sec. XXIV.

[13] *Chung Yung* or *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Ch. XIX.

[14] *Lun Yu* or *The Analects of Confucius*, Bk. II, Ch. V.

[15] *Hsiao Ching* or *Classic of Filial Piety*, Ch. I.

[16] *Meng Tse* or *Book of Mencius*, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Ch. XXX.

[17] *Ibid.*, Bk. IV, Pt. I, Ch. XXVII.

constituted the first principle of familism in the social organization of China. Many Chinese rulers in history encouraged it by their own examples and, practically all of them, by giving awards of one kind or another to those who have been unusually devoted to their parents. Even alien rulers like the Manchus considered its preservation and promotion of paramount significance to their regime. In 1670 Emperor K'ang Hsi issued an edict of sixteen moral maxims, the first of which enjoins the people to pay great attention to filial piety in order to give due weight to human relationship. After his death, his son and successor, Yung Cheng, caused these maxims to be enlarged and improved, and in 1724 the new emperor decreed that they be read to the people on the first and the fifteenth of each month in every city and town throughout the empire. The decree was in force all the way down to the end of the nineteenth century.[18]

The second principle of familism was the devotedness of the younger brother to his elder brother. In his oft-quoted "Announcement" to his nephew, the Duke of Chow considered those who were unfilial and unbrotherly more detestable than robbers and murderers. He said: "Those who commit crimes like robbing, stealing, practicing villainy and treason and those who kill men or violently assault them to take their property are to be abhorred by all. But how much more detestable are the unfilial and unbrotherly ... and the younger brother who does not think of the manifest will of Heaven and refuses to respect his elder brother."[19] Mencius, in discussing the same subject, regarded filial and brotherly affections as laws of nature. He said: "Children carried in the arms all know to love their parents, and when they are grown a little, they all know to love their elder brothers ... There is no other reason for these feelings—, they belong to all under heaven."[20] The importance attached to love and respect for one's elder brother among the Chinese people may be gathered from the fact that in the past nothing could be a better testimony of virtue than for a man to be spoken of by his relatives and friends as a "dutiful son" and "good brother."

The third principle of familism was the proper

attitude of a wife to her husband and her parents-in-law. In China when a woman was married, she went to live with her husband in the family of his folks. She was expected to serve him, obey his orders, and not to thwart his wishes.[21] It would be in contradiction to the mores for her to leave him under almost any circumstances. The Chinese people conceived of husband as heaven and wife as the earth and, to them, it was against reason for a married woman to change her feeling of duty toward her mate.[22] Early in the first century B.C. when Emperor Han Ch'eng Ti was indulging in lasciviousness and profligacy, Liu Hsiang, a high government official and a man of letters of considerable reputation wrote *Lieh Nu Chuan* or *A Biography of Distinguished Ladies* with a note of warning to the court ladies of his time against violation of these traditional moral standards. In this book the author recorded the life of outstanding women in Chinese history whose virtue had helped maintain the august dignity of the imperial households of many emperors. He also emphasized chastity, submissiveness, frugality, and faithfulness as indispensable qualities of womenfolk.

The concept of man's superiority even found support in the writings of educated women. In the first century A.D. there lived a great woman writer by the name of Pan Chao. After the death of her husband, Emperor Han Ho Ti appointed her instructor of the ladies of his court. Later she completed *Han Shu*, a voluminous historical work of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.–24 A.D.) left uncompleted by her brother. Despite her education, she vindicated the venerability of men and the servility of women. In her *Nu Chieh* or *Warnings to Women*, she systematizes all the traditional ideas of subjugation of women and gives them her unequivocal approval. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, the consort of Jen Tsung, the fourth emperor of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) also endorsed her approval of the inferior status of women. She wrote an essay entitled *Nei Hsun* or *Counsel to Women* in which she advises the Chinese women to be "virtuous, gentle, submissive, chaste, quiet, peace-loving and without tears of rage or hatred."

More important than the attitude of a woman to her husband was her attitude to her parents-in-

[18] H. A. Giles, *History of Chinese Literature*, pp. 386–387.

[19] *Shu Ching* or *Book of History*, Pt. V, Bk. IX.

[20] *Mengtse* or *Book of Mencius*, Bk. VII, Pt. 1, Ch. XVIII.

[21] Chen, Ku-yuan, *Chung Kuo Hun Yin Shih* or *History of Chinese Marriage*, p. 180.

[22] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. IX, Sec. III.

law. In China the position of a woman in the family of her husband was extremely difficult. She was supposed to serve her parents-in-law with all human care, courtesy, and respect. According to customary practices handed down from legendary time, at the first crowing of the cock, the daughter-in-law should arise and dress and tidy herself. Then she should go to her parents-in-law and inquire about their health, bring in the basin for them to wash, prepare their breakfast and serve it to them with good cheer. She should maintain the same degree of alertness throughout the day and execute their orders promptly, efficiently, and willingly. Furthermore, she should observe all the rules of decorum in their presence and should neither spit, cough, sneeze, yawn, nor stretch herself, nor lean against anything, nor look askance.[23] These and many other duties used to require as long as three months of instruction before a woman was adequately prepared to enter the house of her husband as wife and daughter-in-law.[24]

The universal application of these basic principles of familism in the agricultural economy of China facilitated and furthered the development of her large family system. This system had many unique features which made it so vastly different from the system that prevailed in the west. What were these unique features? In the first place, the Chinese family was a highly complex institution when viewed from the standpoint of size. In China it was not uncommon to find thirty or forty relatives living in the same household. These relatives usually included husband and wife and their children, the parents and the grandparents of the husband, his brothers, sisters, cousins, and his brothers' wives. As the children grew up and married, the size of the family increased by the natural process of propagation. To the Chinese people who knew little better than the agricultural mode of life their ancestors had developed, the size of the family meant its economic power. And it was on this basis that they considered it the acme of good fortune to have "five generations under one roof."

The complexity of the Chinese family was greatly intensified by the concubinage system. This system was in existence for more than four thousand years. The legendary sovereigns of China including Huang Ti or The Yellow Emperor and

Emperors Yao and Shun all practised polygyny.[25] In the early part of the Chow Dynasty (1122–255 B.C.) it was a custom for the sovereign to have six grades of spouses representing an aggregate number of one hundred and twenty-six.[26] At the end of the dynasty the custom was changed and the number of spouses of a man depended upon his social status. For the sovereign it was one wife and twelve concubines. For a feudal prince it was one wife and nine concubines. For a petty government official it was one wife and three concubines. A scholar might have one wife and two concubines. Among the masses monogamy was the rule.[27] This change in custom continued until the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644–1912) when wealthy farmers and merchants also took concubines.[28] Between 1912 and 1931 many of the ignorant and irresponsible warlords exploited the system to satisfy their lust for sensual pleasure. One of them was notorious for having forty-five concubines. He had more children than he could remember. He was accused of not recognizing them on the street. Somewhat disturbed, he gathered them in the spacious courtyard of his residence one day, and, much to his surprise, he found he had enough sons to make up a veritable platoon.

The development of concubinage in China was a natural social phenomenon. However evil the system might seem from the modern point of view, its existence was traditionally considered indispensable among the Chinese people. To them, nothing could be more disastrous than for a family to have no male offspring to carry on its name. Therefore, a man was justified to take a concubine or concubines if his wife failed to give birth to a son. This justification was so widely accepted that throughout the ages all government regulations of the system were carefully qualified so that those who did not have male offspring would not be unduly affected by them. A good example of such qualified regulations may be found in *Ming Lu* or *Laws and Regulations of the Ming Dynasty* (1368–1643). According to this source, the eldest son of a family is entitled to a maximum quota of three

[23] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. X, Sec. I.
[24] *Ibid.*, Bk. XLI, Sec. X.

[25] Chen Ku-yuan, *Chung Kuo Hun Yin Shih* or *History of Chinese Marriage*, p. 55.
[26] Mai, Hui-ting, *Chung Kuo Chia Ting Kai Tsao Wen T'I* or *Problems of Reorganization of the Chinese Family*, p. 251.
[27] *Ibid.*
[28] Chen Ku-yuan, *Chung Kuo Hun Yin Shih* or *History of Chinese Marriage*, p. 69.

concubines. But he shall not have his first concubine until he is without a male heir at the age of thirty. If, upon reaching the age of thirty-five, he still has no male heir, he can, then, have the rest of his quota of concubines. Other sons of the family shall wait until they are without a male heir at the age of forty before they can take their allotted number of one concubine. Those who violate these regulations shall be subjected to a punishment of forty lashes by bamboo.[29]

In such a complex family organization, all its members were assigned to their proper positions for the purpose of facilitating the maintenance of domestic harmony. These members included both relatives from a direct line like parents and their children and grandchildren, and those from collateral lines like aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins, and other more distant relatives. Attached to their respective positions were their respective rights and duties. These rights and duties changed with the change of status of the individual. In the case of a male member, his status was determined by age in conformity with the long-established Chinese social practice.[30] In the case of a female member, her status was determined not only by her age, but also by her ability to help increase the male population of the family. In her relationship with men, a woman's status changed in the following order: Before marriage, she followed and obeyed her father and elder brothers; when married, she followed and obeyed her husband; and after her husband's death, she followed her sons.[31]

The second feature was the way by which the family was controlled as one functioning unit. Theoretically, the father was vested with absolute authority consistent with the superior status customarily assigned to men in China. But in actual practice, there was a division of labor between the sexes. While the father occupied himself mainly with the duties of earning a livelihood for the family and upholding its honor, the mother was the center of Chinese domestic life. She generally decided when and where her children should begin their schooling. She arranged the matters concerning their betrothals. She managed the business of the household and directed all the punctilious social relations with kith and kin. She attended to the ceremonies with regard to births, marriages, and deaths, and saw to it that the relationships among the various members of her family were satisfactorily maintained. In reality she held a very exalted position among her children as was amply demonstrated not only by the respect they paid to her when she was living, but also by the mourning rituals they observed after her death. According to Chinese tradition, both father and mother were placed in the same category for first degree mourning except when the father survived the mother. In the latter case, the explanation was that "There are not two suns in the sky, nor two sovereigns in a country, nor two rulers in a state, nor two highest authorities in a family. Only one person rules the family (at a time), hence, while the father is alive, the mourning of the second degree is worn for the mother."[32]

To strengthen the power of parental control in the Chinese family, a system of mourning was developed. This system was conceived on the basis of kinship and included five degrees.[33] The first degree was observed for father, mother, husband and husband's parents and extended over a period of three years (actually from 25 to 27 months). The second degree ranged from one year for grandparents, uncles, aunts, brothers, and sisters to five months for great-grandparents, and three months for great-great-grandparents. The third degree was prescribed for married aunts, married sisters, brothers' wives and first cousins (from father's side) for nine months. The fourth degree was established for granduncles, granduncles' wives, unmarried grandaunts, father's first cousins, and father's first cousins' wives, for five months. The fifth degree lasted only three months and was observed for great-granduncles, great-granduncles' wives, unmarried great-grandaunts, married grandaunts, grandfather's first cousins and grandfather's first cousins' wives. Of these five degrees of mourning, the first was generally considered "the highest expression of grief" and "the richest exhibition of feeling of affection and respect." Tsai Wo, a disciple of Confucius, once argued against the three-year mourning and insisted that one year was sufficient. When he went out, Confucius said: "This indicates Tsai Wo's want of virtue." In the opinion of the Master, the three-year mourning was the essence of propriety since

[29] Chen Ku-yuan, *Chung Kuo Hun Yin Shih* or *History of Chinese Marriage*, pp. 68–69.

[30] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. XXI, Sec. II.

[31] *Ibid.*, Bk. IX, Sec. III.

[32] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. XLVI, Sec. VI.

[33] F. Max Muller, *Sacred Books of the East*, Vol. XXVII, p. 205.

"It is not until a son is three years old that he is allowed to leave the arms of his parents."[34]

From this elaborate system of mourning emerged the cult of ancestor-worship to further strengthen the power of parental control in the Chinese family. This cult conceives the idea that the departed spirits of the ancestors are still hovering somewhere in the neighborhood looking after the welfare of their descendants. In order to keep these departed spirits from losing their sense of justice, the living must continue to demonstrate their respect for the dead. One way of demonstrating such respect was to follow the footsteps of the ancestors and keep to the path of virtue. Evidences of this line of thinking can be found throughout the massive history of China. As early as the fourteenth century B.C. when P'an Keng, the seventeenth ruler of the Shang Dynasty (1766–1154 B.C.) was preparing to move his capital to a better location, his people were unwilling to go with him. Thereupon he made an epochal declaration in which he justified his preparation in these terms: "My present undertaking to move the capital is to give repose and stability to the state .... Were I to err in my government ... my ancestors would send down great punishment for my crime."[35]

Another way of demonstrating respect for one's ancestors was the establishment of places where sacrificial offerings could be made to them after their death. In an ordinary family, the central hall was reserved mainly for this purpose. If the family split up as usually happened in three or four generations, several related families might have a common ancestral temple. In an official family the number of ancestral temples depended upon its status and influence. A feudal prince was entitled to have five: one each for his father, grandfather, great-grandfather, great-great-grandfather, and the remotest ancestor. A high government official was entitled to have three: one for each of his father, grandfather, and great-grandfather. A petty official could have only one for his father.[36]

In these ancestral halls or temples the Chinese people offered seasonal and anniversary sacrifices to their departed ancestors. During the day of sacrifice, the filial son was expected to be deeply engrossed in thinking of his parents. In entering the hall or temple he would seem to see them in the

places where their *Ling Wei* or spirit-tablets were set up. On leaving it he would seem to be arrested by hearing the sounds of their movements. A classical example of such devotion was King Wen, father of the first emperor of the Chow Dynasty (1122–255 B.C.). According to Chinese legendary accounts, this illustrious man served the dead as if they were living. He thought of them with great grief and wished he were with them in their ghostly state. So sincere was he in performing the sacrificial offerings that he felt as if he saw the pleased expression of their faces.[37]

The third feature was the solidarity of the family. Centralization of domestic control in the hands of the parents and deification of them after their death were in themselves forces contributing to solidarity. But a more powerful force was the process of conditioning by which the corporate unity of the home was maintained. This process operated for the accomplishment of two chief objectives, namely: collective responsibility in behavior and mutual aid in livelihood. On the one hand, children in China were taught that, whatever work they undertook, they must do it with the thought of glorifying the spirits of their ancestors and bringing honor to the family and not to disgrace their good names.[38] In addition, the Chinese government system was such that the administrative authorities found it convenient to hold the family collectively responsible for the conduct of its members. In cases like treason against the State, the crime of one member might cause the death of the whole family irrespective of sex or age.[39] Brought up in these forms of conditioning, the Chinese people naturally learned to think twice before they acted.

On the other hand, children in China were early impressed with the idea that security of the individual in the family lay in mutual aid among its members. They took nourishment of their parents and aged relatives as their first duties in life.[40] They loved their brothers to the same degree as they loved their own "hands and feet." Sometimes a brother would travel thousands of miles across the sea and go through considerable privation to redeem the honor of a bankrupt brother.[41]

[34] *Lun Yu* or *The Analects of Confucius*, Bk. XVII, Ch. XXII.
[35] *Shu Ching* or *Book of History*, Pt. IV, Bk. VII.
[36] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. XX, Sec. V.
[37] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. XXI, Sec. VII.
[38] *Ibid.*, Bk. XXI, Sec. IX.
[39] *Chung Kuo Hun Yin Shih* or *History of Chinese Marriage*, pp. 213–214.
[40] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. X, Sec. II.
[41] Lin Yutang, My Country and My People, p. 181.

Oftentimes a successful man would willingly share his wealth with his relatives and use his influence to improve their economic status. The legendary Emperor Shun had a half brother named Hsiang. For many years Hsiang had cherished the desire to kill Shun. When the latter ascended to the throne, he raised Hsiang to the rank of a prince. In discussing the episode, Wan Chang, a disciple of Mencius, could not see the wisdom in Shun's way of doing things. Mencius explained: "A man of virtue does not entertain resentment against his brother, but only regards him with affection and love. Regarding him with affection, he wishes him to be honorable. Regarding him with love, he wishes him to be rich."[42] On another occasion Mencius said: "Those who have abilities should train and support those who have not, and hence men rejoice in having fathers and elder brothers who are possessed of virtue and talent."[43]

The fourth feature was the presence of a feeling of continuity in the family. To the Chinese people life was an unending process of succession. One generation died, another came up to take its place and the institutional functions of the family continued. In the "Great Announcement" issued in the name of King Ching at the beginning of the twelfth century B.C., the influence of this feeling of "social immortality" was very marked. The young monarch justified his intention of crushing the revolt which was then brewing against his reign on the ground that he simply could not shirk the responsibility of maintaining peace and order in the empire created by the virtue and prowess of his father. He queried argumentatively: "If a deceased father has broken the ground and his son is unwilling to sow the seed, how much less will he be willing to reap the grain?"[44]

In the writings of Liehtze (a hitherto unidentified scholar who was alleged to have lived in the third century B.C.) there is a parable which also illustrates the influence of this feeling of "social immortality." According to the parable, there once lived in North China an old man of about ninety years of age. This old man had been living in a house facing the Tai Hang Mountain all his life. He was tired of climbing up and down the mountain whenever he went out. So he gathered his family one day and said to them: "Let us set to

work and move this mountain so that we may have a level path leading straight to Central China." The family agreed. Thereupon the old man led three of his children and grandchildren and began to chip the rocks and scrape the earth and carry them in baskets to Po Hai, hundreds of miles away. An orphan boy of the widow next door who had just shed his milk teeth trod along with them and came home only once a year. These activities created periodical commotion in the neighborhood. A friend laughed at the old man saying: "What a fool you are! With all the strength and years left to you, you can't even scratch the surface of the mountain, let alone the rocks and earth." The old man drew a deep sigh and said: "It's only your mind that is not made up; when it is made up, nothing can stop it. You are of less use than the widow's son. When I die, there will be my children to carry on the work, and the children will have grandchildren, and the grandchildren will again have children, and the children will again have children, and the children will again have grandchildren. So my children and grandchildren are endless, while the mountain cannot grow bigger in size. Why shouldn't it be leveled some day?"[45] The friend could not make any reply. Now the Snake Spirit overheard the conversation and went to speak to God. God had pity on the old man's sincerity and ordered the mountain to be removed.

Circumscribed in this kind of organization, the Chinese large family existed very much as an independent social unit. It was self-contained, self-disciplined, self-perpetuating, and self-sufficient. It fulfilled almost all the functions of an organized society and made the feeling of attachment to it strong and irresistible. Economically, it represented the most radical form of socialistic cooperation. Within its four walls all members worked and lived together. They all did what they could and took what they needed. They were all partners in the same productive enterprise. In their various positions, they were all employers, employees, middlemen, and holders of property. Between them there were no essential differences in social condition. They shared wealth and prestige as well as poverty and degradation.

The operation of this form of socialistic cooperation depended on the subordination of desire for personal profit to the desire for virtue, the significance of which is repeatedly emphasized in Chinese

[42] *Meng Tse* or *Book of Mencius*, Bk. V, Pt. I, Ch. III.

[43] *Ibid.*, Bk. IV, Pt. II, Ch. VII.

[44] *Shu Ching* or *Book of History*, Pt. V, Bk. VII.

[45] Lin Yutang, *The Wisdom of China and India*, pp. 1062–1063.

classical literature. Once Mencius went to see King Hui of Liang. The king asked if the philosopher had come with counsels to profit his kingdom. Mencius replied: "Why must Your Majesty use that word 'profit'? . . . If Your Majesty ask, 'What is to be done to profit my kingdom?' the great officers will ask, 'What is to be done to profit our families?' and the petty officers and the common people will ask, 'What is to done to profit our persons?' Superiors and inferiors will then struggle against one another for profit and the kingdom will be in danger."[46]

At another time, a scholar named Sung K'ang was travelling to the State of Ch'u. Mencius met him on the way and inquired about his destination. Sung K'ang replied: "I have heard that the States of Ch'in and Ch'u are locked in desperate fighting, and I am going to persuade the King of Ch'u to cease hostilities. If he would not be pleased with my advice, I shall then go to see the King of Ch'in. Of the two kings, I shall surely succeed with one." Mencius said: "I will not bother you with details, but I should like to hear the nature of your persuasion." Sung K'ang replied: "I will tell them how unprofitable their course of action is to them." Mencius said: "Your aim is great, but your argument is not good. If you start from the standpoint of profit, . . . if the kings are pleased with your counsels and stop the movement of their armies, then all will . . . find pleasure in the pursuit of profit. Ministers will serve their sovereigns with the thought of profit; sons will serve their fathers, younger brothers will serve their elder brothers with the same thought; and the issue will be the abandonment of benevolence and righteousness . . . and the result will be general disorganization for all."[47]

Judicially, the Chinese people believed and practiced the ancient saying that "Chia chou pu k'o wai yang" or "Disgraceful affairs of the family are not to be made known outside." They kept domestic conflicts very much to themselves. Disrespectfulness to parents, parents-in-law and elders in general, unfaithfulness to husband, disloyalty to elder brothers, and violation of marriage customs were usually hushed up and adjustments made by the parents or, in more serious cases, by the family council which was composed of the elders of the household. When conflicts involved two or more families, the matters were customarily submitted to and settled by the elders of the village which, in reality, was "the family raised to a higher exponent."[48] These village elders, together with the local gentry who were schooled in law and history, formed an unofficial tribunal in which most of the civil disputes and petty criminal offenses were liquidated. That was why in spite of the fact that China possessed a minutely organized and dynastically revised system of law,[49] her rulers never found it necessary to set up a separate law-enforcing machinery. The Chinese district magistrate was invested with judicial function, but at the same time, he was the warden of local prisons, the overseer of public roads, the registrar of land, the collector of taxes, the superintendent of education, and the commissioner of police.

Socially, members of the Chinese family were all insured against the many misfortunes of life. Whether the person affected was an orphan, a widow, a blind, a crippled, or a decrepit old man, he or she was taken as a charge of the family.[50] It would be a gross disgrace to the names of the ancestors if any of these unfortunate relatives was allowed to wander about without assistance and care. This was especially true when applied to parents. Confucius once said that a man should serve his father as he would expect his own son to serve him.[51] The significance of this interdependence between relatives was recognized very early in Chinese history. In the eighteenth century B.C. when I Yin, "the sage minister" of King T'ang, was presenting the latter's young heir to the throne, he submitted a written counsel to the new king entitled: *I Hsun* or *The Instruction of I Yin*. In this instruction, the minister said: "Now your Majesty is entering upon the inheritance of the virtue of your illustrious father, everything depends on how you commence your reign To set up love, it is for you to love your elders; to set up respect, it is for you to respect your relatives. The commencement is the family."[52] Living in such a state of interdependence, the Chinese people never felt the need for organized relief outside the home circle.

[46] *Meng Tse* or *Book of Mencius*, Bk. I, Pt. I, Ch. I.
[47] *Ibid.*, Bk. VI, Pt. II, Ch. IV.
[48] Lin Yutang, *My Country and My People*, p. 175.
[49] Yang Hung-lieh, *Chung Kuo Fa Lu Fa Ta Shih* or *History of the Development of the Chinese Legal System*.
[50] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. III, Sec. V.
[51] *Chung Yung* or *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Ch. XIII.
[52] *Shu Ching* or *Book of History*, Pt. IV, Bk. IV.

vised to cultivate the skill and improve the physique of the individual player. Even in card games like mahjong, each person played for himself.

Viewed as a social system, the large family in China worked with considerable effectiveness in a settled agricultural economy. Started from the legendary Emperors Yao and Shun, it stood well the test of forty centuries. It was encouraged in the belief that a nation of cultivated persons and properly regulated families should make a good nation. This belief emphasized the cultivation of the right mental attitude of the individual in human relationship as the most fundamental social function. Confucius regarded it as the key to the establishment of a state of peace and tranquility which he called "the highest excellence." He said: "Trees have their roots and their branches. Affairs have their ends and their beginnings . . . In ancient time, those who wished to bring about enlightenment to the world, they first ordered well their own states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their own families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons. Wishing to cultivate their persons, they first rectified their hearts . . . "[59]

To facilitate the cultivation of the right mental attitude, Confucius developed a system of philosophy which included the three ethical principles of righteousness, benevolence, and propriety. In his opinion, righteousness aimed at the regulation of one's passions and involved constant examination and correction of one's own thoughts and actions.[60] Benevolence aimed at attaining that plane of humanity on which one was able to do to others what one wished to be done to oneself.[61] Propriety was a process of social education by which the people were taught to know that to be righteous and benevolent, "the father should be affectionate, the son should be filial, the elder brother should be kindly, the younger brother should be devoted, the husband should be loving, the wife should be submissive,

the aged should be gracious, the young should be reverent, the friend should be sincere . . . "[62] This process of social education operated to inculcate into the minds of the people from early childhood a proper understanding of their respective social positions together with their various relationships and duties.

As long as the neighboring countries were friendly and peaceful, there was nothing fundamentally wrong in this type of organization. But times have changed and neighbors have grown strong and aggressive. China can no longer exist as a nation of more or less independent families loosely held together by a government which has traditionally exercised a minimum degree of administrative control. Neither can she cling tenaciously to her age-old agrarian economy. She must effect a radical reorganization of her people so that they can develop the bounteous resources of their country to meet the challenge of the time. The program of this reorganization must include as its essential features the liquidation of the large family and the reorientation of the mental attitude of the Chinese people from family-mindedness to national consciousness.

So far, the large family system in China is rapidly being liquidated. The disruptive forces created by industrialization, urbanization, governmental actions in the nature of economic, social, and political reform, civil wars and external conflicts during the last hundred years have all combined to hasten this process of liquidation. But the break-up of the system has not been accompanied by a corresponding rapidity in the reorientation of the mental attitude of the Chinese people. In spite of the introduction of modern education, the influence of four thousand years of familistic tradition is still predominant in practically all phases of their national life. Without a comprehensive knowledge of the development and extent of this influence, it would be difficult to understand the titanic problems which are confronting China in her efforts to adjust herself to the modern world.

[59] *Ta Hsueh* or *The Great Learning*, The Text of Confucius.

[60] *Ta Hsueh* or *The Great Learning*, Ch. X.

[61] *Lun Yu* or *The Analects of Confucius*, Bk. VI, Ch. XXXVIII.

[62] *Li Chi* or *Book of Rites*, Bk. VII, Sec. II.

THE LIFE CYCLE OF AN IMMIGRANT INSTITUTION IN HAWAII: THE FAMILY

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I

THE students of social institutions are concerned primarily with the problems of how best to conceive in objective terms the continuity of an institution. Implicit in the concept of continuity of an institution is the idea of change and functional efficacy, for the survival of an institution depends to a large measure on its ability to adjust itself to ever changing environing conditions. Normally the adjustment of an institution to changing situations takes place rather slowly, but in a crisis situation, such as brought about by the present war or by long distance migration, an institution undergoes a radical and, quite frequently, a cataclysmic change. The institutional change can, therefore, be measured and described quite objectively. It is the aim of this paper to describe and analyze the processes of institutional transition—the break down of the old and the emergence of a new equilibrium. Specifically, it purports to show how the traditional Japanese family modifies its organization as it responds to economic, cultural, and moral forces at work in Hawaii.

A comprehensive study of institutional transition requires a knowledge of what the institution was prior to its modification, and an understanding of the relevant factors which, by interacting with the traditional values, produce a new structure. A knowledge of the former gives a basis for an orderly description of the changes in institutional structure; a knowledge of the latter provides a conceptual framework for a systematic description of the available facts of changing institutional behavior patterns.

II

The traditional family in Japan is, unlike the husband-wife centered unit of our society, essentially a parent-child centered unit. Herein lies the conceptual and ideological difference between the Oriental and Occidental family system. The great emphasis placed upon the continuity of the family in Japan functions to condition, direct, and limit the Japanese mental orientation. To a typical Japanese, the family is an institution *par ex-*

cellence and an end in itself. He places his family welfare over and above his own personal well-being. Within the family he expects to attain a maximum satisfaction of the wishes for response and security. By virtue of his membership in the family, he has his status and enjoys recognition from the community. In the family he discovers the goal he expects to pursue; finds the means with which to achieve it; and develops and shares the attitudes and sentiments manifested in the institution.

In the traditional Japanese family the parent-child relationship is more important than that of the husband-wife, for the perpetuation of the institution rests on continuation of the patriarch-heir relationship. Such a proverb as: "The nuptial relation is borrowed" (*Fufu wa kari Mono*) or "The parent-child relationship is real and permanent" (*Oyako no En wa kitemo kirenu*), is indicative of the people's attitude toward the husband-wife relationship. The latter is looked at simply as transitory and momentary: necessary only for the continuity of the family. A wife is expected to give her full support to the perpetuation of the institution by giving birth to the heir, but she is not regarded as essential to the well-being of the family.[1] Japanese history records many incidents in which the patriarch took his son into complete confidence but ignored his wife. It is customary even today for the patriarch to talk with his eldest son about matters concerning family affairs.

The essential characteristic of the traditional family is not its large size nor its complex membership structure. Large families are found in Occidental societies, and conversely small families are found in Japan.[2] Generally speaking, however, the parent-child centered family tends to be larger

[1] In the analysis of the traditional Japanese family in Japan, I am indebted to Professor T. Toda of the Tokyo Imperial University for his penetrating study of the family in Japan. See his *Research on the Family* (*Kazoku no Kenkyu*) and *The Family and Marriage* (*Kazoku to Kon-in*).

[2] See, T. Toda, "The Structure of the Modern Japanese Families in Japan," (*Gendai Waga Kokumin no Katachi tsukuteiru Kazoku no Kosei ni tsuite*), *The Publication of the Japanese Sociological Society.*

in size and more complex in structure than the husband-wife centered unit. The families with three or more generations are comparatively more numerous in Japan than in America. But, such external differences are merely incidental and not the essence. The essence lies in the unusual premium placed upon the patriarch-heir relationship as vital for the perpetuation of the family through time.

Mainly, because of his office as well as his age, the patriarch plays a very important role and enjoys the highest status in the family. He controls and supervises the family wealth (*Ka-san*), family tradition (*Ka-fu*) and the conduct of all that comes under his authority. His authority, on the other hand, is inherent in the office, and the sanction of it, primarily in custom and public opinion and only secondarily in law. Through family tradition and family wealth, which have symbolic significance, the family gets its *esprit de corps*, and *morale*, and strives to enhance its status within the wider community.

Moreover, the ideological and structural framework of the traditional family in Japan has many points in common with those of other major social institutions—economic, religious, educational, and governmental. This harmonious institutional coordination gives the family its solidarity, which is inherent in the institutional integration and in the organization of the individual's attitudes, sentiments, and habits in accordance with the expectations and demands of the institution. In such a situation the mores and public opinion give their full support to the institutions of adoption (*Yoshi*), divorce (*Ri-kon*), and disinheritance (*Kan-do*), since they insure the continuity of the family through generations of patriarch and heir.

Less institutionalized, but nonetheless, important as factors in solidifying family life, are ancestor worship (*So-sen Suhai*), the code of filial piety (*Ko-ko*), and respect for family name (*Ka-mei*). By participation in the worship of the ancestral cult the family members orient themselves to the temporal perspective—past, present, and future. It gives a religious significance to the office of *Ka-cho*. The code of filial piety with its accompanying ceremonials gives emotional support to the hierachy of member-roles with the *Ka-cho* at the apex. It also maintains social distance between the *Ka-cho* and other members of the family, thereby safeguarding the office of the *Ka-*

cho. Finally, the respect for family name, a symbol of family status and solidarity in the community, creates and maintains *esprit de corps* and morale and thus enhances collective aspirations among the members.

III

Unlike the Japanese village, the society in Hawaii is highly secular. Owing to the capitalistic economy, coupled with the fact that the immigrant comes to Hawaii to make "quick money," life revolves chiefly around the nexus of money, and less on custom and convention. Consequently, human relations become impersonal, fragmentary, and abstract. Moreover, the population of the Islands is heterogeneous and the cultures are polygenetic and often divergent. In this situation the traditional Japanese family confronts crisis, but the cultures of the local community lack the necessary consensus to provide a uniform and standard definition of the situations. A long distance migration resulting in the spatial separation of the immigrant from his family and the community of his origin, together with the fact that there exists divergent cultures in Hawaii, makes the problem of institutional adjustment more highly conscious in the mind of the Japanese immigrant. In his effort to re-adjust his institutional behavior patterns he becomes keenly aware of the traditional institution. Not only is the family now in question, but his personality undergoes some modification. In the Hawaiian situation, therefore, the immigrant finds himself faced with the necessity of changing his old attitudes, sentiments, and habits as well as his attitudes toward the cultural traits which he borrows.

In this new community the immigrant's economic activities lie chiefly outside the orbit of the family. Instead of his career being secured by the transmitted *Ka-san* (family wealth), he is now compelled to sell his labor in a highly competitive labor market. In other words, his social status becomes competitive, rather than institutional. The new status lacks the traditional feature of security as well as conventional value.

For some years after his coming to Hawaii, the Japanese immigrant typically spends his life as a single man, but considers himself an integral part of his paternal family in Japan. When he marries, he sets up a husband-wife centered unit. Both he and his wife become wage earners and set aside a

disproportionally large sum of money.[3] They cherish a common objective of returning to Japan and there to re-establish themselves in the old community. But as more children are born the economic burden becomes heavier and they reluctantly discard their original plan. As they alter their plan of returning to their old community, they become less and less under the influence of their paternal family and they alienate themselves from the paternal family control.

The family continues to show a high degree of solidarity as long as the children are economically dependent. An emotional bond, developing spontaneously out of intimate personal contacts, holds the family members together. While the children are young the goods purchased are limited to those commodities having to do with the bare necessities of life. However, as the children become an important source of family income, there is a striking reorganization of the family expenditures. The children, who are educated in the American schools introduce new items in foods, and other new cultural artifacts—the radio, the piano, chairs, beds, books and magazines, even a whole new set of utensils, and above all the automobile. All these new items borrowed from the American culture entail redefinition of the standard of living.[4] The conflict of economic values between the first and the second generation become a recurrent phenomenon, since the first generation is primarily interested in thriftiness, while the second generation (Ni-sei) in spending. But, this is being resolved by a gradual relinquishing of the authority by the first generation, as the latter becomes more and more economically dependent on the Ni-sei. This change effects the nature of the traditional parent-child relationship as revealed by a first generation woman.

My eldest son came to Hawaii when he was only a boy of twelve. He is now very much a "Hawaiian boy." He is not at all like the young man born and educated in Japan. He lets his wife run the home very much to her own liking. His wife is one hundred percent Hawaiian born. Instead of me, his wife is the boss.

I am now fifty-five. I still go out and work in the sugar cane field and earn money to supplement the household income. This sort of thing is not done in Japan. Something is very wrong here in Hawaii.

In Japan as soon as a son marries his mother retires. The young wife then does most of the hard work in and out of the home. In Japan I would be a nursemaid to my grandchildren. But that is not possible in Hawaii. I have no control over my son's wife. As long as our family needs my money to meet the bills I must work out in the field. I wouldn't dare to offend my son's wife by even suggesting that she should work outside the home.

Here in Hawaii we older people worry a lot. Who is going to support us when we grow too old to work? Only way we could be sure of our future is to be nice to the younger generation. . . .

I certainly wouldn't want to spend my old age in Yoroin (an institution for the aged) and be taken care of by public charity. If such a tragedy ever falls on us, my husband and me, it would be a great shame and disgrace. . . . I feel, a safeguard against such a tragedy is to be always nice to the daughter-in-law. Here in Hawaii woman-folk seem to run the home.[5]

There is still a considerable degree of family economic cooperation, and the sharing of common economic goods tends to foster group solidarity. Moreover, the expectations and the public opinion of the Japanese community still control the conduct of the Ni-seis. It is considered highly desirable for the children to look after their parents, although it is no longer expected that the eldest son exclusively assume this responsibility.

The way in which the family as a group struggles for a higher status within the Island community, reveals realistically the family as an economic unit. To the Japanese immigrant, as to all others in Hawaii, a road to improve his status is to escape from the stigma of a "canefield man" by leaving the plantation. He resorts to one of three ways.

The first and the most common method is "cooperative living without an immediate plan to

[3] A common complaint one hears on the plantation nowadays is that the Japanese family on the plantation makes almost as much as five times what it was able to make some twenty years ago, but it could not set aside any money for future use. The wedding, the birth of a child, death, and departure of some members of the neighborhood entail gifts in the form of goods or cash, a binding obligation from which the family has no escape.

[4] A study made of 100 plantation families in Hawaii shows that the change in the standard of living is less a function of income but of the increase in the number of children educated in American high schools. This fact was particularly the case when it came to the change in the food habits among the families studied.

[5] Personal document. Translated into English by the writer.

leave the plantation." In this case a married son, instead of setting up his own household lives together with his parents and his brothers and sisters. By so doing the household expenditures per capita are kept at a minimum, whereas the household income is increased.[6] After having saved enough money the family leaves the plantation.

In the case of the second, "the specialized frontier method," a specific individual—generally one with skills—first goes to the city. After having located himself, he calls for other members, and when all the grown children have secured jobs in the city the parents and the younger children follow.

The final method resorted to is commonly known as the "clinging vine method." In this case all family members work together to send the one with the greatest promise of professional success to college. After he has established himself in his line of training, he in turn sends one or two other younger members through college. Eventually the whole family leaves the plantation.

Other far-reaching consequences of the new economic order upon the family—especially the decrease in the size of the family and the liberation of women and children from family control—cannot be discussed adequately at present. Although the trend is already observable, the period of the Japanese family adjustment to the Hawaiian society is still too brief to exhibit the complete process.[7]

IV

The change in the nature of tradition affects the traditional family organization. As a result of migration and culture contact the character of the cultural basis of the Japanese community in Hawaii is changing phenomenally. In this new situation the perpetuation of the traditional mores and institutions is difficult. Freedom from the moral constraints of the family system provides an immigrant with greater mobility in both the occupational and social worlds. Furthermore, the pres-

[6] Here is where the old family custom is helpful. As long as an eldest son does not assume an independent unit he is not obligated to give gifts to the neighbors. His father assumes the whole responsibility.

[7] On the structure of the Japanese family in Hawaii, see the author's article by the same title. It appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology*, 46 (1940), 168–178.

ence of divergent cultures increases the opportunities for experimentation with the old custom and mores. The growing attitudes of experimentation and the more or less critical analysis of the traditional institutional behavior patterns, function to secularize those values which were once sacred.

The immigrant leaves behind his ancestral land, house, cemetery, and the village community, which are the indispensable conditions for the survival of household ancestor worship. The inability to transplant them weakens the sentiment toward the ancestor cult and subsequently operates to diminish its moral influence. Further, in the new community the immigrant's philosophy of life or "style of life" changes. His objective or goal in the new world is to accumulate money and as a consequence, his past becomes relatively unimportant: it is toward the future that he charts his course and directs his efforts. With this change he divorces himself from the "spiritual" relation with the ancestors. The family as a unit loses the important temporal perspective which it had in the old community. Added to this is the fact that the *Ni-seis* are more prone to accept Christianity as it has the greater prestige value to them. And frequently it happens that the *Ni-seis* convert their parents into the new religious belief.

Likewise, in the new situation the code of filial piety loses its conventional meaning. Generally, the immigrant in coming to Hawaii leaves behind him his own parents and grandparents to whom filial piety is due. The absence of parents and grandparents means that there is no one with a vested interest to enforce the code. Furthermore, as the relations among the people become increasingly impersonal and abstract, the code loses the concerted support of social pressure emanating from the community. Consequently, in so far as the code persists in Hawaii, it becomes formalized. Acts of filial piety come to be restricted to such formal deeds as sending "spending" money or writing letters to parents in Japan, or returning home while the parents are still alive. The longer the immigrant resides in Hawaii the more formal his adherence to the code becomes. And the more formal the code becomes the more rapidly it loses its constraining force and the sentiment accompanying it.

The family name, too, loses its traditional significance as it is divorced from the family history carried in the memories of people in the commu-

nity. The immigrant soon learns that in the new situation his social status is independent of the status of his parental family in Japan. The latter gives him no prestige, nor does his identification with it enhance his position in the new community.

In Hawaii the old world demands, needs, and wants either disappear or take on a different form, and consequently such practices as the succession to headship, primogeniture, disinheritance, and the adoption of an heir fall into disuse. Not only do the needs change, but also the compulsion of social opinion is relaxed. In the new world the wider community is either indifferent or antagonistic toward the perpetuation of transplanted practices. Even within the Japanese community itself, with the displacement of the first by the second generation, there develops an increasing indifference toward the Japanese tradition. Moreover, in the Hawaiian situation there is no need for succession to headship when the office of *Ka-cho* has little or no significance in the community. Primogeniture is of no value when there is no tangible family wealth, on the one hand, and no social compulsion to perpetuate the family, on the other. Disinheritance loses its force when an individual knows that he could make a better living away from home.

The effect of all these changes is to modify the traditional status of the patriarch. The separation of the patriarch from the old world institutional constellation results in the redefinition of his status as well as all other members of the family. The status of the women and the children improves in response to the conditions of Hawaii. With this change in the conventional status the attitudes of the patriarch are modified and the bond that binds the family shifts from institutional sentiments to emotional and affective ties.[8]

The type of family organization that is now being evolved in the Island closely approximates the husband-wife centered unit with the patriarch as nominal head. It is the younger members of the second and third generations who give definite form to the family life, the pattern of which is borrowed from the American culture. A *Ni-sei*

[8] See, the author's "Japanese Patriarch in Hawaii," *Social Forces*, 17 (1938), 240-248.

girl described the organization of her family in the following excerpt:

Father is the bread-winner of the family and is regarded as the head of the family, actually disciplinary control, however, lying with Mother. Father does not take an actual part in keeping each member of the family in his proper place unless extremely annoyed by the actions of some member, which is very rare, when he arouses himself from his indifference and very definitely forces the guilty one into his place. Otherwise he is seemingly unaware of the behavior of the family members. Rather he has had somebody else shoulder the responsibilities of family discipline in order to be free to pursue his whims and fancies. This very same trait causes some one other than he to assume the customary duties of the head, principally those duties relating to making and continuing social relations with neighbors, relatives, and strangers. It is now an accepted principle in the family that whenever there is a choice between making social calls and staying home Father can be relied on to take the latter course. . . . Thus, Father other than being the breadwinner is only the nominal head. . . .[9]

V

Assimilation by the younger generations of the ideologies, attitudes, and sentiments peculiar to American family life, generally proceeds, though slowly, with relative ease, because the uprooting of the traditional family from its original cultural and community context and its transplantation in the new community have weakened the internal coherence of the institution. With the partial disorganization of the traditional family system and the secularization of the moral bases of the family, the immigrant children incorporate only partially the core of the traditional family system within their own life organizations. Moreover, these children, coming as they do under the influence of the American schools, churches, and public opinion, inevitably acquire the principles of democracy, equality, and personal liberty which are in opposition to the mores embodied in the traditional family organization. And what these children acquire they introduce largely unconsciously into their own family life. The rate of assimilation varies, therefore, directly as the patriarchal control wanes.

[9] *Manuscript document*, written by a University of Hawaii student.

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES AMONG NEGROES FOR VENEREAL DISEASE CONTROL*

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INTRODUCTION

THERE has been acceleration in the tempo of venereal disease control in recent years. While programs have been initiated in many communities placing special emphasis upon the problems facing white citizens, the Negro constituency has often been overlooked in an attempt, no doubt, to begin activities at some convenient point.

Recently, however, there has been a tendency in several cities in the Southeast to view the venereal diseases in the perspective of a community problem demanding community-wide interest and participation. This approach seems the most likely to succeed if the diseases are to be eradicated. For they can become "museum pieces" if there is the desire and effort put forth in this direction.

This desire and effort includes a consideration of basic community organization principles. Some of them are: first, a knowledge of the facts necessary to plan a program for the job to be done; second, to initiate, develop, and modify programs and services in the interest of attaining a better adjustment between resources and needs; third, to develop better public understanding of problems and needs, programs, and methods; and finally, to secure public support to the extent that financial aid is continuously available as long as the program is necessary and the problems to be solved exist.

The facts necessary to preliminary planning, i.e. extent of the problem, were recently published

by the United States Public Health Service. This body of statistics indicates the prevalence of syphilis among the first two million Selective Service registrants.[1] These reports while not inclusive of the total amount of infection in the United States did show by this sample that a tremendous reservoir of disease exists. Dr. J. R. Heller in a "Statement on Prevalence of Venereal Diseases" states, "rates derived from the examinations revealed a total prevalence rate of 100.5 per thousand for 15 southern States and the District of Columbia as compared to 24.0 for the rest of the Nation. The white rate for this southern area was 39.5 and the Negro rate 294.0. Both white and Negro rates in the South were higher than in the rest of the Nation. The highest prevalence rate everywhere was among Negroes—nationally it was 272.0 per thousand as compared to 23.5 for whites."[2]

Dr. Thomas Parran of the U. S. Public Health Service, in explaining the high prevalence rate among the Negroes in an earlier publication states that this race has not been in contact with syphilis as long as some other races and as a consequence its effect differs biologically in them from that in the white group. He further indicates that the charge of greater promiscuity among Negroes as a

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* Read before the eighth annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, March 31, 1944.

[1] Results of serological blood tests for syphilis on on Selective Service registrants. (Washington: U. S. Public Health Service—First million 11/1/40 to 4/15/41 and second million 4/16/41 to 8/31/41) 2 vols.

[2] J. R. Heller, M.D., "Statement on Prevalence of Venereal Diseases" presented at a National Conference on Wartime Problems in Venereal Disease Control—November 22 and 23, 1943, New York City.

reason for the increased prevalence of syphilis is
not entirely true and where there is promiscuity
among the black or white races it occurs in groups
and communities of the underprivileged.[3]

There are no definite statistics on the prevalence
of the other venereal diseases including gonorrhea,
but it is understood that the incidence of the latter
is many times that of syphilis. The available
knowledge of the extent of the diseases then is the
first facet upon which to base programs of control.

In a number of southeastern communities Ne-
groes have participated in the fight and their
activities are presented in this paper.

ORGANIZATION OF COMMITTEES

Negro committee activity was started during
the summer and fall of 1943 in cities included in
this report. In almost every instance their
activity was approximately a year behind similar
activity in the white portions of the same com-
munities. The patterns of organization vary.
Most of these committees were started as a direct
result of the Social Protection Representatives'
stimulating urban groups in at least three States of
the region. In one community the mayor ap-
pointed the chairman and in several others either
the committees were started by representatives of
Health Departments, Office of Civilian Defense,
Army and Navy, or as a part of the health program
of social agencies.

In the majority of cases there is a liaison person
between the Negro and white Social Protection
Committee. However, two other forms of inte-
gration exist, namely, (1) a general committee
with Negro membership and (2) a general commit-
tee with separate white and colored committees.

The committees vary in size from 18 to 50 mem-
bers. Many of them have broad representation
including not only professional persons but citizens
from all walks of life and many interests. This
particular characteristic of these organizations
makes them unique and somewhat different from
some citizens' groups working for civic improve-
ment. In like manner it offers an opportunity for
persons who have contact with all segments of the
community to participate in the program. This is
both desirable and necessary.

The leadership of committees also indicates the
varied interest of members. The range of occupa-

[3] Thomas Parran, M.D., Shadow on the Land.
(New York: American Social Hygiene Association,
1937), p. 175.

tions includes a director of a housing project,
physicians, a dentist, health workers, a college
dean, a hotel head waiter, several college and high
school teachers, and a noncommissioned venereal
disease control officer who is a graduate of the
famous Tuskegee Army Air Force school for non-
commissioned venereal disease control officers.

There is no uniform plan governing the fre-
quency of committee meetings. At least one com-
mittee meets regularly each week and every meet-
ing is interesting and productive. Others usually
meet at least once monthly or at times when some
specific problem demands attention.

PROBLEMS PRESENTED

The greatest problem facing Venereal Disease
Control Committees is that of trying to separate
the whole into units for attack. This is often most
difficult for the knowledge of the existence and ex-
tent of disease does not include the techniques
necessary to get the job started. For example,
prostitution has seldom been an extensive problem
among Negroes in this region; instead it is largely
one of promiscuity. This is an unorganized,
"catch-as-catch-can" sort of problem; difficult to
cope with and hard to curb. Further it is compli-
cated by the fact that it is the teen-age girl who
furnishes much of the activity. These girls quite
often live in communities which do not offer
sufficient group work and recreational facilities or
other normal outlets for expression.

Their recreational outlets frequently take the
form of nightly visits to taverns and "juke joints"
where men in uniform congregate. From there
they are taken by soldiers to cheap hotels and
rooming houses by taxicab drivers or wander off
into dark places where illicit sexual activity occurs.
The taverns or cafes, taxicab drivers, and hotels
or rooming houses are therefore brought into focus
for committee attention.

At this point the problem of policing enters the
picture. This too is difficult because the attitudes
of Negro citizens regarding the usual pattern of
police activity as it affects Negroes offers a stumb-
ling block to progress in this direction. Many con-
ferences and recommendations have urged the use
of Negro police as an aid in this phase of work. A
number of southern cities have Negro police and it
is reported that their work has been effective both
in crime prevention and law enforcement. It ap-
pears that this request for specialized personnel
should be considered in those areas where com-

mittees recognize their appointment as necessary adjuncts to their activities.

In like manner the inclusion of Negro personnel in the structure of health and welfare agencies or the establishment of such agencies where they do not now exist has been asked.

Some committee chairmen have become extremely discouraged when carefully planned recommendations in the interest of reducing infections among Negroes have never been heard from when asked for by officials. A case in point is the experience of a group which met at the call of a USO director who had become concerned because a number of infectious contacts were reported as occurring in the vicinity of his Center. The chairman of the Board, one of the city commissioners, asked that recommendations be made to the mayor and commissioners relative to the problem and action to be taken. This group recommended in part the employment of Negro auxiliary police, a truant officer to work with Negro schools and additional recreation facilities for the community. These recommendations made a year ago have not even been acknowledged. Since submitting the recommendations, which received no consideration, the group has become inactive because of an expressed feeling that there is no need to develop a program because it will not receive cooperation from the white group.

Another problem bedeviling the Negro is that of lower economic status and its consequences, substandard housing, limited educational facilities, and poor health.

Committees have to take all these factors and more into consideration while trying to initiate a Venereal Disease Control Program. That they have made progress in spite of the apparent handicaps is evident in a review of some activities in which they have been engaged.

VENEREAL DISEASE CONTROL ACTIVITIES

Education. Basic to a program of venereal disease control is the fact that the community must have knowledge of the disease and its consequences and that as a result of an adequate case finding program those persons found in an infectious state should receive treatment until cured. This is only overshadowed in importance by a campaign of prevention which seeks to limit the number of cases of venereal diseases—by focusing attention upon those unmet needs in the community which are at present contributing to cesspools of infection.

In two States Social Protection Committees have been able to integrate their activities into State Health Education programs thereby using posters and materials to definite advantage as part of a Statewide campaign. This link with health department representatives was responsible for the establishment of classes for health wardens in one city. It is estimated that approximately 500 Negroes attended these sessions and received certificates of attendance signed by the State Health Officer and the Mayor of the city. These health wardens, who are part of the organization for the Office of Civilian Defense, will be of definite assistance as they reach other persons in their blocks by word of mouth publicity. At the same time they are drawn closer into the Social Protection Committee's work because it is the parent organization.

Negro minister members of committees have been most cooperative. In some communities they have prepared sermons about venereal diseases and have acted as health counsellors to members of their congregations. In others there have been plans initiated to carry succinct and pertinent comments in the regular church bulletin so that the admonishment, "cleanliness is next to Godliness," is translated into text for the consumption of parishioners.

In several high schools students have been given blood tests and those found infected treated. A tragic story was related by the principal of a high school and the treasurer of the Social Protection Committee in his city. A VD picture was shown to the high school group at the school. Afterward a boy eleven years of age came to the principal's office in tears saying "professor I think I have that disease." The principal talked with him and then suggested that the boy have his father take him to the family doctor. The boy talked with his father who said "go along son you've been drinking too much red soda pop." The boy returned to the principal who took him to a physician. This child eleven years of age had a complicated case of gonorrhea.

This incident coupled with the fact that reports from a military installation in the area showed infectious contacts with high school girls and military personnel was responsible for the decision to find cases of disease and treat them in this high school population and also to take other steps necessary to combat this enemy of good health.

In many communities health education classes

have been started.   A course was developed in an Alabama community and the teachers in the public schools will get college credit for attendance. These teachers in turn will enrich their regular class work with materials which will be of benefit to control activities.

Radio time, newspaper space, and other vehicles of communication have been available and are used frequently and intelligently.   There is still need, however, for more movies and posters with Negro characters for use in the Negro community, says Dr. W. A. Mason of the U. S. Public Health Service and it is a timely suggestion.

Repression Activities.   The techniques used in educating the community about the venereal diseases are simple compared with those needed to induce a cab driver to refrain from taking a soldier to a house of prostitution or driving a soldier and his lady of the evening to a house or hotel where rooms can be rented for illicit purposes.   It is likewise difficult to get owners and managers of these hotels and rooming houses to stop making this type of profit.   In the same vein the tavern or cafe operator is loathe to "chase out the girls" when they attract trade to his business establishment—but such is being done.   Some committees have attempted to bring recalcitrant persons into the committee as members thus attempting to get them to stop their nefarious activities as a result of making them a part of the family.

One committee's activities are unusual in that there is a "strong arm" committee composed of a minister, a sailor, and a contact investigator with the health department who regularly visit taverns and other places of business which appear on contact reports.   Their warnings are preliminary to more drastic action if conditions are not remedied.

In another city when an undercover survey showed the existence of harmful conditions, a representative of the committee visited all hotels and eating places mentioned.   One place of business alone was responsible for about eighty infectious contacts during 1943.   The proprietor of this business employed a detective and paid him $60 weekly to keep out unattached girls who came to the cafe for the sole purpose of "picking up" soldiers.   In recent months this place has not appeared on health department records.

Not always has there been success.   In some places it has been impossible to secure the cooperation of managers and owners of business

establishments.   Their disinterest has been partly due to a conviction that their connections are so good that they need not change their way of living and doing business.   These persons will no doubt change their points of view when the weight of community pressure becomes heavier.

The taxicab drivers have been invited to become members of the Committee in one city.   They have not only joined but have paid substantial sums to assist the Committee's work.   In this community "bootleg" taxicabs are being run off the streets and licensed ones have been threatened with action by the Office of Defense Transportation if they do not remain legitimate.   (The chairman of the Committee has responsibility for gas and tire allocations.)   Clear-cut promises of obedience have been obtained from individual taxi drivers and from their association as a body. As an immediate token of faith, the cabs are carrying venereal disease posters as a mobile display.

The cab drivers in another city point out that the soldier needs no assistance in securing female companions, and the only request that the soldier makes of them is that he be carried to a specific address which he has presumably gotten from his girl companion earlier.   These drivers admit that once aiding prostitution was good business and they formerly suggested to a requesting passenger "just where a room might be secured."   This practice, however, has been changed considerably due largely to the attitude of the owners of the cabs who have assured those employed that continuation of this activity is sufficient grounds to cause immediate dismissal.   There has also been an arrest and conviction of one of the drivers for such activity.   In still other communities where the Committee activity has not yet been fully developed initial steps have been taken to deal with cab drivers mentioned in undercover reports as guilty parties acting as facilitators of prostitution and promiscuous activities.   Where this was done in one city contact was also made with a representative of the taxicab union who was understood to have the respect of a majority of members.   This individual was not the president of the organization but was reportedly the one person who could influence the president to cooperate in this type of program.

The repression program has progressed somewhat slowly and largely as a self-policing job by Negroes in their communities.   If more wholesome relationships could be developed between

Negroes and the paid law enforcement officials in their cities there is no doubt that a more basic job could be accomplished. This relationship includes consideration of the employment of qualified Negro personnel with police departments.

Health and Welfare Activities. Health aspects of the venereal disease control program have progressed in a number of communities by the employment of Negro contact investigators with boards of health and the use of Negro physicians as clinicians. The contact investigators working in this region have been most helpful in cooperating with social protection committees, through which they tighten up the control job by liaison services between the boards of health and these groups. Their employment has not only helped the case finding program of the boards of health, but public relations as well.

Negro physicians are also participants in public health programs in some places. However, many other communities have requested greater use of their professional services and the establishment of additional clinic facilities in areas easily accessible to Negro neighborhoods.

In one city in the region the Negro medical school is operating a community-wide all Negro venereal disease control program which functions as an independent but closely integrated division of the health department program. It is regarded as unique in the Nation. In another community there is an equally famous health center manned by Negroes which has a well rounded venereal disease control program. Another committee has secured a VD clinic in a Negro neighborhood as part of the public health program.

Probably one of the most interesting developments in recent months is a program in a seaport community. The Venereal Disease Control Officer of a military installation meets monthly with the Negro physicians and instructs them in the more recent methods in the treatment of venereal diseases. There is no need to add that the enthusiasm is high.

Although the health and law enforcement phases of the program have progressed there has been a lag in the integration of welfare services. Some communities are handicapped because services are either not available or inadequate. There must be a realization that persons who have venereal diseases are not criminals and not medical cases alone. They are human beings in trouble. No lasting benefits can be accomplished without the

ability to see the infected individual as a part of the family and community and influenced by them at every step in treatment. Medical and psychiatric social services, as well as group work facilities, should be made increasingly available as complements to a general health and welfare program.

Several cities have recently employed Negro probation and truant officers. The Social Protection Committee in one community employed a truant officer out of its meager funds when the Board of Education stated it could not do so. It did, however, offer to supervise the work of this employee. This action on the part of the Committee caused favorable comment editorially in the daily press and a promise was made that this person would be continued as a necessary school employee paid from tax funds. This same Committee has received funds from the welfare division of the Navy as a token of their appreciation for the job accomplished. In addition regular classes have been started at the high school for Navy personnel. Regular teachers are paid for instruction and the men will not only have a place to go in the evenings but will no doubt be able to secure higher ratings in the Navy.

Regular social work services are available in connection with clinics in two cities. The establishment of a detention facility will provide social services as a necessary part of the rehabilitation and redirection program which at present does not exist for Negroes in this State.

In the area of group work services it is believed that benefits could be derived from the additional use of USO's for the civilian population during the hours they are not being used by military personnel. Such has been done in some communities and others are investigating possibilities. Prevention, as well as treatment, is the watchword here.

CONCLUSION

Social Protection Committees working in several communities in the Southeast have done much to interest Negroes in the venereal diseases and efforts toward their eradication. These committees are not doing the job alone but are cooperating with other organizations, agencies, and groups in their communities which have similar interests. They are fully cognizant of the fact that there must be team work among the members of the local group if lasting gains are to be made. This teamwork involves consideration and practice of basic com-

munity organization principles whose techniques are applicable to this community problem.

The inclusion of work among the Negro portions of southeastern communities and beginning attempts to provide facilities and services commensurate with the prevalence of venereal diseases within this community segment are comparatively recent developments. Although there are great hurdles to take in developing an effective health or social protection program among any group of any race with low marginal living levels, substantial progress is being made. Basic to this progress are these factors: planning and undertaking the job as part of overall community development; stimulating and enlisting the ready responsiveness among the Negro groups themselves; and providing assistance *to* the group's own activity rather than *for* it.

The value of these committees—if they can be kept alive—rests in the fact that they are an integral part of the local community and they can continue their activities to advantage after the present Federal program is over. It would be a sad commentary indeed if the program of venereal disease control stopped with the cessation of hostilities.

DISCUSSION*

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THE facts regarding the prevalence of venereal disease in America have already been emphasized by Mr. Jackson. It is very important, however, that in any approach to the organization of a program for the control of these diseases, we thoroughly understand, in so far as we are able, the underlying causes of these diseases. The title "Community Organization among Negroes for Venereal Disease Control," tends to mislead, unless we understand by community organization among Negroes, integration of Negroes in the overall planning for the control of these diseases. Diseases, and the communicable diseases particularly, spring from the roots which extend deeply into the soil on which they thrive, the community. I think we are agreed that there are no Negro, no white diseases. Disease as it appears in any minority group in this country, is in reality, an accentuation of the American pattern of disease, be that disease cancer, tuberculosis, or any of the venereal diseases.

Because of their communicability, the venereal diseases are allies of poverty, particularly as reflected in insanitary and overcrowded houses, low incomes, poor education, or little or poor recreational facilities. Where there is overcrowding, these diseases spread rapidly; precocious sex conciousness develops in children, and consequent early infection. It is a significant fact that the

white venereal disease rate is higher in the South than in the more prosperous northern section of our country. The great masses of Negroes live in overcrowded ghettos in our cities. As an example, let us take one such area in a typical southern city of 100,000 Negro population. The section of the city studied, not only furnishes the second highest venereal disease rate in that city, it also furnishes some other interesting observations. In this area 93.1 percent of its population are Negroes. In 1930 the birth rate of this area was 16.6 persons for every thousand persons in the community. The birth rate for the city was 17.4. In comparing the death rate, the condition is reversed. The death rate for the area studied was 26.8 persons per one thousand; the death rate from tuberculosis alone was 10.4 persons per thousand, whereas that for the city was 4.9. This condition is understandable in view of the fact that 62.8 percent of the residential structures in this area are reported in need of major repairs or unfit for use. 14.7 percent of the houses have no running water; 42 percent are without private indoor toilets; 59.5 percent are without electricity; and yet, in spite of the undesirability of these structures, 40.6 percent were reported overcrowded. The most outstanding example was a one-room unit which was occupied by a family of eleven. The parents were 45 and 47 years old; the children's ages ranged from 4 to 22. Three attractive girls, ages 15, 17 and 19 were often seen entertaining company on the front steps of the tenement house. There are

* Read before the eighth annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, March 31, 1944.

no organized recreational facilities in the area. The whole city furnishes only 17 acres for Negro recreation as compared to 100 for whites.

This area is a breeding place for crime and delinquency—33.9 cases for every one thousand families, whereas juvenile delinquency for the city was 16.6. The report of arrests was even more striking. In 1937, the total number of arrests was 408 or 267.7 for every thousand families. This was 6.7 percent of all the arrests in the city.

In comparing the educational status of men, women and offspring, not very much difference was found in the levels attained by each group. The educational level for male adults was 4.7 grades; for female adults 4.9 grades; and for their offspring 5.4 grades.

I quote at length from this study, not to offer excuses for a problem which we are facing today quite frankly, but rather to point out conditions basic to the organization of any community activities for venereal disease control and the control of disease generally. The Negro himself must do much to help the situation. He certainly has not used all of his resources. That, however, is not enough. It is only part of the answer. Folkways of the Negro, and mores of both groups often stand in the way of progress. Too, treatment centers of themselves, however scientific, only partially solve the problem of venereal disease control—only temporize; the problem will eventually be solved through a sympathetic and understanding community, willing to cut down the tree at its roots. In short, there must be a meeting of minds and cooperative planning and action on the part of Boards of Health, of Education, of Recreation, of Industry, of Housing, of Law Enforcement agencies. This is the only rational plan of community organization to combat these diseases. It means the education of all groups and the integration of all groups in the community, and the pooling of the thinking and resources of these groups in the development of the program. In some areas this approach has been partially attained. There can be no compromise in fundamentals if we are to attain our goal—progressive rather than temporary control.

Health Education may be made a powerful weapon in the control of disease. We talk a great deal about it. There is, however, a wide disparity between health education as conceived by those in this field, and as actually practised. "Health Education," as defined by the National Education Association, "is the total of those experiences which favorably influence attitudes, knowledge, and habits concerning individual, community, and racial health." The word, "experiences," is very important, as is also the word "favorably." To develop wholesome attitudes toward environmental sanitation, for example, one must be given the opportunity to live in good houses with water and accepted sanitation. To develop proper attitudes toward healthy living, the community must provide those safeguards which science, developing over the years, has proven not only desirable, but necessary. This includes adequate housing, a living wage, good education, good recreational facilities—not any one of them, but all of them.

In Georgia, there has been definite cooperation between the Department of Public Health and the State Department of Education in working out a program for teacher-training in the venereal diseases and in tuberculosis, two major public health problems among Negroes. At the request of the Department of Education, consultants were sent by the State Health Department to all summer schools in the state, utilizing discussion groups, literature, moving pictures and exhibits on the venereal diseases. Consultants were sent to regional meetings of supervisors for similar discussions. Sixty-four supervisors were thus contacted and definite results are being noted in increased blood testing for diagnosis, increased interest on the part of the public, and increased clinic attendance. In Atlanta, the health officer reported a 30 percent increase in clinic attendance, attributable, he believes, to the work in health education of the City-wide Health Committee, a group composed of representatives of Negroes from schools, social agencies, parent-teacher associations and ministerial associations, and sponsored by the Atlanta Urban League, working in a liaison manner with the City Health Department.

In addition to the committees already mentioned by Mr. Jackson, as doing a very fine job, I should like to call attention to a national group recently organized, which, I believe, is important in that it will reach every segment of the population. The "Conference with Negro leaders on war time problems in Venereal Disease Control" was called by the American Social Hygiene Association in New York City, November 22 and 23, 1943. The Conference might best be explained by quoting from the American Social Hygiene Association:

The Conference with Negro leaders on War-Time Problems in Venereal Disease Control grew out of both governmental and voluntary discussions of next steps leading toward reducing the number of syphilis, gonorrhea, and other venereal disease cases and preventing new infection as far as possible.

It is recognized that these diseases attack people without distinction as to race, creed, color or national origin, and must in turn be fought in the open by all the people. It was also recognized that limitations of economic, social, medical and educational opportunities and facilities conspired to give these diseases special opportunities for spread among certain population groups, including Negro groups. It was known, too, that the Negro citizens are eager to do their utmost to eradicate these diseases from the nation, as an aid in war, and for the community life when peace is restored.

With these views in mind, it was proposed that the American Social Hygiene Association arrange a conference for consideration of what might be done by united action at federal, state, and local levels to reduce the venereal diseases as a serious handicap to Negro health and efficiency. Accordingly, this conference was held in New York City under the auspices of the Association in its National Office, November 22 and 23, 1943. A continuation committee was appointed to follow up the conference recommendations. The conference membership is being proposed as a temporary section of the General Advisory Committee of the American Social Hygiene Association. Discussion centered about three major questions:

The prevalence and incidence of venereal disease among Negroes and specific problems involved in the control program.

The part in the solution of this problem that Negroes themselves can undertake through their voluntary organization on a national, state, and local level.

The assistance that these voluntary groups will need from public and private agencies on the national, state, and local level.

This committee approaches what I believe to be desirable in organization for the control of venereal disease, and I am looking forward to some very effective work. Its success, however, will depend largely upon the philosophy of those people representing public and private agencies in individual communities who will be called upon for assistance —assistance in providing equal educational opportunities; assistance in law enforcement "across the tracks"; assistance in housing opportunities; assistance in regulating wage differentials. These are areas in which the Negro can only ask assistance, areas in which an honest integration in the

over all planning which I mentioned earlier is so desirable. I want to emphasize honest integration in contrast to token integration so frequently practiced, and so void of effect. This honest integration, it seems to me, is the challenge which any organized effort against disease presents. The attitude on the part of the city administrators and private agencies in our communities, north and south, will either encourage or dishearten Negroes who want to do something about the problem. There have been many heartaches in this area. I have an idea that there will be many more discouragements, that this approach to the problem will not come easily, if, indeed, it come at all.

In our community organization for venereal disease control, may we be tempered by the philosophy expressed by John Donne:

No man is an Iland intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the continent, a part of the maine; if a clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontorie were, as well as if a manor of thy friends or of thine owne were; any man's death diminishes me because I am involved in Mankinde; and therefore never send to ask for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.

The Negro is vitally interested in the public health problems which face him. He, too, recognizes venereal disease as a major problem and wants to do something about it.

To summarize:

1. The venereal disease problem in minority groups, particularly the Negro, is an accentuation of the American pattern of disease.

2. The diseases reflect the socio-economic status of the group; low incomes, insanitary housing, lack of, or poor recreational facilities, low levels of education; folkways of the Negro and mores of both groups impede progress in venereal disease control.

3. Adequate community organization for the control of disease, particularly the venereal diseases, will come through the honest integration of the Negro in community planning for the eradication of these diseases. All of the community assets must be utilized in the approach. Negroes should be given an opportunity to experience healthful living in healthy environment, if health education is to be made functional.

4. A desirable plan for community organization is the pattern set by the "conference with Negro

leaders on war-time problems in venereal disease control."

Special emphasis should be placed on the third major question discussed by this committee, "The assistance that these voluntary groups will need from public and private agencies on the national, state, and local level.

Such a committee should be given the status of an advisory committee in the overall planning for venereal disease control in the community.

CONCLUSIONS

This is, to be sure, a long range program, and, to quote Dr. Parran, Surgeon General, U. S. Public Health Service, . . .

"What we do here, if it be well done, is imperative for safety in war, but it is even more greatly productive of permanent peace. Whatever the future holds for us, our efforts cannot be wasted. We build for a strong, vigorous America, eternally ready for tomorrow."

UNMARRIED NEGRO MOTHERS IN A SOUTHERN URBAN COMMUNITY*

HILDA HERTZ AND SUE WARREN LITTLE

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ATTITUDES toward illegitimacy among Negroes in southern States vary through a wide range from complete condemna· tion to acceptance. The writers undertook an intensive study of the attitudes of those most involved—the unmarried mothers—and the views present in the community in which these women lived, Durham, North Carolina. The facts reported here are derived from studies of eleven unmarried pregnant Negro women and from repeated contacts with numerous other lower class Negro women. The significant insights gained were those related to the role that social, cultural, and personality factors play in bringing about pregnancy, and those which help to explain the high rate of illegitimacy among Negroes as compared to Whites in the same community.

Contact was established with a large number of women through hospitals and social agencies. The women were invited to live, without charge, in the home of a middle-class Negro widow, so that close contact and observation could be maintained. Those who came to the home stayed for periods ranging from 4 days to 10 weeks, depending upon circumstances. Follow-up interviews with them were continued for several months. The informality of the situation in this home facilitated observation of the personalities and helped in

establishing good rapport; another aid was the practical help given by the research workers with the daily problems met by the women. In order to avoid any difficulty encountered through the fact that the research workers were white, two Negro psychiatric social workers helped with the interviews.

Information was obtained from the pregnant women, their families, and members of the community (Table 1). Methods used included informal interviews, casual conversation, and observation. In addition, each girl was given a psychiatric interview by Dr. Richard S. Lyman and an intelligence test. Several girls were also given Rorschach personality tests. The reports from these interviews and tests and reviews of hospital and social agency records were combined. In some cases there were discrepancies; the workers took these into consideration in their evaluation of the data (Table 2).

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL BACKGROUND

The information presented here is not intended as a statistical analysis of a definite number of representative cases but as a reflection of knowledge gained through intimate contact with the unmarried pregnant Negroes. However, on the basis of additional knowledge gained in further studies[1] in this Negro community, it seems evident

* This study was made under the direction of and with valuable assistance from Dr. Richard S. Lyman, Professor of Neuropsychiatry, Duke University School of Medicine.

[1] Studies by Hilda Hertz and Arden King.

TABLE 1

Personal Data of Eleven Unmarried Pregnant Negro Women

AGE	GRADES COM-PLETED	YEARS OF RESIDENCE			LEGAL STATUS OF GIRL	TYPE OF FAMILY	OCCUPATION			PREVIOUS PREG-NANCIES	RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION
		U	R	V			Father	Mother	Girl		
R. M. 20......	11		18	2	Leg.	Matriarchal	Farmer	Farmwife	Domestic	0	Methodist
A. J. 22......	11	22	7	17	Leg.	Matriarchal	Unskilled	Domestic	Domestic	0	Baptist
P. W. 26......	9	2	17		Leg.	Matriarchal	Farmer	Domestic	Domestic	3	Baptist
L. B. 22......	11	5			Leg.	Matriarchal, Eco. coop-erative	Farmer	Farmwife	Beauty Culture	0	Baptist (Inactive)
G. M. 16......	10	16			Illeg.	Common law, Eco. cooperative	Unskilled	Tobacco worker	None	0	Baptist (Inactive)
A. P. 19......	8	19	14		Leg. (?) (Adopted)	Unstable, Eco. coop-erative	Unknown	Domestic	Domestic	1	Baptist (Inactive)
M. W. 16......	0	2			Leg.	Unstable, Eco. coop-erative	Unskilled	Deceased	Domestic	0	None
E. V. 17......	5	15	2		Leg.	Unstable	Semi-skilled	Domestic (Deceased)	Domestic	0	None
L. K. 15......	7			15	Leg.	Unstable	Unskilled	Domestic	None	0	Baptist (Inactive)
M. G. 16......	8	8	8		Leg.	Unstable	Farmer	Farmwife (Deceased)	None	0	None
S. T. 12......	0	12			Illeg.	Unstable	Unknown	Domestic	None	0	None
Av.: 18......	7										

Source: Information given by the girls, their families, and other members of the community.

that the cases presented are representative of a rather large group.

It was found that the women studied tended to fall into two more or less definite groups which, for

(A) This group was class conscious and expressed very definite attitudes toward those people whom they considered below themselves—those "common" people of whom one expected nothing

TABLE 2
DISTINCTIVE PERSONALITY DATA

ORIGINAL ATTITUDE TOWARD PROJECT	REACTION TOWARD OTHERS IN THE HOME	TEST RESULTS		PSYCHIATRIC COMMENTS
		Intelligence quotient	Rorschach test	
R. M. Liked refuge, companionship	Liked Dependent	Kent—80	Impulsive Extroverted	
A. J. Liked refuge	Liked Somewhat superior	Binet—92	Emotional disturbance Immature Introverted	Probable schizoid personality
P. W. Liked refuge	Liked Helpful Somewhat superior	Estimated 70–80		Mixed psychoneurosis, anxiety tension
L. B. Liked companionship	Somewhat aloof	Kent—80	Emotional immaturity Conflict	
G. M. Indifferent	Adjusted	Kent—73		
A. P. Indifferent	Antagonistic toward E. V.	Binet—67	Emotional immaturity Anxiety	
M. W. Indifferent	Dependent Passive	Bellevue—Wechsler—41	Low I.Q. Immature	Mentally deficient
E. V. Liked refuge	Adjusted Dependent	Binet—67	Immature Possibly neurotic	Emotional
L. K. Indifferent (was sent by social worker)	Pleasant Aloof	Binet—75		Withheld information
M. G. Indifferent	Passive	Binet—65		
S. T. Liked (was sent)	Liked Dependent	Estimated to be low		

Source: Information obtained through observation, interviews, psychological tests, and psychiatric examinations.

purposes of clarity, will hereafter be designated A and B.[2]

[2] These are comparable in many ways to the lower-lower and upper-lower classes mentioned by John Dollard and Allison Davis in *Children of Bondage* (Washington, D. C.: American Council in Education, 1940).

good and with whom one would not care to associate. These girls felt that illegitimacy caused a definite loss in social status. They also realized the importance of money in determining social status.

(B) This, the larger group, did not appear to be class conscious. They are neither concerned about their status in the Negro group nor do they recog-

nize any definite group below themselves. However, they showed some awareness of people above them in social status and thought that "white folks" were superior socially.

In economic background the groups differed little. The fathers of all of the girls were either unskilled or semi-skilled laborers or farmers, the mothers domestic servants or farmwives.[3] At the time of conception, the women studied were either in school or in domestic service (except one hairdresser).

An interesting characteristic of this community (as in rural areas)[4] is the economic cooperation among Negroes. Many households are held together by economic considerations. For example, in the home of G. M. several members of the family worked and contributed to the household expenses while one stayed home to "keep house." Several of these "Economic Cooperative Units" were encountered during the study.

Many girls, particularly in Group B, had very unstable family backgrounds. Each had lived in several different homes and several shifted residence frequently between rural and urban communities. E. V. was born in town, moved to the country at the age of 7 to live with her grandparents because of her mother's death, returned to town at the age of 9.

The girls in Group A came from matriarchial families in which the mother retained her strong hold over the girl until adolescence or longer. It is significant that these girls were older than the others at the time of the first pregnancy; conception usually occurred only after the mother's control was broken by separation. Group A stressed religious concepts. Religious thinking was not an important part of the lives of the girls in Group B, although some had attended church irregularly. A high value was placed upon education by the members of Group A, who were generally better educated than those in Group B.

The women in Group A reported that the lower class of people accepted the illegitimate child and its mother but that "nice people" considered illegitimacy a sin and the illegitimate child a disgrace; each of these girls seemed able to rationalize her own pregnancy. The same opinion was given

[3] In Durham Negroes have the opportunity to obtain higher economic status than in other parts of the South.

[4] Charles S. Johnson, *Shadow of the Plantation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

by Negro nurses, college students and teachers (presumably the "nice people" referred to). It also corresponds to Margaret Brenman's[5] report that the standards of middle-class Negroes and middle-class whites were comparable. There is some evidence that the upper-class Negro is more strict in this respect than the middle-class one.

In contrast, the predominant attitude in Group B was that of acceptance of illegitimacy. These girls reported more illegitimacy among their families and friends than the others. In general,

Percent

FIG. 1. PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL LIVE BIRTHS WHICH ARE ILLEGITIMATE BY RACE IN DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA, 1933–1943

(Source: Table 3)

the attitude of each pregnant woman corresponded, as might be expected, with the attitudes and opinions of her family.

In no case did the problem of the future support of the child appear to be a matter of great concern. It did not seem to be a factor in coloring the attitude of the girl toward her own pregnancy. However, P. W., who was considered psychoneurotic by

[5] "Minority-group Membership and Religious Psychosexual and Social Patterns in a Group of Middle-class Negro Girls." *J. Soc. Psychol.*, 12 (1940), 179–196.

the examining psychiatrist, expressed mild anxiety about supporting this additional child. "I sho' don' know whar I'm gonna get money to pay fo' this young 'un's keep."

Most of the girls had little or no knowledge of contraceptives. L. B. had previously used contraceptives, and A. J. had "asked him to use something but he wouldn't." The idea of abortion had not occurred to these girls as a means of getting out of their difficulties; many of them had never heard of it. Of five who knew about it, four were afraid of the physical danger and considered it murder and very sinful; a social worker suggested it to L. K. for medical reasons but there was insufficient evidence to warrant it.

Although informal and extra-legal adoption occurs frequently in the community, only two of the women studied allowed it. Numerous requests from friends and neighbors were refused because "I don' wanna give ma baby 'way." Maternal love and pride were very evident.

Attitudes toward marriage ranged from the flat statement of "aint gonna marry no man" to an attempt to force the putative father into marriage. The latter was probably due to the influence and suggestion of the girl's employer, a very religious woman. Most common views expressed were "never thought about it" and "don' want to marry him after the way he treated me." Two of the girls stated that they were planning to marry the baby's father in the future but postponed it because of the war and draft situation.

Although the girls liked the men involved at the time of conception, their attitudes later varied. If the man assumed financial responsibility and was fond of the child, the girl continued to like him. If, as more often happened, he assumed an attitude of irresponsibility, she showed resentment and animosity. None of the alleged fathers was in the army at the time of conception. Three were married men with families; the others were young unmarried men, some of whom were admittedly responsible for as many as four other illegitimate children.

No girl seemed in doubt as to the identity of the baby's father, although one girl told conflicting stories. Almost half of the women stated that they had had sexual relations with only one man,[6] al-though others admitted having relations with several men. None was promiscuous in the common sense of the term. It is the practice for a girl of this group to "go with" the same man for several months, never having more than one "boy friend" at the same time.

PERSONALITY

It was anticipated that an understanding of the personalities of the girls would be gained through observation of their reactions to contact with attitudes differing from their own in the home where they were placed. It was also hoped that there might be some change in personality of probable therapeutic value to them.

Their attitudes in regard to the new situation were revealed in the process of adjustment there. Those who found the home a place of refuge and those who had come for companionship stayed for longer periods of time than those who had strong ties binding them to their own homes.

Usually four girls were in the home together. They had to adjust to each other, to the landlady and her family, and to other boarders in the home. There was at no time open conflict, although the scorn that E. V. and A. P. felt for each other prior to their coming to the home handicapped their adjustment and was probably a contributing factor in A. P.'s premature departure. Some girls held themselves aloof, but none showed actual dislike for others in the home. The girls were always polite and friendly toward the research workers, and were almost without exception cooperative.

While the situation in the home revealed nothing startling about personality that would help in understanding unmarried motherhood *per se*, it did help in understanding the individuals. It also brought about definite personality changes in the case of E. V. From an untidy, forlorn being with a reputation for sullenness and outbursts of temper as well as fighting she became a rather tidily dressed person with a pleasant and cooperative manner, voluntarily doing tasks about the home. However, she lost none of her dependence upon others. She stayed in the home for 10 weeks and the changes persisted.

The psychiatric interviews and the Rorschach tests augmented and confirmed the impressions of the workers. Only one girl was definitely classified as psychoneurotic, though others showed neurotic tendencies. Several showed signs of immaturity and lack of imaginative capacity.

[6] Only two of the eleven studied had previous pregnancies. Of the many mothers contacted, most were unable to participate in the study because there was no one to assume responsibility for other children.

The intelligence test used in every case where it was feasible was the revised Stanford-Binet, Form L. The range of I.Q. was from 41 to 92. Consideration was taken of the fact that the tests used were not standardized on Negroes. However, it seems safe to say that none of the girls was superior intellectually, most of them falling in the groups "dull normal" and "borderline deficiency." It is not warranted on the basis of this study to assign "low mentality" as the cause of illegitimacy, since these girls do not differ in that respect from their friends who did not become unmarried mothers.[7]

CONCLUSIONS

This study has resulted in an understanding of some of the factors that are responsible for the high rate of illegitimacy among southern Negroes in an urban community.

1. Cultural and social factors. A large number of Negroes, predominantly from the lower class, accept illegitimacy more or less as a matter of course. This attitude must be understood in terms of family structure. Since this structure tends to be either an unstable or matriarchal one, and different from the upper and middle class Negro and white groups, the usual definition of illegitimacy may have little meaning in this situation.

Where the family had retained the character of an economically cooperative unit (as in Group B and with rural Negroes), the child was welcome and became part of the family unit. It is only when there is no place in the family group for the unmarried mother and her child that she may feel any uneasiness about her pregnancy, since she will have to assume all responsibilities.

The members of Group A have become influenced by this acceptance of illegitimacy. Being separated from their own families, they have become somewhat isolated from their social group. Their new contacts are with people who have different values and with men who neither care if they "get a girl in trouble" nor expect to marry her. The attitude of each of these girls toward her own pregnancy is superficially one of condemnation and fear that she has "brought disgrace" on her family, but she is usually able to rationalize her own situation. For example, A. J. stated: "He 'forced'

me at first. I didn't have no mother and father to look out for me." Since these girls condemn abortion, they cannot resort to it. So they must either accept a lowered status and become a part of the group that accepts illegitimacy or let the child be adopted into a family unit.

2. Personality. The writers were in a position to view sexual relations outside marriage only from the aspect of those few personalities who are presented in this paper. Acordingly our conclusions do not penetrate far into the general problem of prostitution. The eleven girls studied adjusted well to the new situation in the home. Two of the girls, both in Group A, exhibited personality disorders; psychiatric interviews revealed that A. J. had emotional disturbance and probable schizoid personality and P. W. had a mixed psychoneurosis. General intelligence, as tested, was below normal in every case but one.

3. Illegitimacy as a problem of urban adjustment. Among the elven women studied and the many women interviewed, there was a noteworthy lack of arrests for immoral practices. The indications are that these unmarried mothers come from a group that follows the accepted patterns of sex behavior among lower class Negroes. Other reports[8] indicate that these patterns are rural rather than urban in their origin and are related to the family structure found in rural life.

These girls have not yet acquired the "city sophistication" and with it the knowledge of contraceptives and abortions. Thus, illegitimacy could also be studied in the context of urbanization of the Negro. Since the Negro family, as a result of its adaptation to the city, becomes more like the white family—a small family group—the child becomes more of a burden, and support becomes a consideration of importance. The girls studied have not reached the point where this is important enough to cause uneasiness.

The high rate of illegitimacy among Negroes is being affected by urbanization of the Negro group and by the higher degree of mobility created by a war situation. The 1943 illegitimacy rate has decreased in this community. This may be due to an increased knowledge (through the Army) of contraceptives and the fact that many members of the group represented by the girls studied are

[7] George B. Mangold says, "Mental deficiency is probably the most importan single cause" [of illegitimacy]. *Children Born Out of Wedlock* (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Studies, Vol. 3, No. 3, June, 1921), p. 41.

[8] E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in the United States* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939); Charles S. Johnson, *Shadow of the Plantations* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934).

being married to soldiers (and receiving the allotment).

seems to be the most important factor contributing to the high rate.

TABLE 3

LIVE ILLEGITIMATE BIRTHS BY RACE IN DURHAM, NORTH CAROLINA

YEARS	WHITE BIRTHS					NEGRO BIRTHS				
	Total	Legitimate no.	Percent	Illeg. no.	Percent	Total	Legitimate no.	Percent	Illeg. no.	Percent
1933	693	674	97.3	19	2.7	448	284	63.4	164	36.6
1934	692	681	98.4	11	1.6	483	319	66.0	164	34.0
1935	708	696	98.3	12	1.7	496	345	69.5	151	30.5
1936	656	638	97.3	18	2.7	447	313	70.0	134	30.0
1937	642	629	98.0	13	2.0	450	303	67.3	147	32.7
1938	746	737	98.8	9	1.2	481	305	63.4	176	36.6
1939	712	694	97.5	18	2.5	519	355	68.4	164	31.6
1940	778	761	97.8	17	2.2	558	388	69.5	170	30.5
1941	844	822	97.4	22	2.6	579	387	66.8	192	33.2
1942	1055	1040	98.6	15	1.4	639	422	66.0	217	34.0
1943	1377	1355	98.4	22	1.6	664	485	67.6	179	32 4
Total....	8903	8727	98.0	176	2.0	5764	3906	67.6	1858	32.4

Source: The data have been obtained from the Department of Public Health, Durham, North Carolina.

It is the opinion of the writers that illegitimacy can best be understood when examined in its cultural context, which may be responsible for the differential rate of illegitimacy between white and Negro groups (Table 3). In the Negro group the acceptance of illegitimacy by the lower class

These findings indicate the direction future studies might take. Further work is being carried on along the same lines in this community.[9]

[9] Hilda Hertz, Negro Illegitimacy in Durham, North Carolina (Durham, N. C.: M. A. thesis, Duke University, 1944).

(Concluded from page 49)

In addition to his membership and presidencies in the American Sociological Society and the Rural Sociological Society, Dr. Sanderson was active in the American Country Life Association of which he was one of the founders and the first secretary, and later its president. He was a member of Sigma Xi and Phi Kappa Phi, and a fellow in the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

The department which he directed became recognized as a leading one in the United States, evidence of this being found in the large number of graduate students who come to Cornell to study in this field. In the last quarter century, 40 students have taken the doctor's degree in rural sociology, in addition to the large number who have received the master's degree. Practically all of these men now hold responsible positions in the field of rural sociology in colleges of agriculture, experiment stations, and in the United States department of agriculture, as well as in several foreign countries.

Dr. Sanderson was a continuous writer in the field of general and rural sociology. In addition to five books, he published 17 research bulletins, most of them from the Experiment Station at Cornell, 48 articles in scientific journals and magazines, and a very extensive list of reports, proceedings, and book reviews.

Following retirement, Dr. Sanderson went to Florida in the hope of improving his health. He was striken while returning to Ithaca from the South, his condition necessitating interruption of the journey at Washington, D. C. where he was removed to a hospital.

Dr. Sanderson was a native of Clio, Michigan and was born September 23, 1878 as the son of John P. and Alice G. (Wright) Sanderson. He and Anna Cecilia Bandford were married in September 1899 and she survives with their daughter, Alice, and two brothers—Ross W. Sanderson, New York City, and John P. Sanderson, who is associated with the U. S. War Manpower Commission in Washington, D. C.

W. A. ANDERSON.

Cornell University

GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, CITIZENSHIP

Contributions to this Department will include material of three kinds: (1) original discussion, suggestion, plans, programs, and theories; (2) reports of special projects, working programs, conferences and meetings, and progress in any distinctive aspect of the field; (3) special results of study and research.

NEW YORK CITY TODAY

As Told in Statistics*

M. MARGARET KEHL

Municipal Reference Library, New York

JUTTING out into the ocean, on any fairly detailed map of the United States, is a small island which locates New York City. This hundred mile island is Long Island and home of two important boroughs of the City—Brooklyn and Queens. Manhattan and Staten Island are too small to show on the map and The Bronx is a part of the mainland. These five boroughs, or counties, constitute the City of New York—or Greater New York.

The metropolitan district embraces a much larger area than this city. It takes in some of New Jersey, Connecticut, and sections of the New York counties which border the city limits. This New York region of the Regional Plan Association includes 5,528 square miles. The land area for the New York-New Jersey metropolitan district as used by the United States Census embraces 2,514 square miles.

The area of New York City, as reported for 1943, according to the Chief Engineer's office is 320.41 square miles, or 205,078 acres, divided as follows: Manhattan: 22.30 square miles; Bronx: 41.41; Brooklyn: 80.95; Queens: 118.60; Richmond: 57.15 square miles.

The greatest length of the city is 36 miles from north to south, with a breadth of 25 miles at its widest from west to east.

Measured along the shore line, runs 578 miles of waterfront, of which approximately 300 miles is improved. The figure of 770 miles of waterfront, which is often used, includes the piers as well as the shore line. Of these 487 piers, the Federal Government owns 18, the State of New York 6, and private companies operate 271. The city-owned piers—192—have decreased somewhat due to the East River Drive improvement.

It is possible to get more than one answer to statistics on New York. This is true of the area figures to the extent that a table prepared by this library in 1929 contains six different sums from as many sources. We have seen it true of the metropolitan district and the waterfront mileage. This difficulty, in locating up-to-date and authentic information quickly, prompts this compilation of statistics. The basis of the study is Chapter X of *New York Advancing* prepared by Miss Rebecca B. Rankin for the Mayor in 1939. The tabular data presented there have been used so constantly as to recommend revision.

Some of the items in *New York Advancing*, such as armories, aviation, and port commerce are not included, for obvious reasons. The 1939 business census figures are admittedly old, but the best available. "Facts About New York Which Make It Unique" as printed in the *Guide Book to the City of New York*, of the Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, are not intentionally duplicated here. On the assumption that any figure is better than none, if properly documented, one piece of information goes back to 1931. Estimates are quoted, where they are accepted, and when no other definite figure is available. The whole picture may be checked or amplified by a visit to the Municipal Reference Library in New York City where each source is available for study and use.

That the city is so closely allied with the wealth and success of the State of New York, and so

* As of December 15, 1943.

important to the country as a whole, is only too apparent when one tabulates its resources. The Regional Plan Association is well aware of the constant influx to the city, when it estimates that its population in 1960 will probably be 9,384,000. This represents a 43 percent growth between 1930 and 1960, although the growth of the United States may only be from 12 to 30 percent.

The Department of Health estimate, as of July 1, 1944, for the population of New York City is 7,677,000. The United States Census of 1940 said—7,454,995. It is also estimated that these peace time figures have had a six percent drop, if we consider only the civilian population,—in other words subtract at least a sixth, for the servicemen.

Of the 1940 census total, 5,316,338 are native born and 2,138,657 foreign born. Of the last figure, the male white are 1,057,839 and the female white number 1,022,181. In other words, 65.7 percent are native born white and 27.9 percent are foreign born white. Negroes account for about 6 percent, and the other scant 2 percent are either Indian, Chinese, Japanese, or "all others."

In the foreign white stock, which means that the parents were both born abroad or that one of the parents entered as an alien, the Italian group is largest. Russian descent is next, then the Irish, and German is fourth.

When one comes to the Mother Tongue however, Yiddish will be found greater than Italian. The next largest group is the German speaking one. Polish, Russian, and Spanish all number over 100-000.

In the foreign white stock group a little over half had one or both parents born abroad. 48,418 Negroes in the city were *not* born in New York City—or about one-tenth of the 458,444. Native born Indian, Chinese, Japanese, etc. number 8,831, and foreign born account for another 10,219.

The population center is still in Calvary Cemetery, Queens, although the boroughs have not grown equally. The Bronx reflects a 10 percent increase over 1930 figures—1,394,711. Brooklyn has grown by 5 percent—or 2,698,285. Manhattan's population, in spite of all the trend away from the island, increased 1 percent—1,889,924. Queens, with better rapid transit moved ahead 20 percent—1,297,634. Even Richmond or Staten Island increased 10 percent—174,441.

In 1943, the death rate had risen slightly, as it seems to in each war period, standing at 10.9 per 1000. The birth rate with contrasting optimism

is several points higher or 17.6 per 1000. 77,703 new couples took the marriage vows, which continues the records set in 1940 and 1941. The 1940 census lists 1,749,057 married men and 1,751,830 married women in New York City. May one wonder at the unequal figures?

Marriage brings us to churches. The 1936 religious census finds 114 denominations in the city with a membership of 4,245,907 in 3,181 churches. The attendance is undoubtedly larger in this year of war. The Jewish Congregations account for over two millions and the Roman Catholics are second with 1,551,296 members.

Let us peep into the houses of our seven millions. The 1940 housing census lists 618,087 residential structures. In these, 2,047,919 dwelling units were occupied, some 200,000 vacant. It is doubtful if the vacancy is true today, with rental signs down at most apartments. The average rent for a tenant-occupied unit was $41.26 with a median of $36.71. Manhattan had the highest average at $48 per month and Richmond, the cheapest at $32.44. 324,320 families owned their own homes while 1,740,860 families were tenants.

In the occupied dwelling units there were still 837 with hand pumps for water, 1007 with no water supply within 50 feet, 1516 with no toilet facilities, 86,694 with no shower or bath tub, 8,302 with no cooking fuel provided, and 59,056 with no refrigeration. However, 96 percent of all the homes had radios. Over half of the dwelling units were located in structures of more than 5 families. About five percent of the families were Negro and an additional six percent were aliens. Since most of the Negroes lived in rented quarters, the fact that the majority paid between $20 and $49 a month, with the median for the city at $36, is worth thought.

The more unfortunate of New York's people who live in institutions, such as prisons, homes, and mental institutions, number 34,202, over 14 years of age. The city's 22 prisons received 90,638 in 1940-41, of which 69 percent were repeaters.

In an effort to better housing conditions, the city has a vast housing program. Fourteen developments are already completed—with 17,023 apartments. Thirteen are planned for the postwar period. These will accommodate another 17,093 families and will cost about $100,000,000. To East River, Kingsborough, Williamsburg, Harlem River, South Jamaica, Wallabout, Queensbridge, two Vladeck, Clason Point, Red Hook, Fort

Greene, First and Edwin Markham Houses, completed, will eventually be added Lillian Wald, Morrisiana, Abraham Lincoln, James Weldon Johnson, Marcy, Gowanus, Elliott, Amsterdam, Jacob Riis, Brownsville, Governor Alfred E. Smith, St. Mary's and Astoria developments. (In addition to the foregoing there are imposing private, limited dividend, and cooperating housing ventures.) This is but a small part of a plan for future public improvements. It is mentioned in detail because it is all set to go. With the city facing an estimated population of nine millions in 1960, too much emphasis cannot be put upon housing accommodations.

On a very hot day about two and one half millions go to the city's six beaches—Orchard, Jacob Riis, Rockaway, Coney, Wolfes Pond Park or South Beach. Countless others use the 488 playgrounds operated by the Park Department or enjoy city parks—18,232 acres in all.

About 4000 miles of the street total of 5,702 miles are paved, which also means a street cleaning job of approximately 60 million square yards. Under these streets run some 3000 miles of sewers and 4,550 miles of water mains. Garbage and ashes measuring 23,659,224 cubic yards were collected in 1940. Eleven destructors disposed of 10,170,000 cubic yards. Six new treatment sewage disposal plants, plus eight of the old type screening plants are in operation.

Across the waters and connecting the boroughs are 58 bridges, with 4 under the supervision of the Port Authority, 5 under the Triborough Bridge Authority, and 49 maintained by the New York City Public Works Department. The longest, with a span of 3,500 feet, is the George Washington Bridge. The Bronx-Whitestone measures 2300 feet and Bayonne, 1675. Seven city-operated ferries carried 27 million passengers in 1941. Private railroad ferries, of which there are 16, brought another 33 million back and forth to the city. By rail or ferry, 309,712 commuters enter New York daily, and it is estimated that 175,546 travellers are daily visitors. Over eighty million arrived and departed from Pennsylvania Station through September 1943 and for the same nine months, an additional fifty-eight and a half million came, via Grand Central Station.

While the railroad travel has increased with the war, vehicular traffic has decreased due to the rubber and gasoline shortage. In December, 1942 the Port Authority traffic crossings were off 29

percent. The Triborough Bridge was also affected about forty percent at the beginning of 1943. It is estimated that between 10 and 15,000 cars use this bridge daily. The traffic count on all city bridges under the New York City Public Works Department for October 24, 1940 showed a 14 percent increase over 1939, or 921,426 vehicles. At this point it is difficult to give an accurate picture of the present traffic figures. Undoubtedly there is a decrease from normal but, on the other hand, there has also been an upswing since the time, directly after compulsory rationing, when Broadway or Fifth Avenue was desolate of cars.

The Port Authority in recording decreases in the the Holland Tunnel, Lincoln Tunnel, and George Washington Bridge noted a 13 percent drop in revenue between 1941 and 1942. Since these crossings and the Queens Midtown Tunnel are affected by tolls, the decline in traffic will slow their debt clearance.

When the Motor Vehicle Bureau of the State reported on car registration up to January 31, 1943 only about one half of the cars registered in the previous period had obtained 1943 plates. The drivers licenses are about the same since they are good for three years and many prefer to keep this privilege. The 1941 number of operators and chauffeurs was 319,483. In 1940—28,829 hack licenses were issued by the Police Department. In 1942 only 12,123 taxicabs are listed.

A direct result of these smaller figures was a decrease in highway accidents. In 1942 only 18,994 were reported, 8000 less than in 1941. With the strict dimout rules at the end of 1942, accidents began to increase, so that the city was glad to replace the 85,000 bulbs in its many traffic signals with brighter ones when the restriction was lifted.

Subway and elevated lighting has been restored, too. During the dim-out period, there was no decrease in subway travel. On the contrary, the figures have risen each year. The daily average of revenue passengers carried by the New York City Transit System, which includes buses, was over seven millions. In the previous June of 1942 this figure was about six and a half million. For the same month in 1940—a World's Fair year—the total was about six million. These daily averages do not reflect the tremendous traffic at certain points—such as a two million increase in one station in Queens—Parsons Boulevard,—between 1942 and 1943.

The potential voting population of New York

City, which includes those who are citizens and over 21, is 4,474,689 (1940 census). Even allowing for the absent soldiers (about 700,000), the registration for the 1943 election was pitifully small—1,750,343. The *actual voters* were even fewer. One of the tangible results of this indifference is that there were only 17 councilmen, instead of 26, elected for 1944–45. For the last presidential election, 3,390,460 registered, for the gubernatorial only 2,145,473.

Effective January 1, 1944, the 24 Congressional districts in the city were divided, so that more proper regard is shown for the population. The Bronx, Kings and Queens gain, and Manhattan has three less representatives. Naturally this reapportionment does not actually take effect until the Congress is elected next November. There will be six Congressman for New York County, four for The Bronx, nine for Kings, four for Queens, and one for Richmond with a part of Manhattan included.

Reapportionment in the State also gives New York City five extra Assemblymen, the district boundaries to be settled by the City Council's Board on Reapportionment. The Senatorial Districts are increased by 2, again giving the larger boroughs more representation at the expense of Manhattan. The last change in Congressional Districts was made in 1922, although the actual setup goes back to 1911. The state districts were created in 1917. A change seems to have been indicated.

The war has had its effect on our schools, too. In March, 1942 there were 34,335 teachers in the public schools, 75 percent of whom were women. In 1943, there were 29,337 teachers. The registration of pupils has also dropped to 882,823 for elementary and high schools. This new low for school children is a product of the declining birth-rate of previous years and a trend toward employment on the part of children. The average daily register for the school year, 1941–42 was 977,659. For the same period there were 808 schools, which includes the vocational high schools, trade, and evening elementary schools. In addition it is reported that one in every five children attends the catholic schools. There are 278 elementary and high school in the New York Diocese with an attendance estimated at 120,750. The same figures for the Brooklyn Diocese are 235 schools and 118,000 in attendance. These 1943 parochial school statistics include Westchester, Nassau and Suffolk counties, which are part of these dioceses.

Besides the four city colleges, there are some twenty other colleges and universities. Eight publicly-owned museums and 36 private ones attract great numbers of people. The three public library systems operate 144 branches and sub-branches and about 900 stations, or from 1044 points of distribution. Book circulation in 1942 to 1,732,922 borrowers was 19,220,105 volumes.

On the amusement side the city boasts of five zoos and the fine spectacle at the Hayden Planetarium. Both the Park Department and the Board of Education operate swimming pools. There is ice and roller skating at Flushing Meadow Park. This is not a complete picture but there is probably no sport lacking. The newest venture of the city is the New York City Center where the best music and drama may be presented at cost. 759 theatres are assessed at $184,442,100, of which 64 are legitimate, as distinguished from moving picture theatres. The average weekly attendance at the 83 theatres in the Times Square district exceeds 1,779,408. Anyone who has tried to get tickets will agree that this total may even be smaller than the true figure. The Metropolitan Opera House seats 3,528 and enjoys an average weekly attendance of some 26,000 during its season. Then there are 1,170 cabarets and 256 dance halls. Six radio theatres attract 40,000 weekly.

With the theatrical district concentrated largely in the Times Square zone, no one will dispute the statement of the Broadway Association that "Times Square is the busiest and most densely populated place in the world at night." It has always been a popular spot, even with the Great White Way very gray. But the influx of servicemen has brought it phenominal business, particularly over week-ends. The migratory population is said to be 6,437,814 weekly. In its 200 service restaurants, Times Square serves about 5,000,000 meals a week. Theatres, as we have said, are crowded to capacity. Three great war agencies give food and entertainment to over 93,000 servicemen every week in this area. About 1,800,000 a week shop at the department stores in the area between 32nd and 59th Streets. The phones in Times Square are equally busy with an average business day of 370,000 calls. Attendance at the 43 churches in the district is at least twenty percent above last year. The square is but typical of the city.

Postal receipts for Manhattan, Bronx, Brooklyn, Flushing, Long Island City, and Jamaica post offices for the year ended June 30, 1941 were over $90,000,000. "Over 5 million New York newspapers are printed daily" says a 1931 study. Surely this figure is much larger today, but no such estimate is available. By mail and by press, there has been an increase greatly enhanced by the war. Telephones are fairly static for the same reason. There were 787,607 residence wires out of a total 1,169,023 in the city, at the end of 1941.

The market value of corporate securities handled by the New York Stock Exchange on November 1, 1943 was $63,288,657,000, which is an increase of eleven billions over November 1, 1942. Bank deposits in the 1,166 banks as of June, 1943 were also six billions above 1942—or $31,172,000,000. With this wealth, goes an increase in individual income returns. Before the change in rate, and before our entrance into the war, 824,357 filed in 1939. The latest summary for 1941 of Federal income taxpayers lists 2,040,212.

Figures for retail and wholesale business and wage earners for 1939 can be found in the census figures. Sixteen and a half billion dollars sales are included. Since this is before our entrance into the war and before the orgy of spending, these business receipts are surely different. In the same year, the 512,666 wage earners in manufacturing industries represented about 10 percent of all such wage earners in the country. The major industry groups of employed workers for 1940 were in clothing, printing, and food products. In 1943 the picture changes so that the apparel industry still leads, but metals and machinery have second place, with food and printing, third and fourth. Breaking the 1940 census figures into major occupational groups, clinical and sales employees lead, operatives and kindred workers were next. Service workers, craftsmen, and proprietors or managers are next.

According to the United States Employment Service, unemployment in September, 1943 dropped to 68,000 as compared with 400,000 idle in July, 1942. A November, 1943 estimate is 50,000. A good indication that the city is enjoying its share of war work is a reduction in vacant loft factory space. In 1941, ten and a half million square feet lacked tenants. Today only about one million square feet can be rented. A decline in unemployment is reflected in the 89,026 home relief cases of September, 1943. The year before

there were 238,610 cases reported. There was a light increase in old age pensions—56,312 as of September, 1943.

The annual per capita food consumption was set forth by the Metropolitan Defense Transport Committee in 1941; Butter—19.5; fish 19.3; poultry 44.4; eggs 36.2; milk 282.5; cheese 10.2 and potatoes 160.3—all in pounds. Visualize if you can these figures multiplied by seven million and what the marketing problems of the city is. There are six wholesale and nine retail markets operated by the city at the present time.

The building industry, with its priority problems, has not enjoyed a war boom, although 8,118 new buildings were assessed for 1942–43. In the first nine months of 1943 building and alteration permits—14,952, were about one half of those issued for the same period in 1942. This brings the number of buildings to 683,239. Over 4000 are city owned or leased. 44,000 elevators are used. Actually, there are 7,062 elevator apartments and 135,207 walk-ups. 516 hotels are assessed at $329,564,200. The largest group is one and two family dwellings—477,248. If these residential figures differ slightly from the U. S. census figures already quoted, it is well to remember that much of the census was done on a sampling basis, whereas the Tax Department cannot fail to list and assess each building. Of office buildings, New York has 1,679 assessed at a total of $1,550,367,050, and 10,998 store buildings at $675,692,065.

The Department of Public Works maintains 68 public buildings such as courts, borough halls, some health stations, and our City Hall. Of the 223 hospitals in New York City, 26 are city, 3 State, 5 United States, 104 proprietary, and 85 voluntary.

In caring for the tremendous public necessities for New York City, the municipal government had a payroll of 197,081 employees in December, 1941. At the end of 1942 about 11,000 were on military leave. As of April, 1943 the U. S. census estimate was 136,000 but since this does not include about 41,000 in the Board of Education, the number is probably around 177,000 at present.

Estimating that at least one-tenth of all the Federal employees in the country, outside of Washington, are in New York, we may add about 280,000 under U. S. Civil Service. 5717 Federal employees came here with the transfer of agencies. Again, estimating that less than half of all State

employees work within the city, or 20,000, we may conclude that there are 479,000 public servants in the city. This includes our 2000 county employees.

Daily consumption of water averages 906,700-000 gallons, with a per capita use of over 125 gallons. The number of water meters are 180,298, service connections, 670,399, and 78,000 fire hydrants.

Fire losses for 1942, with 6000 less fires, declined about $500,000. This $9,346,835 does not include the loss of the Normandie. There were 28,294 fires. In a year of definite water shortage, the decrease in fires and fire loss was fortunate. 10,313 uniformed firemen and 367 fire companies were also busy instructing their auxiliaries and new personnel.

The same wartime difficulties confronted the uniformed police—17,582—in 1942. 7,125 patrol corps members, besides the air warden force, looked to them for guidance. In the discharge of their regular duty, the police used 405 motorcycles and 464 radio patrol cars. 782 of their automobile equipment have radios.

To pay for all these city services, the basic tax rate rose to .0289 for 1943–44. In 1940 it was .0284, 1941—.0280, 1942—.0279. With the local assessments, Manhattan's rate is .0304; Bronx—.0303; Brooklyn—.0305; Queens—.0313; Richmond—.0306. The tax levy for 1942–43 was $483,940,316, based on taxable real estate, which, with Corporation and Special Franchise realty, was assessed at $16,122,974,455. The land alone was valued at $6,892,199,644. Real estate taxes collected under this levy amounted to $438,305-000. Assessments paid were $37,514,515. Of the 821,927 parcels of land in the city, $3,814,979,005 is exempt property belonging to the municipality. Total exemption is valued at $5,118,603,609.

Another large item of collection covering the sales tax and other special taxes brought the city

$52,688,000 in 1942–43. The tax levy or expense budget for 1943–44 was $742,205,823. The 1940–41 total was $581,048,834. For 1941–42 it dropped to $573,740,594. A tremendous jump took place in 1942–43—$769,214,273. The total funded debt on June 30, 1942 stood at $3,034-484,944 with the debt limit at $1,643,728,708 and the net funded debt at $2,484,529,999.

In addition to the housing program already described for postwar construction, the city plans all sorts of projects. The capital outlay budget as approved for 1944 is $55,568,188. Prominent in this budget is the completion of the new Idlewild Airport which will be six times the size of the other city airport, LaGuardia Field.

The original 1942 postwar plans called for an expenditure of $628,000,000. Of this the largest item was for new schools; the next largest is for the Department of Public Works for bridges, sewage disposal improvement, and a new Brooklyn Court building; the third largest for the integration of the three main transit lines, and next for additional hospitals. Each city agency submitted plans and every phase of city activity will benefit.

The cost of the overall picture has naturally risen. In some cases money has been appropriated for the survey of some special need. The Second Avenue Subway, the second stage of the Delaware Water Supply system, and a new wholesale market fall in this category. Adding these items to the program raises the total to about one and a quarter billion dollars. Of course the municipality expects Federal help, probably about 45 percent of the whole.

If only a part of these works gets out of the paper stage, New York City will be in a good position to meet the unemployment problem which will follow close on the heels of the war, or until industry can make the necessary adjustment to peacetime production.

GROUP PERSISTENCE AMONG AIR WARDENS*

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THIS paper presents some of the conclusions drawn from a study in the persistence of a social group, much of whose original rationale has been dissipated. The specific organization is that of the Air Wardens in a New York City sector[1], and the time of the study is the winter of 1943–44.

The sector lies in mid-Manhattan. It is rather cleanly dichotomized by one of the city's broad avenues: to the west lie large wholesale firms; to the east, a section of apartment houses and private homes—mainly converted brickfronts and brownstones—with a number of retail stores, several schools, and a few office buildings. The inhabitants are predominantly middle class, by any of the usual criteria. Most of them are clerical and professional people; the others are small merchants and artisans. The wardens provide a fairly representative sample of the local population, slightly weighted in favor of the professional group.

The exact size of the group is difficult to determine, since there is no formal distinction between active wardens and those who, once enrolled, have never resigned but who seldom or never participate. The number of nominal Air Wardens is between seventy-five and eighty. Of these, thirty or forty can be counted on for regular attendance at meetings and for two hours a week of "sector duty" at headquarters. At least this number may be expected to turn out for a test blackout; in the event of a real attack, the entire membership would probably be at their posts.

Systematic observations of the group were begun in October 1943 and continued until February 1944. This period of study was, however, preceded by a year of participation in the group's activities, and some of the impressions arising out of that experience were used as guides for later research. During the months of study, careful notes on behavior as expressed in word and action were

recorded along with whatever background material suggested itself. As artfully as it could be done, conversations were steered in pertinent directions, but care was taken to leave the structuring of response in the hands of the informants. If at any time they showed a disinclination to pursue the subject, it was allowed to drop until a better opportunity presented itself. At length, when it became evident that, owing to the current low rate of interaction between members, this technique was producing diminishing returns, six representative wardens were subjected to interviews, lasting on the average an hour or an hour and a half. The small number of interviews may be excused on two grounds: the long period of participation and observation which had preceded the interviewing, and the homogeneity of the group in question.

The point of departure for the study of this group is its original rationale—at the time of its organization in June 1941. The concept of rationale is fundamental to our discussion. By it is meant "an emotionally meaningful basis for activity."

The original rationale for the group (and for the whole network of protective services) rested on the expectation that New York, along with other cities of the American mainland, would be subjected to aerial bombardment. This expectation could not, in the nature of the case, be based on knowledge derived from direct experience. The technical possibility of long-range air attack had been established, but beyond that lay an unstructured field in which no one possessed sure knowledge. Strictly speaking, this is, of course, always the case; we cannot be certain today, nor can the citizens of London, that bombs either will or will not fall. But Londoners can reckon the probabilities on the basis of last night's raid; we cannot and could not in 1940 and '41.

In the absence of this kind of knowledge, a statement that air attack was to be expected, therefore, could rest its claim for acceptance only on the authority of those making it and on the various sentiments and beliefs which could be called on to bolster the official expectations. These expectations were only gradually aroused. The official admission that bombing of American

* For his aid and suggestions I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to Dr. Robert K. Merton.

[1] A sector covers an area of the city containing the homes of about 500 people. It is officially regarded as "the basic unit of Civilian Defense."

cities was possible came early after invasion of the Low Countries, but the inference that no such attack was actually expected at that time may be drawn from the fact that the Army Air Corps did not complete its organization plan for defense against aerial bombardment until nearly a year later, in April 1941.

In May, the Office of Civilian Defense was created with Fiorello La Guardia as its director. He urged the immediate organization of Air Warden Services throughout the country. The implication of this step was clear; the official expectations had mounted to a point where a widespread system of protective services was considered essential. They continued to rise, imperceptibly but surely, during the summer and fall of 1941, until the situation was dramatically crystallized by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Almost immediately the official degree of probability reached its maximum. Three weeks later, Mr. La Guardia asserted: "The war will come right to our cities and residential districts....We may not expect long-continued, sustained attacks such as the cities of England have suffered, but we will be attacked ... and we must prepare for that." This warning was repeated by government spokesmen in the next few months, although not always with the same degree of certainty. Mr. La Guardia himself had modified his position only slightly in May 1942, when he stated: "The streets of our city may at any time become battle streets." This official attitude was filtered down through the service by a hierarchy of interpreters. From the outset and through the summer of 1943, it was maintained by the sector commander of the local group: "We are going to be bombed. There is no doubt of that, and we may as well make up our minds to it."

These official expectations were bolstered by a number of beliefs and sentiments, some of which had government sanction, and all of which were, and less frequently are, expressed by the wardens themselves. These may be conveniently classified as follows:

1. *The "irrationality of the enemy" theory*. It was believed, for example, that Germans would demand revenge for the bombing of German cities. Or, in another expression: "When things really get bad for the Nazis, they'll get desperate and do anything."

2. *The "morale of the enemy" theory*. This is based on an analogy with the boost of American spirits after the bombing of Tokyo. It is given official status in an OCD publication: "When their armies retreat, when the submarine campaign fails, when the shadow of disaster begins to fall across their world, they will turn to air raids to lift their own morale."

3. *The "panic response" theory*. It has been felt that what would be good for German morale would be, at least momentarily, bad for ours. "What the Germans want to do is start a panic in New York, and believe me, it would be one."

4. *The "military objective" theory*, to the effect: "What the Germans really want is to interrupt the flow of ships and supplies from New York Harbor."

Supporting any or all of these varying convictions are considerations of the technical possibilities of attack. The principal ones are: (1) *secret bases*. "The Nazis have secret bases in the Caribbean that we don't know anything about"; (2) *submarines*. "I hear they have submarines which can carry three medium bombers"; (3) *aircraft carriers*. "Maybe I shouldn't say this, but I heard there was one sunk off the coast only a couple of weeks ago"; (4) *long range bombers*. "They have a whole squadron ready to take off from France or Norway. A suicide squad. They couldn't get back. But they'd get here."

The significance of the rationale (based on these official expectations, buttressed by this set of beliefs) was that the organization of an Air Warden Service became an emotionally meaningful possibility. In the want of such a rationale, a situation remains amorphous and reaction to it assumes random and meaningless forms. A typical instance is provided by the panic response which a number of radio listeners exhibited at the time of "The Invasion from Mars." In the matter of a hypothetical aerial attack by mundane enemies as it presented itself in 1940 and '41 (although there was necessarily an element of the unknown and unknowable—thus leaving open an area in which rumors and attendant emotions could have free play) an authoritative, if not conclusive, statement of expectation could be made. If this were accepted, activity could assume the form (among others) of the organization of a group with the explicit aim of preparing defensive measures, "including enforcement of the blackout, guiding people to shelters, reporting fires and fallen bombs, administering first aid, reporting the presence of gas and removing injured persons from damaged

buildings." For such a group, the rationale provided a charter validating its activities.

The individual, at the same time, was furnished with multiple incentives for affiliation with the group. It is important for an understanding of the development of attitudes within the Air Warden group to list some of these initial incentives. The list is admittedly not exhaustive; indeed it is difficult to see how it could be. The following appear, however, to have been the most frequent:

1. *The desire for security which derives from the acquisition of techniques.* It is assumed that any danger is felt to be minimized through the mastery of rational techniques designed to meet it. In view of the high probability originally conceded to attack, a direct gratification accrued to those who made serious efforts to prepare themselves to counter that danger. A retrospective observation made by a warden in October 1943 brings this out very clearly.

It's [the A.W.S.] a wonderful thing—I almost said: it *was* a wonderful thing. . . . The morning after the first blackout my wife said she thought we ought to move. We live on the sixth floor, you know, and she was worried about a bomb dropping. Listen, I said, if a bomb drops on this building, it'll be too bad, no matter where you are. I said: why don't you join the Air Warden Service and find out what they're doing about things? So she did and went to lectures and First Aid for a couple of weeks and she found out what they were doing. And she's never said anything about moving since. That's what I mean when I say it's done a lot of good. People know that preparations are being made and it allays a lot of fears.

2. *The desire for dramatic experience.* The program of activities laid out in anticipation of aerial bombardment presented considerable opportunity for dramatic experience. It is hardly necessary to assume that a desire for this is a constant in human nature in order to make the empirical observation that, in the American culture at least, the tendency to follow parades, to run to a fire, to stop to watch a street fight is widely diffused. On the basis of this observation, it would be reasonable to expect that a program of this nature would attract, even in the absence of other incentives, a sizable following. The qualification must be made that this would occur only if the probability conceded to attack remained high. If this were appreciably lowered, the dousing of incendiary bombs and the rest would be inter-

preted by the outsider not as rehearsal for an intended performance but as sport or as nonsense. He might still be curious, but he would have no strong incentive for affiliation.

This analysis appears to be supported by the data. Every air raid drill in the sector, particularly if incendiary bombs are used, always attracts a crowd of bystanders. In the early days, several of these usually turned up afterwards at headquarters to volunteer their services. Blackouts were similarly followed by enlistments.

The interview material suggests that a desire for dramatic experience was present in many such cases. The remarks of one warden may be quoted as an example:

I figured I'd like the Warden Service best because I can't stay in the house when the siren blows. If a fire engine goes by, I always have to run out and see where it's going.

Many of the wardens impute this incentive when speaking of others and explain early defections from the Service as brought about by its blocking. A case in point is the following:

A lot of people got steamed up at the beginning and then they lost interest. It just wasn't very exciting. We weren't bombed next week.

3. *The desire for power as the representative of an authoritative body.* In addition to its implicit promise of dramatic experience, the Air Wardens' program gave reason to believe that a certain amount of power would accrue to the wardens by virtue of their position. It has been the subject-matter of frequent allegations concerning the Service that many wardens were attracted by this opportunity. "He just wanted to be a warden so he could push people around" is a common formulation. That the wardens have acquired a certain measure of such power is unquestioned, and there is evidence to indicate that some of them enjoy exercising it. This evidence will be presented in a later discussion. It does not appear that many of them entered the service with power as a deliberate consideration, but it is reasonable to believe that some recognized from the beginning the power possibilities which were inherent in the program and were, at least subconsciously, attracted by them.

4. *The desire for "service."* One of the most striking phenomena associated with American participation in the war has been a widespread

accumulation of guilt feelings among the civilian population. The contrast between the lot of those who are physically exposed to the horrors of war and that of the relatively well-housed, well-fed American civilians has weighed heavily on many consciences. In an effort to shuffle off a part of this guilt load many Americans have sought an outlet in action. The more aggressive the form of this action, the lighter is the burden which must be borne. A case in point crops up in a conversation with one of the wardens in the fall of 1943.

It's kind of got in people's blood like they want to do something.... Take this fellow in my office. He's joined the State Guard. They drill two hours every week and he feels like he's doing something. Of course that work's more interesting than the Warden Service. They learn a lot of valuable things like how to handle a rifle or a machine gun.

Actual transformation into a soldier with his implied ability to inflict punishment on the enemy is the most satisfactory method of reducing this burden of guilt. In 1941, the Air Wardens were faced with exactly this prospect. As La Guardia pointed out, city streets might at any time become battle streets; civilians then would become front-line fighters, and the wardens would find themselves, in the words of the official handbook, " 'non-commissioned officer(s)' for the ... populace." The experience of London supported this, and the handbook went on to urge that American wardens model themselves on the English pattern.

The link in the minds of the wardens between the desire to shuffle off a part of the guilt load and their affiliation with the Service is clearly marked. When asked, why did you join, the most usual response is in such terms as the following:

A warden shamed me into joining.

I guess I felt guilty about not doing more about the war.

I think all civilians have a guilty conscience. Now I'm a strong healthy girl and I ought to be in the Waves or Wacs, but I can't, so I do what I can to be helpful.

It must be emphasized once again that these initial incentives depended for their strength on the widely-held belief of 1941 and '42: it can and will happen here. In the winter of 1943–44, this belief appears to be greatly weakened. The wardens make markedly fewer references to the

"theories" which were freely expressed a year or two ago. And the intensity with which they are voiced seems to be much less. In the last few months, in fact, there is a growing tendency to deny any likelihood of air raids. "They've got too much to do at home. They aren't going to waste any planes sending them over here." "There aren't going to be any raids. This whole air warden business is stupid."

The weakening of belief in the possibility of attack is associated with a decline in the ranks. Actual resignations have increased: on the average there is one every other week. More usual, however, is the technique of non-cooperation: wardens remain on the list, but either refuse "sector duty" or simply fail to put in an appearance. This sin of omission, formerly the most heinous in a warden's catalogue, is now allowed to slip by unpunished. According to one warden interviewed in February:

Each warden's degree of practicality is now in process of crystallization. Dr. M— crystallized on February 1st by refusing longer to go on drills or to keep watch at Sector Headquarters. The gentleman who has hours 8 to 10 on Mondays crystallized this week. I feel crystallization coming on.

Among the wardens who remain and who continue—however aware of "crystallization"—to participate, this infection is countered by an insistence that the danger is not yet clearly past Despite a growing tendency to disclaim any genuine concern, even at the beginning, the wardens still maintain—"at least in conversation" as one put it—that a raid may come. The usual response is of the following order:

I wasn't convinced. I still don't feel it's very likely, but it's a possibility.

I wasn't all fired with the thought that New York might be blown to pieces. Oh, I thought we might get a nuisance raid. (Now?) I don't think the danger of raids will be over till the war's over.

Nevertheless, indications that this adherence to original belief in the possibility of a raid has become increasingly ritualistic give rise to the question of the actual mainstays of the group's persistence. Participation, on the part of thirty or forty, continues. How, if at all, have incentives been transformed to make this possible? On November 28, 1943, a warden made the following entry in the guard-duty register maintained at

Sector Headquarters: "Are my services really needed any longer?" And as an afterthought: "All right, I'll stick." What are the considerations which, for the wardens as a group, interpose themselves between this question and this answer?

The list of transformations which initial incentives have undergone is intended to be suggestive rather than complete. The following seem important:

1. The desire for security resting on the learning of techniques has been in large measure fulfilled. With the decline of belief in attack has been associated a reduction of the anxiety which springs from ignorance of what to do in the emergency. Much less emphasis is currently placed on the value of skills. They are only nominally demanded by the Service, and the wardens do not spontaneously stress their worth to the degree which they formerly did. An announcement in November of a new series of courses in fire-prevention was coupled with a flaccid endorsement by the Sector Commander: "It might come in handy some day. You never know when you might be in a fire." Any interest which survived this faint praise was quickly driven to ground when he added: "There'll be examinations afterwards. But don't worry about them. The Police Department won't even look at your answers." The course was not given.

Among the wardens themselves there is less inclination to dwell on the benefits of acquiring techniques than was evident earlier. Only in response to direct questions do the wardens say:

Oh, I think you learn tact. And how to handle drunks. But I wouldn't say I feel trained.

A few things I guess I've learned. I don't know what particularly.

Despite these limp responses, it may be hazarded that the instability now apparent among the wardens stems far more from the frustration of having nothing to do than from any premonition of incompetence should a raid ever come. The following train of thought, although couched as a "gripe," reveals a clear recognition of the value of the Air Wardens' training and a sense of responsibility which is the antithesis of low morale.

During the last drill we had, I was a "casualty," and I had to lie on the sidewalk for about forty minutes—fortunately it was a warm night—watching them trying to get that stretcher down from the top floor. Everybody milling around, messing things up. My first thought was that if we ever had a real raid the wardens would be running around in a panic. *My second was that if they didn't walk through it now, it'd be chaos.*

It seems safe to assume that the wardens are fundamentally sure of their ability to handle a real emergency, and that this kind of "gripe" is a credit to their training rather than a devaluation of it. The remark of one warden is illuminating: "I guess it would all come back. *Automatically* you'd know what to do." And in a second breath: "I guess we could use some refresher courses." The word "automatically" deserves italics; it bespeaks an assurance too solid to need defense. That it is not merely personal is evidenced by the speedy coupling with refresher courses.

2. The desire for dramatic experience has been transformed in two directions: First, initially instrumental activities which have been given no realistic opportunity to function are converted into play. Secondly, the role of "crisis-handler" during an air attack is scaled up to fill the dimensions of any emergency. The two forms are analytically separable but are not, in practice, found in isolation. Illustrative of the first type of transformation are the remarks of one girl who regards much of the sector's activity as a *divertissement*. Speaking of the salvage drive in which the wardens participated, she said:

Such stuff. It was a scream. . . . I enjoyed it a lot. I wouldn't mind doing it again if it was necessary. I think almost any of us would do practically anything if it was for a good cause. For instance, I think it would be fun to shovel snow, the way it was suggested in the paper. I think it would be a riot to sweep Fifth Avenue. . . . (The patrols?) Oh, they were fun. It was fun going into the bookstore for coffee afterwards. I've never minded any of it.

The second type of transformation was adumbrated by an early redefinition of the Air Warden's role to include defense not only against attack from the air but also "by enemies from within our gates." This activity of the wardens, in New York at least, was only slowly conceded by the Police Department. At length, however, it became customary to call out the wardens for many duties at some remove from their original ones. They have been sent on patrols to "watch out for sabotage," they assisted in checking the spread of the Harlem riot, in guarding fire boxes on Hallowe'en, even in forming a posse to look for a kidnapped baby. Any of these situations may

recur, and among some of the wardens there is a marked desire to have a part in them. "Even after the war," said one warden, "suppose there's some emergency—say a boiler blew out at 81—. We'd all be there in a few minutes." Another spoke of the possibility of riots "like the one up in Harlem. Or espionage. Anything that might come out of the war. There were those two F.B.I. men who came to 'sector' and wanted information about somebody in the neighborhood. And we were able to give it."

3. To some extent a correlate of the opportunity to be a "crisis-handler" is that to share in the exercise of power. One of the wardens remarked: "I love to make trucks pull over to the curb. I just love to stop traffic. I should have been a policeman." Another was even more candid.

I guess my bossy instinct is satisfied. I'm bossy. I know it. I do like to run things. I can do it too. Just sitting at "sector" wasn't much, but when I was put in charge of guard duty, it gave me something to do.... (Do we have enough authority?) Definitely not. That's why most people laugh at us. They think we're damn fools. Now I think if you're going to do something you should do it all the way. The way things are, if somebody won't do something, we tell the cops and they say: "We'll take care of it," and that's the last you hear of it. We'd probably get arrested if we tried to use any police authority.

The fact that by the terms under which the organization was set up, the wardens were expressly denied any police power, gives rise to an instability in the relations between wardens and the civilian population. Cooperation from the latter was assumed in the organization's charter. This has not been universally forthcoming, and the wardens are frustrated in their attempts to do anything about it. In the one test case in the sector, when a warden succeeded in having a chronic violator of the blackout haled into court, the judge released the offender with no more than a reproof. The warden, feeling that he had been made to appear ridiculous, resigned and was only with difficulty persuaded to return. This experience has been widely discussed in the sector and a number have expressed annoyance and discouragement at the judge's attitude.

This instability is perhaps one source of the wardens' cultivation of their tie with the Police Department. This is a relationship *de novo*, foreshadowed in the official specification of the Air Wardens' role. They were enjoined to consider

themselves as "the principal liaison agents between the ... people ... and the elaborate structure of air raid precautions and services." Since the visible representatives of this structure are the police, it follows that the two groups have been brought into a contact which neither police nor the wardens, as law-abiding, middle class Americans, had experienced.

A byproduct of this contact has been greater friendliness between the wardens and the police. To both it has been something of a discovery. A former Deputy Police Commissioner, now in the Army, expressed the matter in a conversation, as follows:

When the job was dumped on the Police Force, they didn't know how to go about it. They didn't know any civilians except politicians and crooks. Now they've met some law-abiding citizens.

From the wardens' point of view the new contact has stripped off a cloak of impersonal authority, transforming a set of awesome symbols into human beings. One warden remarked: "Before all this, I don't think I'd been in a police station in my life. Now I'm in and out of there two or three times a week."

This friendliness has, in turn, permitted a reflection of police authority to fall upon the wardens. Not only may they be "in and out," but they are recognized in the process, known by sight and perhaps by name, obliged when they ask some small favor. This recognition, bestowed in greater measure, of course, on the leaders of the organization than on the rank and file, provides compensation for the lack of authority from which the wardens suffer. This consideration, along with the others which have been mentioned: "I think the main thing that's come out of the Air Warden Service is the contact between the police force and civilians."

A second field in which the desire for authority and recognition may be achieved lies within the organization itself, where a prestige system has gradually developed. It is improbable that advance considerations of this prestige were significantly present in the minds of volunteers in 1941 and '42. The situation might have been different in an area with a marked sense of local community; in the relative anonymity of this urban sector, however, it is unlikely that many thought of advancing themselves in the eyes of warden-neighbors with whom they were barely, if

One of the most amazing things is that so many people in the neighborhood have made new friends. It's just like a small community when you meet people on the street. You can live in New York for years and years and never know who your next door neighbor is.

Associated with the transformation of initial incentives has been the reformation of the organization's rationale. The form which it now takes may be stated in three propositions:

1. Air attack is still a possibility, however slight, and will presumably remain one for the duration.

2. There exists independently a state of general emergency, sharpened by the induction of many of the police into the armed forces, which requires, on occasion, the services of a volunteer auxiliary force.

3. Volunteers for a "war job" are, in any event, considered as obligated to continue in their chosen service for the duration.

It is evident that these provide a less meaningful basis for activity than did the original rationale. It seems safe to predict that for this organization, at least, no alternative or supplementary rationale will prove a solid foundation after the original one completely disappears. The questions remain: What has been the effect of this experience in group activity? Will there be for the wardens, not as a group but as individuals, a carry-over into the post-war world? Will this experience encourage them to seek gratifications in other organizations? And if so, what kind of organizations? Or will the slow dissipation of their interest which they have known in the Warden Service lead them to shun such participation? The answers to these questions, if asked of former wardens and other civilian defense volunteer workers in the years after the war, should give us a better understanding of the contribution these groups have made not only to the war but to the organization of American life.

WOMEN'S BUREAU IN THE RECONVERSION PROGRAM

The following statement has been released by the Women's Bureau:

How to guarantee women workers sound levels of employment and labor standards in tomorrow's industrial skyline is the most pressing problem now facing the United States Department of Labor Women's Bureau, Frieda S. Miller announced yesterday on being sworn in as the new director of the Bureau. She was welcomed by Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins.

Succeeding Mary Anderson, who retired June 30 as head of the Women's Bureau, Miss Miller is eminently qualified for her new job, having served for a number of years in the New York State Department of Labor, first as director of the Women in Industry and Minimum Wage Division, and later as the Industrial Commissioner. Miss Miller resigned in 1943 and went to London as special assistant to Ambassador Winant, with opportunity to study British labor conditions. She returned to this country last April to attend the Philadelphia Conference of the International Labor Organization.

Reporting yesterday that similar war and postwar problems for women exist in Britain and the United States, she added: "Reconversion to civilian production is a rapidly growing challenge in view of cutbacks in certain war materials, but it is a manageable thing if we are both forehanded and farsighted as to planning. And to succeed it must include careful readjustment of women workers, who at present form a third of our employed persons against a fourth in 1940.

She outlined a three-fold function of the Women's Bureau in the reconversion program: (1) Setting up right conditions in so-called women's industries; (2) developing new job opportunities for trained and competent women who have proved their ability during the war; (3) keeping open to women the doors of training for skilled work.

"We must start immediately to build these structures into our already shifting industrial system, and thereby guard the interests not only of women but of the country as a whole. The importance to the Nation of the millions of women who are a permanent part of its labor force cannot be overlooked.

"Though the present total of over 18 million women workers will drop with the coming of peace, the number will be higher than before the war.

"Failure to aim at definite objectives for women would mean thousands stranded without work and other thousands forced into low-paying jobs while the cost of living remained high. Such an acute crisis developing with a downward spiral in purchasing power and also in business and industrial activity, but accompanied by rising relief rolls, might almost be compared in effect to a robot bomb that cuts in all directions and undermines community welfare and morale."

The need to improve conditions in substandard types of employment, such as certain service trades and consumer goods industries was stressed by Miss Miller.

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PROBLEM AND METHODOLOGY IN AN AMERICAN DILEMMA

HOWARD W. ODUM

University of North Carolina

AN AMERICAN DILEMMA. The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. 2 vols. By Gunnar Myrdal with the assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944. 1483 pp. $7.50.

An American Dilemma is one of those works which it is not possible to review either adequately or fairly. Perhaps the best way to symbolize this judgment is to say that the two volumes may well serve as basic materials for a research seminar which features both methodology and major area

of American problems in which procedure, drill, details, are more important than general assumptions and conclusions. Indeed the two main purposes which seem most prominent in Dr. Myrdal's own writing are to challenge American social science through a criticism of its lack of purposive and practical objectives and a restatement of its obligations to improve mankind, on the one hand; and his desire to set the incidence for America "to do something big and do it soon."

Since Dr. Myrdal boldly emphasizes primarily

these two major objectives and qualities of his work, it seems logical to feature them in our present review, although prefacing all our discussions with the assumption that *An American Dilemma*, in its comprehensiveness, in its originality, in its analysis, is the best thing that has been done on the Negro and is likely to be the best for a considerable time to come. To the social scientist and the "intellectual" planners, publicists, and reformers, the book is a "must." The work is not only a godsend to the sociologists who teach courses on the Negro and race, but it is scarcely possible to imagine such a course that will not have to use liberally these volumes as texts.

Perhaps we may best approach our discussion of *An American Dilemma* as a major contribution by comparing it with another two volume product of a cooperative research project. For in at least three striking ways Myrdal's book is comparable to Quincy Wright's superb two volume, *A Study of War*. Each of these important works is the result of cooperative research but with the author assuming complete responsibility for the final volumes. Each deals with a universal societal dilemma in which the outward manifestations of the problem reflect tension and tragedy for which no "solution" appears. And finally, each features the methodological approach to social science.

Professor Wright's work was the result of more than ten years of cooperative effort in no less than sixty-six studies of eighteen major projects initiated at the University of Chicago in 1926. The studies, directed by Professor Wright with the cooperation of other members of the Social Science Research Group at the University, were made by some twenty-four research assistants. Ten of the studies were published in book form, and the final definitive work prepared by Professor Wright who assumed entire responsibility, appeared in 1942.

Dr. Myrdal's work was the result of cooperative study, authorized by the Carnegie Corporation in 1937, begun in 1938, consistently interrupted by war work, and published finally in 1944. In addition to the two main volumes, there were four other separate volumes published as "The Negro in American Life Series," while twenty-two manuscripts have been filed for record. The study made under the direction of Dr. Myrdal, with the special assistance of Richard Sterner and Arnold Rose, was organized with five special staff members in addition to the three collaborators; thirty-one special "task" research assignments, and thirty-six assistants. Prior to the organization of the work a panel of about fifty advisers was consulted and in the later stages there was a committee of three to advise on selection and publication of manuscripts.

Not only are these works dealing with the human and societal dilemmas of war and race, but each study was begun at a time when there was expectation of both objectivity and uninterrupted study and of optimistic trends, and both ended in the unpredicted chaos and turmoil which made some of their assumptions and conclusions appear out of date before they could be published. Thus Professor Wright says of his study that it was "begun in the hopeful atmosphere of Locarno and completed in the midst of general war." Similarly, in his introductory note to *An American Dilemma*, the late Frederick P. Keppel wrote, "When the Trustees of the Carnegie Corporation asked for the preparation of this report in 1937, no one (except possibly Adolf Hitler) could have foreseen that it would be made public at a day when the place of the Negro in American life would be the subject of greatly heightened interest in the United States . . . when the eyes of men of all races the world over turned upon us to see how the people of the most powerful of the United Nations are dealing *at home* with a major problem of race relations." So, too, Dr. Myrdal's italicized conclusion on page 1003 that "The gradual destruction of the popular theory behind race prejudice is the most important of all social trends in the field of interracial relations" strikes hard against the rising tide of race prejudice and conflict the world over, but particularly in America.

Yet these unpredicted developments are perhaps all the more reason why these authors should have featured the importance of social science in the study and direction of trends and why they should give many pages to the discussion of methodological approach. In his total work Professor Wright has 40 chapters and 45 appendices aggregating 1552 pages, while Dr. Myrdal has 45 chapters and 10 appendices with a total of 1482 pages. In each case much of the burden of the appendices is on the methodological approach. Professor Wright goes so far as to devote all of Chapter XVI to "Scientific Method and the Study of War," and Chapter XVIII to "The Social Disciplines and War," while special appendices include these on "Cooperative Research on War," "Approaches to

the Study of War," "Analysis of Psychological Drives, Motives, Interests, Purposes and Intentions." Of special importance in relation to Dr. Myrdal's work are the Wright units on "The Social Disciplines and War" and "The Evaluating Ideas of Modern Civilization." Among the methodological appendices in *An American Dilemma* are "Methodological Notes" on: "Valuations and Beliefs," "Facts and Valuations in Social Science," "Principle of Cumulation," together with special appendices on "Quantitative Studies of Race Attitudes," "Research on Negro Leadership," and "Research on Negro Caste and Class."

In each of the works, moreover, there is emphasis upon purposive social science. Professor Wright is convinced "that the problem of preventing war is one of increasing importance in our civilization" but "neither thought nor action can be effective without a clear and widespread vision of the world as a whole, of the interactions of its past and present, of the interrelations of regions, and of the interdependence of its peoples." Dr. Myrdal stresses the "practical side" in which "the aim of this book is to throw light on the future and to construct, in a preliminary way, bases for a rational policy" and "we have today in social science a greater trust in the improvability of man and society than we have ever had since the Enlightenment."

II

Sampling some of the admirable statements of objectives and conclusions of *An American Dilemma* may serve as illustrations of both the problem-methods approach and of findings and content, as well as the basis for certain realistic criticisms. Fundamental, for instance, and from this reviewer's viewpoint at least undebatable is the italicized conclusion that *"The Negro problem is an integral part of, or a special phase of, the whole complex of problems in the larger American civilization. It cannot be treated in isolation."*

And again, the central viewpoint of the Myrdal treatise is stated clearly and boldly as a moral problem, "the American Negro problem is a problem in the heart of the American." Dr. Myrdal insists that "Though our study includes economic, social, and political race relations, at bottom our problem is the moral dilemma of the American—the conflict between his moral valuations on various levels of consciousness and generality. The 'American Dilemma,' referred to in the title of this book, is

the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall call the 'American Creed,' where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social, and sexual jealousies; considerations of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook."

Equally bold are Dr. Myrdal's assertions with reference to American social science of which he is extremely critical. Following his characterization of theoretical research as dealing with the present situation and the past development while practical research "is exclusively concerned with the future," he writes that "In a study of the American Negro problem which is as predominantly practical in its intentions as ours, the frame for all our theoretical research thus consists of certain practical questions concerning the future status of the Negro and the future of race relations in America."

But "Social scientists are so habituated to using static and fatalistic value premises with such facts as the mores, social processes, and social trends, and they are so prone to associate radical valuation premises with a complete disregard of the facts, that they often do not realize that it is quite possible to couple trends. The static and fatalistic value premises have actually imbedded themselves into the data." In his Appendix 1, Dr. Myrdal gives reasons "why social science is essentially a 'political' science; why practical conclusions should not be avoided, but rather be considered as a main task in social research; why explicit value premises should be found and stated; and how, by this technique, we can expect both to mitigate biases and to lay a rational basis for the statement of the theoretical problems and the practical conclusions."

In all this, Dr. Myrdal has oversimplified the very comprehensive and critical problem of methodology and has not bridged very well the distance between his own theoretical assumptions and his practical problems. As compared with Professor Wright, his inquiry and his representation of the social sciences is extremely limited. Professor Wright went a great deal further in seeking representative viewpoints and possible contributions by

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setting up a total framework for the many social disciplines in the *Study of War*. Under the heading "Disciplines Related to Social Science" he considers History, Geography, Biology, Psychology. Of the "Pure Social Sciences" he catalogues Anthropology, Sociology, Philosophy and Ethics. He discusses four "practical" social disciplines in Theology and Religion, Jurisprudence, Military Science, Diplomacy; two "applied social sciences" in Economics and Political Science; and five "emerging social disciplines," in Statistics, Population, Technology, Social Psychology, and International Relations.

Dr. Myrdal illustrates the static and *laissez faire* nature of social science with a brief criticism of Sumner, Park, and Ogburn but adds that "The tendencies criticized are, however, common in all social sciences in the entire Western world. Too, not all American sociologists have a do-nothing (*laissez-faire*) bias. In earlier generations Lester F. Ward, Simon Patten, and many others were reformers, and Ward thought of social science as social engineering. Their methodological principles were not clear, however. In the present generation Louis Wirth, to mention only one prominent representative of a growing group holding a dissenting view, has expressed opinions in fundamental agreement with this appendix."

In his own research and in the mode of inquiries made and reported through his special staff and assistants there is a limited representation of any methods or "schools" of research which have been accepted and tried through time and testing, by any of the social sciences. And it is not offered as a criticism but a fact that most of the units and areas of inquiries were so highly motivated by particular evaluations and biases that they could not possibly be scientific in the specific meaning of the word. We repeat this is the best way that the study could have been made by Dr. Myrdal and in the opinion of this reviewer he could not have equalled his personnel, a part of the value of the work being in this evaluative feature. The criticism made is in response to the invitation implied in this whole premise.

In his interpretation of the rôle of Sumner's folkways, mores, and their effect on southern social sciences he misses the two main points. First, he confuses the rôle of the folkways in explaining society with the fundamental facts of cultural conditioning which is basic to all realistic folk- and social psychology or cultural sociology, and he

ignores entirely the fact that the essence of the folk-regional sociology which has been developing in the last twenty-five years is to have the technicways of planning (Dr. Myrdal uses the term social engineering as the ideal sociological goal) transcend the folkways and supplant the mores, thus accelerating the rate of cultural evolution. The total efforts of the folk-regional sociology in so far as the theoretical implication is concerned are exactly in contradiction to Dr. Myrdal's contribution.

Just as the Negro problem is an integral part of the complex of the total national problem, even more so is it part and parcel, inseparable and insoluble from the total complex of southern culture and economy. For twenty-five years and more southern social scientists have attempted to work out some such framework as would insure that whatever aspect of the southern scene was involved, the Negro must be considered an *integral* and *integrated* part and whatever aspect of the Negro's life and culture may be involved, it is inseparable from the whole. Yet efforts actually to implement planning through this sort of social engineering were usually considered in the nature of a neglect of the Negro, a lack of courage by southern liberals, and a planning to retain the southern *status quo*, the changing of which was clearly the main object of the planning. From two to four years before Dr. Myrdal began his work, a program for the Southern Regional Council was set up after many, year after year, meetings of white and Negro leaders, largely representatives of the universities. It took the wisdom and courage of the southern Negro leaders to see that no adjustment of the Negro's part could be enduring until it was worked out in integration with all the southern and national culture, through technical workable ways of doing the job. The specifications for such a Southern Regional Council and the researches of the Southern Regional Committee of the Social Science Research Council were made available to Dr. Myrdal but were not utilized.

In the appraisals of the American scene, the historical cultural conditioning of the pre-Civil War, the reconstruction period, and the later regional-national efforts are inadequately recognized. The historian is all but absent from the scene. There is no mention of many of the names and influences that were most potent in the Ogden movement and in the extraordinary efforts, measured by millions of dollars and thousands of workers, who set the incidence for what is reality in the South. There

is no mention of the University Commission on Race Relations, and almost complete lack of recognition of the whole field of public education. There is no recognition of the powerful conditioning influence of the treatment of the American Indian. A standard saying among the southern common folks is that we ought to treat the Negro as we did the Indian, kill him if he doesn't behave and, if not, isolate him and give him what we want to.

Although making the caste system basic there is little recognition of the compound culture involved in the folk society of the Negro which operates within the total state society of the whites, having its extraordinary effects upon the condition of Negro culture and setting up as magnificant mastery of environment as can be found in the annals of human culture. There is little recognition of the psychiatric problems involved in the regional and frontier heritage in conflict with modern technology, such as are analyzed by Dr. Franz Alexander in *Our Age of Unreason*.

The Negro problem is accurately described as moral. Yet on any basis that appears to the scientist or the social planner its solution is not so simple. Even so, if it is a moral problem, the presumption would be that Ethics and Religion and related social disciplines, as in the case of the *Study of War*, would at least have a part in the solution. On Dr. Myrdal's conclusion that social science is primarily "political," there is the dilemma of reconciling the practical ends with the moral problem on the one hand, and with the sociological emphasis which is assumed, on the other. From this reviewer's viewpoint, with all the assumptions of practical results pointing the way to the future, Dr. Myrdal seems to get little farther than Mannheim in his *Diagnosis of Our Time* or Lewis Mumford in his *The Condition of Man*. In these any direction of social action appears static because the conditions, culture or *ethos* of the people must remain the same unless something more specific in the form of change, technicways or planning is offered. In neither Mannheim nor Mumford, or again in Myrdal, does such specific reality offer anywhere the answer. Always there is assumed some way out; never is the way pointed out. In Mumford there is no precise and definite answer to his magnificent questioning of folk renewal. In Mannheim, whose subtitle is "Planning for Freedom" and whose sequel volume is to be *Essentials of Democratic Planning*, there is posited the ideology of a single objective but always

there is the complex of what someone has called the coefficient of plurality of forces which seems to this reviewer equally characteristic of the Myrdal philosophy.

In the monistic moralistic approach there are two other implied assumptions. One is a sort of moral isolationism in which hypothetic and untested moral hypotheses are projected as units in planning. Another is the violation of the old mathematical equation that the sum equals the total of its parts. In other words, in this moral and perhaps intellectual isolationism the implication is that the Negro problem is the total of the American Dilemma and all the rest of the efforts for human freedom and progress must be dropped unless this particular dilemma can be solved at once.

These criticisms are offered, as it were, in the implied invitation of Dr. Myrdal's so wide a challenge both to problem and method in America's most difficult domestic dilemma. It seems quite likely that his work is more valuable because there cannot be agreement on many of his conclusions and for the stimulating effect it will have on both social scientists and practical workers, *provided* they will face the issues realistically. There appears throughout the work a cordial appreciation of the American situation and especially a generous appraisal of the South in the perspective presented. It is in the broader scientific and planning aspects that critical questioning will be most profitable.

DIAGNOSIS OF OUR TIME. By Karl Mannheim. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. 195 pp. $3.50.

Every book by Karl Mannheim manifests two peculiarities of thinking which make it difficult for a reviewer to do justice to the richness of its ideas. In contrast to the usual writer who, like a pilot, leads his reader from the point of departure to the place of destination, Mannheim is like a guide who merely conducts him around selected spots of interest. The danger of this method is that readers are tempted to judge the structure of a book by Mannheim as fragmentary although close study reveals a coherent unity. The advantage of Mannheim's procedure lies in the opportunity it gives him and his reader to visit a great variety of places which lie on the same route, although sometimes it is not easily recognizable. A reviewer, whose task is to point out the red thread of a publication, faces in Mannheim's books such a multi-

tude of colored threads that he would have to go far beyond the limits of a review were he to mark all of them. The reviewer's work is complicated further by Mannheim's habit of thinking like a flier at a port of arrival, i.e., he circles around each issue by considering it from every relevant angle until it seems covered on all sides. Such circumspection not only enhances the thoroughness of the investigation but also increases the range of noteworthy issues. In view of the extraordinary wealth of deep original insights of Mannheim's latest book, the following observations will be no more than a small instalment of the total due.

Diagnosis of Our Time is a general application of the author's theory of "Planning for Freedom," which was elaborated in his preceding work, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, and will be followed by *Essentials of Democratic Planning*, a systematic treatise of several aspects of planning. The book is a collection of seven studies dealing with the immediate predicament of democracy. It explores some urgent shortcomings and opportunities of contemporary democracy with the object of serving scientific knowledge and influencing social change. Although most of its observations are based on the author's experiences in wartime Britain, they are also significant to Americans, the conditions of whose life involve basically the same deficiencies and potentialities.

Before elaborating two of the strategic points, planning in education and in values, the author restates and develops his theory of "Planning for Freedom." He realizes that the structure of democratic society is undergoing radical changes of which its many crises are only symptoms. The prevailing predicament is neither temporary nor local, but marks the transition to a new social order in all industrial countries. Unless the disintegration of the old system is acknowledged, its causes understood, and democratic techniques adopted, control of events is impossible, and the misery of totalitarian countries is unavoidable. Three changes are responsible for the obsolescence of the older system and for the maladies of modern society: first, the transition from laissez-faire liberalism to planned social organization; second, the transformation of a minority democracy into a mass democracy; and, third, the invention of new techniques of social control.

Mannheim asserts that there is no need to despair over the complexity of these changes if the necessary adjustment is made to the new reality.

Planning is the technique for adjustment. Planning has become inevitable but, like every other technique, it can be used for desirable as well as for despicable ends. Events have shown that if it is not employed deliberately for the former, it will be abused for the latter. The democracies which want to retain their freedom, therefore, face the imperative duty of becoming militant, i.e., of conquering their freedom, not by laissez-faire liberalism but, paradoxically, by planning—Planning for Freedom. The concrete conditions of contemporary society seem to Mannheim favorable for a militant democracy for two main reasons: First, disappointment with Liberalism as well as with Fascism is growing as much as scepticism about Communism, and, second, during the present war long steps have been taken toward the new social technique by the far-reaching social controls, at least some of which will become permanent. On the assumption that the present situation is strategically opportune for democratic planning, the general diagnosis proceeds to specific problems.

Mannheim's ultimate objective is the active transformation of man and society. He regards education, like youth, as one of the strategic points, comparable in importance to the race between education and catastrophe suggested by H. G. Wells. Education, which until now has been detached and blind to society, is becoming integral, i.e., it integrates the curriculum with activities of other social institutions, as well as the individual with his past experience. Sociology is called upon to suggest the direction for this integral education, in which "the modern teacher will think of himself not so much as a schoolmaster but as a lifemaster doing from another angle what the social worker does in his sphere" (p. 65). In contrast to the traditional educational theorist, the sociological educator realizes that education deals with man not in the abstract but within and for a definite society. He knows that the ultimate educational unit is not the individual but the group. He recognizes that educational aims can be understood only within their social context, and that all rules of social control change with the changing social order. Finally, he is aware that education is only one form of social control and that it can succeed only if it is coordinated with all others. Although a trend toward such a sociological orientation is already discernible, a comprehensive "awareness" (p. 67) in social affairs is indispensable to a militant

democracy if pitfalls of over-specialization and neutrality-objectivity in education are to disappear.

Evolutionary transformation of man and society requires a minimum of spiritual consensus if the social structure is to be coherent. Moral values, therefore, constitute another strategic point in a contemporary diagnosis. Social causes such as disintegration of primary groups, industrialization, and new forms of authorities, have devalued the age-old values of Western society. As a result of the general process of secularization, the formalism of religion, the church's subservience to the ruling class, and the religious scepticism of the public, even Christianity is involved in the moral crisis. Several contradictory and mutually neutralizing values co-exist in democracy which, consequently has no single value, a fact evident in education, criminology, leisure, etc. A planning democracy, however, needs an integrating bond to emotionalize society, to unify social purposes, and to instill responsibility into criticism and cooperation. Thus, there arises for Mannheim the question which, a generation ago, disturbed Max Weber so deeply and later troubled Max Scheler: How are values, how is religious experience, possible in modern society? In contrast to Max Weber, Mannheim holds—irrespective of, although not inconsistently with, the historical relativism of his *Ideology and Utopia*—that agreement is possible now on some basic values which have been inherited from antiquity and Christianity and are common to all democracies. He believes that even deep religious experience can be regenerated in a planning democracy, not by planning for it deliberately, but by consciously leaving free scope for it to arise spontaneously. Thus planned creation of values becomes a function of social policy.

Like Mannheim's previous books, the present volume is not a piecemeal investigation but aims at a total therapy based on total diagnosis. Mannheim's search for social action started with his *Ideology and Utopia* in which he inquired into the forms of ideas underlying social actions and found them embedded in the social structure of their historical situation. In *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* he examined social-psychological and institutional conditions of social action in contemporary society and found them in want of conscious social control. Aiming at concrete direction of social action, he proceeds in *Diagnosis of Our Time* to inspect specific strategic points of modern

society; and we may expect these inquiries to be continued with ever greater emphasis on concreteness. To this endeavor Mannheim's balanced method of historical sociology—*description pour prescription*—is eminently adapted, since it prevents passive positivism, on one side, and abstract utopianism on the other.

In spite of its empiricism, however, *Diagnosis of Our Time* is insufficiently realistic to achieve the author's purposes. The vagueness of Mannheim's system is caused by his insistence on a coefficient plurality of social forces. It has long been acknowledged that every direction of social action is bound to remain abstract unless the condition of "δos μoι πoυ στω" is fulfilled. Asking oneself why a thinker such as Mannheim is unaware of this requisite, one is inclined to find the answer in his extreme reaction to the monistic historical approach which has dominated European continental thinking ever since Marx. Disillusioned with the monism of Marx, Stammler, Weber, and others, Mannheim discovers a multiplicity of social forces. In this he is on firm ground historically, but he compromises his chances for social action by omitting to arrange these forces in a hierarchic structure. Adequate concreteness and specificity cannot be attained without their stratification. Once their order has been recognized, nobody is better qualified to accomplish the step from social strategy to social tactics than Mannheim, whose powerful and wise work has widened our consciousness of the contemporary situation and has set an unrivalled standard for the discussion of social reconstruction.

PHILIPP WEINTRAUB

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THE CONDITION OF MAN. By Lewis Mumford. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1944. 467 pp. $5.00.

Animals have two characteristics. They conform to type, and they learn nothing from the experiences of their ancestors. In both respects human beings have an advantage; for they are not bound to keep within the limits of the type, and they are able, if sufficiently awake, to avoid some of the more tragic mistakes of their ancestors.

Mr. Mumford's book is an account of how certain human triumphs have been perpetuated, also how certain mistakes have been repeated. It is a history of human ideas and cultures. The beginning is at Chapter II, The Primacy of the Person,

wherein the contribution of Judea to the civilized
sum-total is set forth. "The life of Jesus of Naza-
reth has been both magnified and diminished by
the growth of the Christian Church." ... "Too
often we see the form of Jesus and hear only the
words of Paul." The Church managed to combine
the Roman sense of order with the Greek ideal of
"beautiful goodness." There resulted the unity
of the thirteenth century. Then we take a leap
of 700 years and find ourselves getting towards the
middle of the book where we find the striking
chapter, Capitalism, Absolutism, Protestantism.
Here we begin to deal with the contemporary
world, that baffling world in which crisis is piled
upon crisis until men, bewildered by the crash of
nations and theories, ask each other, "What shall
the end be?" For within half a lifetime they have
seen a major war followed by a major economic
disaster followed by a major war which, if we are
to believe certain prophets of discomfort, may
well be followed, unless an extraordinary wisdom
mans the controls, by another economic disaster.

From this point onward Mr. Mumford writes
with eloquence and even fervor. His warmth,
which is at moments almost evangelical, leads him
sometimes into generalizations too extreme, but
it has the merit of seeming to be the natural
warmth of a good conversationalist instead of the
impersonal abstractionism with which the hand of
science so often writes its books. The author is
revolted by what he calls the deformation of per-
sonality that began with an overweening devotion
to materialism, mechanism, and despotism. How
shall the partial and fragmentary man be made
whole? That is the question that lies at the core
of the book, the yardstick with which the stages
of civilization are measured.

We could wish that Mr. Mumford had been able
to give a more precise and definite answer to his
own central question. His analysis of the mala-
dies that have beset societies for the last 150 years
is often penetrating, but to a degree we are already
familiar with the names of these ills: expansion,
crisis, neurosis, excess, social maladjustment, spe-
cialism, corporatism, war. What are his remedies?
Here, unfortunately, we get generalization instead
of precision. We must "decentralize power." We
must "build up balanced personalities." We must
use "our immense stores of energy, knowledge, and
wealth without being demoralized by them."
"Our first task is that of self-examination, self-
education, self-control."

To our mind, this is vague, too vague. We
want something more specific. What is a practical
first step? What tool do we first take up? What
is the first item on the program for the opening age?
Does the author see nothing in labor unionism as a
basic unit of a possible new society? Can we take
no hint from the Russian soviet idea, Irish coopera-
tives, our own TVA?

Mr. Mumford's list of great teachers and exem-
plars leans heavily toward the Old World or toward
some great mystics. Goethe, for instance, is men-
tioned twelve times, but Thomas Jefferson, who
was no less versatile and had far more character,
both individually and socially, is mentioned only
once. This seems all the more strange since Whit-
man is mentioned eleven times and Thomas
Aquinas ten. As a guiding mind for a sick and
crippled age Mr. Mumford points to Patrick
Geddes (incidentally he calls the book issued this
year by our own University Press at Chapel Hill,
Patrick Geddes: Maker of the Future, "the best
study to date"), but he does not make out a com-
pletely convincing case for his man. We think
Mr. Mumford has laid a bit too much emphasis on
the dignity of the individual person and not enough
on the value of the cooperating group. But he has
written, it must be repeated, with extraordinary
eloquence. As for his bibliography, that if read
and pondered, would be a far-reaching education.

PHILLIPS RUSSELL

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PRICE MAKING IN A DEMOCRACY. By Edwin G.
Nourse. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings In-
stitution, 1944. 541 pp. $3.50.

The title of Dr. Nourse's work is hardly indica-
tive of its content. Its object is to show, in the
light of a modern theory of dynamic, social eco-
nomic equilibrium, that the modern, and espe-
cially the American "Big Business" executive,
ought to follow in his enlightened self-interest a
policy of low prices with quick adjustment to fur-
ther reduction in cost, thanks to technological and
other improvements.

Without entirely neglecting other fields the
author centers his investigation upon large-scale
industrial business, with its typical imperfect com-
petition and administered prices.

The author stresses the responsibility which the
change from perfect competition to this new mar-
ket situation has thrust upon the business execu-
tives and emphasizes their interest as a group in

achieving steady and lasting equilibrium between production, investment, and consumption through a policy, which quickly passes the fruits of technological and organizational improvement on to the consumer. In so doing such a policy will also serve to produce those steady conditions of reasonably full employment without which private management cannot hope to preserve the political setting and the rules of public administration compatible with its survival, and will succumb in time to state interference and will give way to public ownership of the means of production.

In "Selling" a theory of administered low prices in a dynamic, economic society of imperfect competition and monopoly to business, Dr. Nourse incidentally has written an excellent treatise for the general student on price theory, as applied to the industrial situation of our day.

His intimate knowledge of the mentality, folklore, and the current problems and practices of "Big Business" gives his discussion a realism and a tinge of practical wisdom which makes it particularly useful.

His advice, to the reviewer's mind, is essentially sound and founded on good theory, clearly and simply presented. Nevertheless, it is an open question whether the advocated policy alone will suffice to achieve the end in view. The author is aware that he is not presenting a panacea; yet it seems to us that it should have been made more explicit, that the position of strategic responsibility into which scientific mass production has put business executives has of necessity political as well as economic aspects. If there is to be a democracy in a world of this economic structure, the leaders of business, the leaders of labor, and the leaders of organized consumption, as well as politicians and public administrators, have to be constantly aware of the necessity and obligations to keep all factors of economic life in a moving equilibrium through a cooperative policy aiming at just that. This activity is bound to transcend for all concerned the range of merely economic activities and interests.

On the plane of economic considerations one may be doubtful of a rather general acceptance of the author's viewpoint by the leaders of business, which is admittedly a condition of success, though it is conceivable that the reconstruction period following the war may offer favorable psychological conditions for such a new start.

There remains, however, the rigidity of prices in small scale business where imperfect competition and monopoly often backed up by local legislation prevails in many fields and will be hard to break, particularly in the strategic building trades. There remains the question whether labor leaders can be won over in general to a wage policy and a policy of labor conditions in tune with the proposed price policy. This would be, of course, as a rule, not a policy of low wages, but of flexible adjustment of wage rates, etc., to marginal productivity of labor in enterprises of average progressive efficiency in each individual branch of business. There remains the question whether bankers and other leaders of finance, whose influence on industrial policy the author regrettably does not discuss, will fall in line, and there remains the likely retarding influence of trade association and cartel executives, to which the author alludes. Foremost, however, there remains government as a factor in the making of prices. It may or may not be true that the present degree of government interference would permit economic dynamic stabilization through private business initiative, as the author contends. Even if this were so, the possibility would remain that government moves would tend to counteract the effect of this business policy of low prices, or, which would be equally nefarious, that business men would fear such a development, and would therefore fail to adopt a progressive price and production policy.

Finally, the influence of disturbing international development ought to be considered, and it should be made plain that the economic and political responsibility of the modern business man extends to this field. The author does not touch upon this topic, and seems to assume a rather isolated economy, or one in which influences of the international market situation on the rhythm of national business can be neutralized. This is, of course, a proposition open to doubt.

These remarks are not intended to minimize the considerable merits and usefulness of Dr. Nourse's work, but merely to stress the reviewer's conviction that his approach, while sound as far as it goes, will bear fruit only when made a part of a broader policy of consciously cooperative action for a new pattern of democratic culture which remains to be clarified and towards which all elements of society must be educated.

HERBERT VON BECKERATH

Duke University

LIBRARY AND WORKSHOP

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUNG. By Jolan Jacobi. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943. 144 pp. $2.50.

LINCOLN-DOUGLAS: The Weather as Destiny. By William F. Petersen. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1943. 167 pp. $3.00.

OFFICE ENDOCRINOLOGY. New revised edition. By Robert B. Greenblatt, M.D. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1944. 243 pp. $4.00.

The Psychology of Jung. There is a substantial group of those interested in psychoanalysis, who, although recognizing the pioneering rôle and significance of Freud, believe that the most important contribution to the understanding of the problems symbolized by the concept of the unconscious is being made by Carl Jung. As one of those with this conviction, the reviewer has felt that the influence of Jung has been hampered by the impression of vagueness, even mysticism that his psychological theories have made upon the English reader, part of which is due to manner of presentation. This, Jung recognizes in the foreword of this book. Here, as always, he stands in sharpest contrast with Freud as he writes, "Since it is my firm conviction that the time for an all-inclusive theory, taking in and presenting all the contents, processes, and phenomena of the psyche from one central viewpoint, has not come by a long way, I regard my theories as suggestions and attempts at the formulation of a new scientific concept of psychology based in the first place upon immediate experience with human beings." He therefore welcomes this attempt to draw together the most important of his teachings. The student of human nature, unless he has boxed himself within a compartment-isolation as a result of psychoanalytic partisanship, will also welcome this summary of Jung's psychology. The presentation rests on the two foundation pillars: the principle of psychic totality and the principle of psychic dynamics. Upon these the book is built by an interpretation of the nature and the structure of the psyche, the laws of its processes and operations, and the practical application of this approach to human behavior. Following this, there is a biographical sketch of Jung and a bibliography of his writings which he, himself, has furnished. *The Psychology of Jung* is not only a book that deserves the attention of the student of human behavior; it is also a contribution that the marriage and family counselor may well read and reread and ponder as he gains deeper appreciation of the value of Jung's

insight through his own wrestling with the problems brought him by persons in trouble.

Lincoln-Douglas: The Weather as Destiny. Sociology will never be welcomed to full fellowship with the well-established sciences if it is content to catalogue end-results, however objective and reliable its methodology may be in doing this. It must trace causation. This means that it must both connect its findings with the specialties that uncover influences that move human nature and recognize individual differences in response to environmental forces. *Lincoln-Douglas* is an attempt to demonstrate a type of environmental pressure rarely regarded. Sociology has given testimony to the nervous effect of weather especially on the behavior of the criminal and the inmate of the institution. Petersen, in this highly original book, attempts to relate weather causation to two types of physiological constitutions. Lincoln and Douglas are used as the chief examples. The author's thesis is that their debate occurred when the weather conditions favored the personality expressing itself within the body construction of Lincoln. The weather is traced throughout the later career of the President as it was connected with the significant events of his life. Changes in sun spots, that is, in our solar energy, are also interpreted as influences operating on the destiny of persons and nations. This environmental causation has been emphasized by various students of human nature, Boris Sidis, for example, in his foreword to "The Occurrence of Revolution" (*The Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, V. 13, pp. 215–224). The increase in the accuracy and distance of weather-forecasting accelerated because of the demands of World War II has reinforced the belief of these earlier writers that certain cosmic conditions have a basic control of weather. *Lincoln-Douglas* is an intriguing book. Although written chiefly for the medical specialist, the sociologist who reads it will find it both interesting and fertile in its suggested implications.

Office Endocrinology. One of the hazards always facing the instructor of a marriage course is the interpreting of marital experience too exclusively from the background of his own specialty. It matters not what is his field of interest there is the easily understood tendency to spread causal influences affecting marriage with which he is familiar until they crowd out all others and give the students a

mischievous and distorted approach to marriage experience. *Office Endocrinology*, written for the average, busy medical practitioner, is a good book for the non-medical instructor to have on his shelf, not only for the valuable information it gives but also as a constant reminder that there are fundamental aspects of marital adjustment that are too easily and too often disregarded, even unrecognized by the sociologist, home economist or psychologist who happens to be teaching marriage. The book is based on simple physiological concepts and histological data. It is just these conditions that are frequently decisive in determining the success or incompatibility of an individual marriage. Some of these discussed in the book are: dysmenorrhea, amenorrhea, distressing symptoms of the climacteric period in both male and female, sterility, habitual impotency of the male, and so common an origin of adolescent inferiority as acne. The first edition of this book was quickly sold out. This new edition not only contains new knowledge from this rapidly developing field of medicine but also additional chapters including a section on male endocrinology. For the doctor it is a therapeutic guide book; for the teacher of marriage a source of insight protecting against an unbalanced portrayal of marriage problems.

                                    ERNEST R. GROVES

University of North Carolina

FREEDOM FORGOTTEN AND REMEMBERED. By Helmut Kuhn. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1943. 267 pp. $2.50.

The main theses of the book can be summarized as follows: Freedom, that is, our ability to choose in accordance with our insight into the choice-worthiness or goodness of alternatives, includes the freedom to undo our freedom. The German people, succumbing to despair, losing faith in their material future as well as in the power of reason, let themselves be betrayed into the serfdom of the deified state and thereby lost their freedom of rational choice. Freedom does not accrue to human society as a result of inevitable evolution—this is the lesson to be learned from the experience of the totalitarian nations. Therefore we must "remember" what freedom means and why it is essential to the preservation of civilization.

Keenly aware of the presence in the democratic countries of a state of mind, which if it became sufficiently common and activated, would consti-

tute a favorable condition for indigenous totalitarian movements, the author presents us with one of the most solid and penetrating studies of Nationalsocialism and at the same time with an attempt at philosophical re-orientation.

The major part of the book is concerned with an analysis of the elements in the intellectual tradition of the German people which made them "forget" freedom and predisposed them to succumb to Nationalsocialism. The author gives a penetrating analysis of the processes of adaptation and accommodation to the new political creed, particularly among the "educated" classes after Hitler's seizure of power.

Few of the numerous publications on Nazi Germany contain such excellent analyses of the socio-psychological reasons for Hitler's success and such plastic and understanding characterizations of the people's conduct after Hitler's ascent to power. Masterly are the more or less incidental sketches of the atmosphere of insincerity, of fear, of self-deception, which developed as a consequence of the Nazi regime.

As to the major thesis that Nationalsocialism was a fruit of despair and hatred, it is certainly true that broad masses had, long before Hitler's ascent to power, lost faith in any of the older political parties and that many were groping for a new political creed. I also agree with Kuhn's opinion concerning the reasons for the lack of opposition from the educated classes and why so many among them were able to make their peace with the new regime without much moral and intellectual compunction. There can be little doubt that these conversions were facilitated and intellectually prepared by some of those philosophical schools on which Kuhn lays the blame. Certainly some of the men who scarcely a decade ago had won the admiration of their younger contemporaries as the leaders in new and progressive currents of intellectual life set a devastating example by producing pseudo-sociological interpretations of "the Revolution of the People"; but the conduct of the broader mass of "educated and respectable people" I am inclined to ascribe to simpler and grosser motivations. Nevertheless the fact remains that an appalling blindness against the significance, in terms of ultimate issues, of the measures by which the Nazis attained and secured power, prevailed among the educated classes. The common people, in the first line the rank and file of the labor movement, saw more clearly through

the smokescreen of ideology, and in their majority stayed in the opposition even after they had been forced into external submission. A realistic political training and the possession of a political creed, helped them to keep their minds clear. Failure to do justice to the attitude of the workers is perhaps the one real weakness in Kuhn's analysis. Also, I think he overstresses the deterministic element in Marxism. Furthermore, while it is true that the original "old guard" around Hitler consisted of "desperadoes" in more than one sense, one can scarcely say that the wealthy financial supporters of the movement were motivated by gloom or "passion." A more explicit exposure of the interest-dominated, completely cynical opportunism among the class which they represented, would have completed the picture. On the whole, Kuhn's judgments are fair and well-tempered, even where he deals with the Confessional Church. In view of the exaggerated notions about the oppositional rôle of the churches, this discussion, by a participating observer, is especially valuable.

The last sections contain a re-statement of the essentials of democracy, a refutation of many errors and confusions concerning dictatorship, state regulation of economic activities and other phenomena often erroneously taken as symptoms of totalitarianism, and an attempt to define, in philosophical terms, the "enemy." The sacredness of the individual, the instrumental nature of the state versus the supremacy of the state and the total negation of freedom—these are the opposing positions. The state, being neither wholly good nor wholly evil, must again be related to a supra-political purpose: the enhancement of the dignity of the lives of its citizens (p. 211). Unless these principles, which are far from being new, are "remembered and recollected," i.e., become again the guiding principles of our political volition, we cannot hope for a true victory, and a lasting peace. Clearly, this position involves abandoning the sovereignty of the national state in the interest of a new global order.

The book ends with an appeal to the churches to re-orientate theology towards the pressing issues of our age, to deliver and defend the message of man's immediacy to the Creator, to fight off the new "demonology" of race and state deification. It is to these ideas that certain sociologists are most likely to object as a relapse into prescientific thought. Those, however, who hold that society and its concrete institutions are a creation of men, constantly to be renewed by willing and thinking

and acting, and who believe in the superior value of a society of free men, will find themselves in agreement with the author.

RUDOLF HEBERLE

Louisiana State University

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES. By Pitirim A. Sorokin. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1944. 253 pp. $3.00.

Sorokin's thesis is that there are no basic conflicts between Russia and the United States which should prevent their mutual understanding and effective cooperation now and in the postwar world. If they do not cooperate, the outlook for peaceful world organization is dark. He shows that unbroken peace has always prevailed between them, that both are great continental powers whose problems and development have been and are quite similar, that they have made many cultural contributions to each other, that there is a basic cultural congeniality between them, and that their future sociopolitical systems are likely to show more convergence than divergence. After a comparative discussion of geopolitical, familial, religious, literary, scientific, legal, political, moral, and creative similarities, he concludes there are four indispensable conditions for a durable peace: reintegration of cultural values, acceptance of these by the major powers as binding, limitation of sovereignty in regard to war and peace, and a world organization with power to enforce decisions relative to war and peace. These conditions are now realizable.

While this reviewer finds many specific statements and interpretations with which he disagrees, he is in general agreement with the purpose and conclusions of the book. He believes the case would be much stronger, however, if the author had not tried to prove "too much." There are many points which verge on special pleading—over- and understatement, if not actual distortion of facts. Among these is the inability of the author to find anything constructive in the socalled "destructive stage" of the Revolution (1917–1934); a too roseate picture of Czarist Russia, especially with reference to treatment of peasants, Jews, Poles, Finns, and other subject peoples; the insistence upon the essentially "democratic" nature of Czarist Russia; the close similarity (convergence) of the Soviet and American economic systems; the "comparatively bloodless and noncoercive" expansion of the two countries; the essential "congeniality" of the two

peoples; the "unity in diversity" argument; and so on. His argument that the "main causes (ultimate values)" and "supplementary factors (minor values)" theory of social causation is much better than the multiple factor theory is not convincing to me. Both theories seem about equally useless for natural science.

Sorokin now hails the Soviet regime as "one of the four most original sociopolitical experiments" since 1789. He still holds that the "destructive stage" of the Revolution was wholly bad, except for destroying what was moribund, but now that it has been "liquidated" into nationalism, the interrupted beneficent prerevolutionary trends are being resumed. He obviously has been "liquidating" the Revolution in his own mind and, while the process is not complete, he can say "Let us accept things as they are and go on from here." While he, like all good Americans, disapproves the excesses of the Revolution, he is beginning to appreciate some of the results of the New Russia and to be proud of them.

This book throws new light on the sensate-ideational hypothesis. Three or four years ago, we were told that "all sensate values are blown to pieces and anarchy reigns supreme"; dire things were predicted. Now it appears that for the last ninety years things have been getting better day by day in every way both in the United States and Russia—except for the "destructive stage" of the Revolution. Most of these advances were and are what formerly was damned as "sensate"; now they are implicitly approved. However, there is little evidence that the trend from supernaturalism to naturalism has abated; there are many "atheists in foxholes"; the "return to God" formerly advocated as a *sine qua non* of salvation does not seem imminent. It is not profitable to charge a man with inconsistency; I would rather hope this book is a sign that Sorokin is beginning to think sociology is a natural science rather than a branch of theology. At any rate, he seems more favorable to "sensate" culture and more optimistic about the future than he was a few years ago.

Sorokin's readable style and plausible argument, his great reputation, and his wide familiarity with Russian and American culture probably will convince many readers that Russia is not a land of savages and a potential enemy to America; that the chances for world peace are menaced if we do not cooperate with Russia; and that "unity in diversity" and world peace are desirable and pos-

sible. These propositions seem obvious to me but I am afraid Sorokin's book will not convince many of the millions of Americans who need convincing on these points.

READ BAIN

Miami University

THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY: A Study in Public Administration. By C. Herman Pritchett. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943. 333 pp. $3.50.

No program of the Federal government has been the subject of more controversy, both before and after the establishment of the agency to carry it out, than the Tennessee Valley Authority, and none has greater meaning and significance for the student of modern government and administration. Much of the voluminous literature regarding the agency has been colored by the prejudices of the authors, some friendly, some hostile. It is refreshing, therefore, to find a volume which, like the one under review, gives a comprehensive and well balanced analysis of the history, development and administration of the multi-purpose program of the agency, an analysis written by a competent political scientist who brings to the task not only the equipment of the student but a practical knowledge of the agency gained during a period of three years of personal association with it as a member of its administrative staff.

The volume, which appeared at the end of the first ten years of TVA's existence, has been variously described as a handbook of the agency and a case study in public administration. It is both. The Introduction sketches the controversy over Muscle Shoals which preceded the enactment of the law, from the close of World War I to 1933. Part I, which outlines the TVA program, including water control, finding a market for power, operating problems of the power program, and regional planning and development, provides the necessary background for an understanding of the administrative organization and procedure. Part II, which occupies slightly more than half of the book, deals with administration, covering in successive chapters administrative organization, TVA and the President, corporate freedom, and personnel administration. A concluding chapter considers the meaning of TVA as symbol, instrument, and portent. The author's style is fluent; the text is well documented. The type and format are attractive. About a dozen tables, maps and charts

are included, as well as a reasonably adequate index.

The TVA program has so many facets that whole volumes may be written on it without more than incidental overlapping or duplication. Since any one of the chapters of this book might be expanded into a volume, it is obvious that, in a brief review, comment can be made on only a few selected aspects of the program. First of these is the corporate form of organization. This volume was, in fact, largely an outgrowth of interest in this specific problem. It is generally recognized that certain types of public enterprise require more freedom of operation, more elbow room, than is readily attainable under the forms and procedures which govern the financial activities and operations of ordinary government departments and independent establishments. The increasingly frequent use of the public corporation as a form of organization for such undertakings indicates a disposition to believe that this may be the answer to the need for greater freedom. Professor Pritchett's analysis of TVA clearly indicates that while this may be true, much remains to be done in clarifying the position and powers of such corporations, which because they are public, have a greater responsibility to the public than similar organizations of private character. To achieve the desired independence of action without according a degree of autonomy inconsistent with their public status is not easy.

The decision to exempt the TVA from the Federal Civil Service was not lightly made. It was based on the assumption that the Civil Service Commission was not sufficiently well organized and sufficiently efficient in operation to enable it to supply the high grade technical personnel required for such an undertaking. Although one may admit both that there was much justification for this view in 1933, and that in its first decade, TVA's Personnel Department did a good job in meeting the needs of the agency, there is definite danger in such a procedure. One may also aver—as Mr. Pritchett does—that the Civil Service Commission of the present decade, with decentralized operation through Regional Offices, is quite a different type of organization from that which existed ten years ago. This being true, one may well question the necessity for or the desirability of continuing the exemption, and still more may he question the advisability of providing for such exemptions in

the case of any additional corporations which might be established in the future.

Nor should one fail to remark on the leadership which the TVA has provided to that portion of the southern region in which it operates. No one who has watched developments in the South during recent years can have failed to observe the growth of a new determination to tackle current problems and to try to work out a solution for them. There is no doubt but that TVA has had much to do with this upsurge of social, economic, and civic consciousness within the region. Granting full credit to TVA for its significant accomplishments, one who believes that the strengthening of American democratic institutions is dependent upon the restoration of the state and local governments to their former station of power, dignity and prestige, cannot help expressing the hope that other groups of states similarly situated will undertake themselves, through cooperative arrangements, programs of regional development along lines parallel to those followed in the TVA experiment. The Interstate Commission on the Delaware River Basin represents an effort in this direction. The TVA was established as a yardstick for power, but also as a model of what might be done in regional development by Federal-state-local cooperation. The test case has been highly successful, but in other areas, the states should recognize their problems and assume leadership and responsibility in working out a solution of them, with or without a corporate structure such as TVA represents.

TVA is significant in still another way, as Professor Pritchett clearly indicates. It has done a good administrative job. That job has been done, for the most part, by young men—men who have been trained in the theory and practice of the science of administration. Thus TVA provides a concrete example of what can be done by competent, trained, professional personnel working with intelligence and determination to apply sound principles of organization and administration. The Morgan case, to which considerable space is devoted, was interesting, and in many ways, significant, but it was also unfortunate in that it centered public attention upon an episode of temporary importance, while the long range program of the organization which was going steadily forward, was obscured from view.

All of these things point to one very important conclusion, namely, that public administration in this country is presently in a state of transition.

We are trying within the framework of our constitutional system, to develop new forms and apply new techniques which are essential if government is to discharge its responsibility under new and constantly changing conditions. This effort breeds discord and conflict between those who, on the one hand, cling to the old and do not understand what goes on around them, and those who on the other, care so much about preserving that which is good in the heritage from the past that they want to apply those modern techniques by which alone the fundamentals can be maintained under the new conditions that now exist and seem likely to continue into the future. Sometimes the conflict is acute, but the struggle for good administrative management is slowly being won. I have faith to believe that in another decade the things for which we fight on the governmental front at home will be pretty generally accepted. That faith is supported not only by the record of the first decade of TVA as set forth in Mr. Pritchett's book, but by personal observation at close range, of government agencies at work in wartime.

W. BROOKE GRAVES

Philadelphia Federal Council on Personnel Administration

HENRY W. GRADY: SPOKESMAN OF THE NEW SOUTH. By Raymond B. Nixon. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943. 360 pp. $4.00.

We have waited a long time for a competent biography of Henry W. Grady. Published 54 years after Grady's death, Raymond B. Nixon's volume proves that the waiting has not been in vain. Nixon has had access to the Grady papers; he has not rushed into print; and as a journalist he not only knows how to write, he knows how to write about the functions of the newspaper man. This is a definitive biography that should not have to be redone within our generation. A must item for historians, this biography should prove of equal value to those concerned with the problems of leadership, of regionalism and sectionalism, of industrialization, agricultural reform, and of race relations.

Happily, Nixon treats Grady primarily as a newspaper man—a reporter and publisher who became in his brief development of 39 years a great editor, a great orator, and an unofficial statesman. To present Grady in this light is to do the most possible to rescue him from the shades of mythology that were closing in. One of the penalties of

praise is the counter-attacks it provokes. In certain circles Grady has been painted as a front for predatory economic interests, while others have suggested that he exploited the race issue for personal and party gain. Nixon's view of Grady is favorable but, as far as this reviewer can judge, he gives all the evidence and leaves the reader free to render his own judgment.

The problems that Grady faced were not ephemeral, and they are not outmoded. In the summing up, Nixon would suggest that the New South he advocated has not yet arrived.

To Grady the New South meant the utilization of the dormant natural resources of the region and the diversification of its agriculture. It meant the development of manufacturing to supplement the once almost exclusively agrarian economy. It meant a logical adjustment of the Negro question. And since sectional animosities retarded the attainment of these goals, the New South implied first of all complete fraternity with the North.

A half century after Grady's death we are in a position to realize that his great contribution consisted as much in the manner and spirit he brought to social conflict in the South as in the solutions he proposed. Grady's ideas were far ahead of those held by the Bourbons of his day, but in politics and race relations they already appear static in a changing world. His great contribution lies in his methods—methods that were greatly aided by his gifts of personality and character. In a period when the nation had grown tired of strife in and about the South, Grady appeared like Clay, an apostle of compromise and conciliation. Moreover, he had the personality demanded by such a rôle. He was the irrepressible boy who retained the gay spirits of youth, the sentimental Irishman who never lost his faith in human nature. As an editor Grady had no part in the early traditions of personal journalism. Temperamentally, he had a positive dislike for denunciation and personal controversy. He was the great conciliator in a period when fire eaters were abroad in the land waving bloody shirts. The South still has need of men of his temper and gifts.

RUPERT B. VANCE

University of North Carolina

THE AMERICAN WOMAN. The Feminine Side of a Masculine Civilization. Revised and enlarged. By Ernest R. Groves. New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1944. 465 pp. $3.50.

In *The American Woman* Ernest Groves has done a difficult job with courage. He has drawn together from many times and many places the trends in world events which were meaningful in the life of woman, and has put them before us in a book which is a survey in the most literal sense of the word. From the eminence of long experience and wide scholarship he looks back over the way that women have come, to the place where they now are, and through his carefully delineated trends we shall be guided in the way to go forward. The content of the book will be familiar to the student of American history, but it is freshly organized around a lively issue. Its concern is not with Women, however brilliant as individuals, but with Woman, as social partner, as guardian of cultural values, as economic competitor.

While all history is cultural background, there is special meaning in the forces and influences included in the first chapter. They bear not only on American women, but on all the women of the Western World. The new definition of the status of women, brought about by the growth of the Christian faith, is carefully traced. Christianity proved to be more than a new religion—it became also a new civilization, with new possibilities for women. No government then in power survives, but the Christian faith is itself a continuing influence in the lives of women from the fall of the Roman empire, through the Renaissance, the Reformation, the founding of a new nation in a new world, into the present day.

The forces which worked together to make America a land of opportunity for women, as it was for the socially and religiously oppressed of other countries, are well traced. The influence of women in the colonies began when Mrs. Forest and her maid, Anne Buras, arrived at Jamestown with the second supply ship. Their presence introduced a stability which had been conspicuously lacking before. Not only did the presence of women lessen the restlessness among men, but their domestic and industrial contributions were essential to the founding of a permanent settlement. Religious beliefs in most of the colonies made women subservient to men, and had a profound effect upon the permanence of marriage. This in its turn contributed to the stability of the often precariously balanced American colonies.

As settlement and growth brought the country to the era of frontier life opportunities were open for adventurous women as well as for men, and these opportunities had as much influence on the permanence of family life as religious beliefs had had in colonial America. The individualism brought about by frontier life, however, made it necessary for each individual to prove his worth independently of family connections, power, or prestige. Full appreciation is given to the part played by frontier women in perserving and cultivating the refinements of life through a period when such preservation meant determination and sacrifice.

As the story of the young nation unfolds, the material is interestingly organized to show the economic, sociological, and political influences in the life of the women of the United States. The effects of colonial and frontier conditions, the industrialized north, the slave economy of the south, the agriculture of the middle west, are carefully and dramatically drawn. Sombre and exciting phases are balanced to heighten the color of each, and the result is a narrative which gives the reader a feeling for the romance of life in our country as related to women. The women who participated in the development of the west made a contribution to the story of the American woman which will be missed by many readers. It is to be hoped that the next revision of the volume will make good this omission. The Spanish and Russian influences on the far western part of our country affected women quite as much as the conditions in the east and middle west which are so carefully delineated.

After the Civil War the tempo of women's activities quickened perceptibly. In the north the need for cheap labor brought women into the textile and related industries in great numbers, and for the first time women became a significant factor in economic competition with men. The low wage for which women worked kept the whole scale of living at a low level. These conditions brought about the early participation of women in labor unions. This little-known story is interestingly told.

The development of the machine economy was retarded by the cheap labor of women, but once it got under way it opened up new opportunities of employment to them. The typewriter, the sewing machine, and the telephone in particular, created new fields of work for women. The admission of women to institutions of higher learning became a moot question. The documentation here is of special excellence.

The infiltration of women into the professions, the effort to bring about social legislation, which in its turn led to the long fight for woman suffrage, the granting of full legal rights to women—each milestone is carefully evaluated in its significance to the whole.

Here is a book, carefully documented, sympathetic, free from bias, that will go far to bring about a much needed clarification.

It could well serve as a college textbook. There are a few colleges that are making an effort to lead students to appreciate the fact that social progress must be made by the best men and the best women working side by side in policy-making groups. Such colleges will find in *The American Woman* a well organized body of thought, and a clear indication of the ways in which our culture rests upon the combined efforts of men and women. It is a book which well requires thoughtful reading, but it rewards by providing a comprehensive basis from which to answer the question, "In which direction shall we go?"

GERTRUDE LAWS

Department of Education for Women, Pasadena City Schools

PLENTY OF PEOPLE. By Warren S. Thompson. Lancaster, Pennsylvania: The Jaques Cattell Press, 1944. 246 pp. $2.50.

The dominant and most interesting feature of this book, which was written for the general reader, is the recurrent outcropping of Warren Thompson's own interpretive and predictive judgment. In a footnote on page 5, "The writer believes" that China's population has been stable for a half century; on page 8 he writes "I do not believe that facts justify" the view that immigration causes natives to reduce their birth rate. The topic sentence in the next paragraph is followed by an explanatory, "I do not mean ...," etc. Thenceforth throughout the book personal assertions appear frequently. Some writers use the first person arrogantly or from an assumed position of superiority. In this book, however, the author writes merely as a zealous and competent student wishing to use his energies in expressing conclusions rather than professionally exhibitionistic proofs. He wants people to be aware of and to make reasonable judgments about population problems. This is not to imply, of course, that data are not also present; most of Thompson's

judgments are expressed after a partial exposition of relevant facts.

The first chapter reviews population growth of the world and its parts since 1800. Succeeding chapters (there are 15) discuss birth rates, death rates, war and population growth, the future growth of nations, rural-urban distribution, migration, age changes, biological fitness, minorities and population policies. Some selected conclusions are:

(1) About the birth rate: that "To help the children of the poor overcome their social and economic handicaps is, perhaps, the chief challenge of the differential birth rate" (p. 37).

(2) About length of life: "We have made it possible for more people to live out the normal span of life but we have not increased its length" (p. 71).

(3) About international relations: "The increase in the industrial strength of the East and the accompanying growth in population seem to the writer to portend a shift in political and economic power from West to East" (p. 103). "Either we must organize the world economically and politically so that the inevitable and desirable changes in the needs of peoples for raw materials, etc. can be met ... or we must look forward to periodical and devastating explosions such as we are now having" (p. 105).

(4) About rugged individualism: "It is my contention that the rather sudden slackening of population growth in the West has strengthened the urge of business towards monopoly, and has therefore hastened the time when the public must participate more largely in the conscious management of our economic life" (p. 172).

(5) About eugenics: "... by far the greater proportion of our abnormal and problem individuals are the result of social conditions rather than of heredity" (p. 183).

(6) About our future in the United States: "Unless people believe that the raising of a fair-sized family is highly desirable and offers a satisfactory opportunity for personal fulfillment, I do not believe that any economic inducements that can be offered will keep us from dying out" (p. 232).

This is a very good little book and it deserves to be read by plenty of people, whether or not they have thought before about population problems.

HOWARD W. BEERS

University of Kentucky

PEOPLES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Bruno Lasker
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1944. 288 pp. $3.00.
Illustrated.

Many of the books on hitherto vaguely known
peoples and countries now looming suddenly in
sharp outline on the horizons of the American
reading public are "custom-tailored" compilations
made to order. *Peoples of Southeast Asia* is a
study of quite another type. Mr. Lasker has
brought to it wisdom and insight distilled out of 30
years as a researcher in the fields of labor, race,
culture, education, social and psychological prob-
lems affecting white, yellow and brown folk in
Great Britain, the U. S. A., the Pacific and the Far
East. Professionally he is not academic, his
affiliations, through the crucial era spanning the
first and second World Wars, having been more or
less continuously with the U. S. Department of
Labor, *The Inquiry*, the Institute of Pacific Rela-
tions and such enterprises. His knowledge of the
peoples about whom he writes is at first hand, from
travel and personal observation, supplemented by
literary research. By "Southeast Asia" Mr.
Lasker means that area of vast, complex and
disparate natural and human resources, ethnic
diversity yet common interest and destiny, extend-
ing from Burma, Laos, Tonkin and Southwest
China, out through the East Indies to the
Philippines.

The strictly scientific minded anthropologists,
ethnographers, and sociologists who read this
volume will fume a bit over some faults that mar
the essay. Authorities are quoted at length,
sometimes verbatim, (pp. 24 et seq.) without men-
tion of title or even indirect clue as to source, in
either text, footnote or bibliography. There is a
tendency toward facile acceptance of interesting
but scientifically unproven pronouncements, and
positive statement of the author's own opinion
on questions where more knowledge would have
made his views at least tentative, if not negative.
All this makes Chapter II on origins quite
amateurish.

It is difficult for an ethnologist to see the logic
in views expressed in the subsection entitled
"Refugees All," in which the author assumes that
all hill tribes are skulking refugees despite the fact
that in many instances (Shan, Lolo, Igorote, etc.)
they are more warlike and often more intelligent
than the neighboring coastal agriculturists and
fisher folk. Apparently it has not occurred to
Mr. Lasker that constitutionally (in physique and

temperament) these rugged people are suited to
and prefer their hunting, planting, and living in
the uplands, rather than paddy farming and fishing
in hot valleys and along swampy coasts. Sir
James George Scott is quoted (pp. 24 ff.) as having
the last word on the ethnic origins and relation-
ships of, for example, the Shan and Kachin minori-
ties in the Burmese population, whom he describes
as "racially identical with the Thai of Indo-China
and Thailand. . . ." This *racial identity* has not
been discovered or established anthropologically,
so far as this reviewer is aware! Then: "The Jav-
anese—a Mongoloid deutero-Malay group. . . ."
Just what will this unexplained bit of impressive
"scientific" lingo mean to Mr. Lasker's general
reader? There are even many anthropologists
to whom it will be "just one of those terms" out of
some race-classifier's grab-bag of concoctions
coined to fit ill-defined ethnic types. I know Mr.
Lasker too well, however, to suspect him, as I
would suspect many a popular writer, of "slinging
scientific lingo" to impress the little-informed.

The 32 photographs (presumably Mr. Lasker's
own) reproduced as plates, exhibiting native types,
life and customs, are capable of revealing to an
observant reader as much as the text of the book.
But Mr. Lasker writes with abundance of original
wisdom and authority in his own field: native
problems, welfare, aptitudes. There is profound
insight in his chapters on the heritages, the sub-
sistence and social needs and aptitudes of the fish-
ing, the planting, the trading and the fabricating
tribesmen and classes of this populous tropical
world.

Not nationalism but trusteeship under present
colonial Powers, subject to an international council,
with an acceleration of progress of native popula-
tions toward self rule and responsibility, is pictured
for the future (pp. 244 ff.). There will, and should,
be no violent transitions, but rather an orderly
"shift from 'possession' . . . to 'trusteeship' " (pp.
244–267). "Without a reliable world organiza-
tion, the 'demolition of the colonial system' is
hardly a constructive proposal" (p. 270). This
remark, from an ardent, life-long friend of the
underdog everywhere, bears great weight. Mr.
Lasker proposes not federation of national and
colonial units, but "three-dimensional regional
organization that would give broad recognition to
the need for concerted action" (p. 280) by means
of (1) *political* collaboration through an inter-
national council or commission, (2) a central or-

ganization for over-all planned *economic* cooperative enterprise, and (3) inter-*cultural* exchange and cross-fertilization.

The literature now available on Southeast Asia and Indonesia is suited to every serious taste: for current geographic interest, Hawthorne Daniel's *Islands of the East Indies* (Putnam, 1944); for the historically minded, Bernard H. M. Vlekke's *Nusantara* (Harvard, 1943); for ethnographers, Raymond Kennedy's *The Ageless Indies* (John Day, 1942); for the student of colonial administration, A. D. A. DeKat Angelino's monumental *Colonial Policy* (Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931) and J. S. Furnivall's *Progress and Welfare in Southeast Asia* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1941); for the educator, Edwin R. Embree's *Island India Goes to School* (University of Chicago Press, 1934) and J. S. Furnivall's *Educational Progress in Southeast Asia* (Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1943). Now in the volume under review there has emerged for the general reader, for the historically, geographically and ethnographically minded, not least for the colonial administrator, yet most of all and in particular for any thinking reader who seeks understanding with knowledge—a wise book, a sensible book, positing no program, expecting no utopia, yet opening doors to better, happier days for the teeming Southeast Asiatic-Indonesian folk within "the world made one," in the era which lies ahead.

E. S. Craighill Handy

Oakton, Virginia

Freedom from Fear. By Louis H. Pink. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1944. 254 pp. $2.50.

This book is remarkable from various viewpoints. The author, having been Superintendent of Insurance of the State of New York for many years and, at present, President of Associated Hospital Service, in contrast to many hyperspecialized insurance writers, is familiar with insurance business of all kinds, with insurance on a non-commercial basis and with social insurance (security). His book's principal and most voluminous parts, therefore, cover "Social Security —Public and Private, Compulsory and Voluntary." Probably it is the first time that an American-born author and expert so intimately combined private insurance business and government-managed compulsory social insurance, usually called security. I may not be wrong in assuming that Pink's book and its terminology,

used for two generations in most European and some other countries, will open a new era in our insurance literature. His axiom is: "Social insurance is essential in any civilized community and we should have as much as we can afford to pay for and can properly organize and manage" (p. 222). The author, conscious of his highly progressive task, seems to be a little afraid of his own courage and so sometimes, after having recommended important innovations in one paragraph, is eager to defend traditional institutions in another paragraph. For decades it has been my privilege to teach that social security—at least most of it— has to be considered real insurance. Now Pink tries to prove that "true social security includes all types of insurance." So we completely agree. The author is afraid that by introducing more social security—in the old sense—into the United States, private insurance business might be more or less eliminated. No serious man in favor of broader social insurance intends to destroy our magnificent insurance business. There was plenty of room for both in dozens of smaller countries around the world and there will be plenty of room for both in our big country. The necessary prerequisite is that social compulsory insurance exclusively must embrace not more than a minimum of help; from above the minimum up to the maximum is the domain of free enterprise, as it was abroad. "What we need in the United States is closer understanding and cooperation between federal and local government and the voluntary agencies, plus a Sir William Beveridge" (p. 149). In my opinion, Pink would be such a person. The book explains, besides insurance and/or security, almost all important world problems (The Road toward Peace; An Economic Union of Nations) in one hundred pages. These chapters are certainly of interest. They lack, however, the deep and broad viewpoints to be found in the other parts dealing with Pink's specialty, insurance in the all-embracing sense of the term.

Alfred Manes

Indiana University

Education Faces the Future. By I. B. Berkson. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1943. 345 pp. $3.50.

Dr. Berkson seeks a way out of what he regards an impasse in current educational theory. He sees in the current conflict of educational philosophies, in the alleged lack of positive goals and

clearly stated aims, the symptoms of intellectual and moral "confusion," even of spiritual disintegration. Faith in the methods of experimental intelligence, in freedom, and in inevitable progress, has, it appears, given way to profound dissillusionment. Behind the "disorder" in the educational scene lie deep-seated philosophical and social controversey. American educational philosophy is dominated by the individualistic assumptions of a liberal era that are no longer congruent with modern social needs. And the methods and doctrines of traditional liberalism, he maintains, are no longer adequate to cope with the needs of "an organic and interdependent society."

Dr. Berkson is critical of both the relativism of the experimentalist and the dogmatism of the absolutist. "Experimentalism," he writes, "gives a false impression of constant change and a lack of permanent value." Moreover, contemporary naturalism assumes too easily a continuity between the natural and social, the actual and potential. The intellectualism of Dewey, he complains, gives us nothing to hold on to except the bare methods of reflective inquiry. "Can the colorless conception of 'working hypothesis' inspire man with the emotional drive needed for active social change?" he asks.

On the other hand, Dr. Berkson warns us that there is to be no return to "unchanging fixed and final ends." "The goals of life," he holds "are plural and cannot be reduced to a single ultimate Good." Nor does a return to inward spiritual values wholly satisfy the quest for the "unity of life." For spiritual life "is also a form of individualism, refined and cultural individualism, but individualism nevertheless." In the need for collective and organized guidance, for the study of specific needs and the planned employment of resources of science and the forces of production—in these, Dr. Berkson sees the "culmination of the denial of supernaturalism in human affairs," and a denial of "miracles, dependence on change and of an imminent Idea of Progress."

The author urges a new concept of social and economic planning as well as a new "intellectual and moral synthesis," as the basis of a reconstructed social and educational philosophy. The proposed "new liberalism," is to achieve a synthesis between "the ethical idea in the religious traditions of Western Civilization" and the "humanistic liberalism of the 18th Century," with the "social realism" of an age of science. The terms of this

integration are found in the traditional institutional forms, the family, the church, and the nation. To these institutions Dr. Berkson looks "for the maintenance and implementation of values, for the development of communal loyalties, and for the deepening and enlargement of personality that results from participation in the organized forms of social life."

Dr. Berkson states his analysis of the social and educational problem in terms of a dichotomy between authority and freedom, stability and change. It is in the traditional heritage that the author finds the abiding norms and the "source of our values—of truth and justice, love and mercy, reason and freedom." On the other hand, in economic planning the author sees the need for systematic use of scientific experimentation, and the "engineering attitude of mind applied to the improvement of social welfare." Thus the author's analysis rests upon a separation between values set up as ends, and the methods of science which are regarded as merely instrumental.

ALEXANDER BRODY

College of the City of New York

STRANGE FRUIT. By Lillian Smith. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1944. 371 pp. $2.75.

From the title of a Negro song about lynching, "Southern Trees Bear Strange Fruit," comes the title for Lillian Smith's first novel. Highly publicized, banned in Boston for "indecency" of language, *Strange Fruit* has rapidly forged ahead into the list of best sellers. To many readers the fact that this book was written by a white woman of the Deep South has made it seem a strange literary fruit, but one must not forget that two decades ago Ellen Glasgow was writing brilliantly and with sincere understanding of Southern life and of situations in that culture which she might know about but was not supposed to write about. So, at least, thought many Southerners of the Old School.

Negro groups have been especially pleased at the publication of a book such as *Strange Fruit* which fights for their cause in a world made conscious of a concept of global democracy. Concerning the novel, W. E. B. Du Bois in an article in the literary supplement of a recent *New York Times* commented that *Strange Fruit* "should be required reading in every deanery, every parsonage, and every Legislature on both sides of the Potomac," and one might be inclined to agree if every reader

might also be given a copy of Howard W. Odum's *Southern Regions* wherein he would be required to find the answer to the question of how societies grow and to learn the role of nature, history, the folk, in the cultural development of the region. Otherwise one might fear that *Strange Fruit* comes at an unfortunate time, when an over-sensitive South, feeling that the rest of the Nation is attempting by force to reform it, would simply see in *Strange Fruit* another presentation of a part of their lives which the other areas would entitle, "Southern degeneracy."

Lillian Smith, vehement, forceful, articular spokesman for a South which she as Mencken loves but chastises, noted for her work with Paula Snelling in the magazine, *The South Today*, has written a strong vigorous novel of a small town in the Deep South during the early twenties, when a new idealism was instilled in the minds and hearts of returning soldiers who had found beyond their little local worlds a new horizon of thought. The author calls her town Maxwell, Georgia, and against this setting of a turpentine and cotton community, in the heat of August and the community revival she weaves her story's threads.

Strange Fruit provides a three-fold approach to Southern life. It is a story of individuals of a town caught in the web of circumstances and forced on to tragedy. There is the theme of Nonnie Anderson's love for Tracy Deen, son of one of the old aristocratic families; Nonnie near-white and educated and "glad that she was pregnant." Events march swiftly to a climax of lynching, lynching of an innocent Negro man, and then Maxwell settles back into apathy. There is little that is new in treatment of this approach. George Washington Cable found it in his stories of *Old Creole Days* and *The Grandissimes*, T. S. Stribling in his trilogy, Clelie Huggins in *Point Noir*. Lyle Saxon and William Faulkner have seen and used its powerful appeal. Nor is the use of lynching new as a form of literary treatment. One almost wishes Lillian Smith had used more of the little everyday frustrations of life to make her points and that she had omitted the lynching. The decreasing rate of lynchings has made this climax a little stale as literature and reality.

There is a fine gallery of character drawings in the novel and, in the small town evangelist, one of the most excellent descriptions is given. Over the lives of all these people there hangs ominously the influence of sex and this Freudian treatment

of characters and their development is an outstanding characteristic of the book.

Strange Fruit provides us with two other avenues of approach to Southern life. It is a study of a "Small Town, South" and the treatment of social groups is finely done. Lillian Smith gives us rich descriptions of these. We see the workings of the minds of the mill people, the farmers, the plantation owners and their workers, the professional folk, the Negro groups of Black Town. They are bound together in the novel with indissoluble ties. Even Ed Anderson, brother of Nonnie, returning from Washington for a vacation feels himself drawn back to the town life. "He'd dreamed its deep sand so hot to bare feet, spat-spat of rain on palmetto, of an old rickety house pushed against the swamp; dreamed its smooth hot days blazing against the eye; . . . it still had something to do with his blood and soul."

In *Strange Fruit* there is a third approach to Southern life. It is the story of two great regional cultures, Negro and white, conditioned by many factors. There is the Negro group, facing the realities of cultural inheritance and limited training, seeking their share in the "American Dream"; feeling that the whites believe the Negro a Negro and nothing more. And there is the white group trying at times to analyze its feelings and conscious of its problems. *Strange Fruit* has rich passages of the way of the folk and the folk wisdom. This is reflected in the little Negro maid Dessie's comment: "Ef dey wants to be good to you, dey is, ef dey don want to, dey aren't. You don't have nothing tall to do with it. You jest waits . . . you waits. And ef you gets in dey way . . . Jesus . . . dey'll. . . . ."

And there is Old Ten explaining to her husband why she had been forced to beat her son: "I wants him to live. He got to learn. He got to learn there's white folks and colored folks and things you can't do if you wants to live."

In Tracy's relationship to Nonnie the power of the folkways is clearly shown:

He did not sit there piling facts here and facts there. . . . The anthropologist proved there was no superior race. Sure he knew that. Boys in the army said the South wasted half its money and time keeping the Negro in his place. . . . He knew that, too. He knew what the facts were. They had no more to do with your feeling than knowing about the reproductive system had to do with your feelings about the mother that bore you.

All he knew was that thirty minutes ago he had been with the woman he loved, now there was a colored girl named Nonnie.

Throughout the novel the author seems to say: "Here is a new world situation similar in many respects to that of the last war. The South faces crisis and dilemma. She must continue to grow and not to waste her human resources. Do we have to do little things?"

Concerning the "problem" aspect of the novel each reader must ask, as does Elizabeth Nitchie in her *Criticism of Literature,* "Does the author warp plot and characters to achieve her purpose as a social reformer?"

A thoughtful reader should follow *Strange Fruit* with some reading as to what Southern towns have been achieving since 1920 and how many reforms have been accomplished. He should know the work done by Southern leaders, both black and white and the many fine adjustments that have been made. One Southern State reaching complete equalization of salaries for Negro and white teachers, another making fine experimentation in Negro voting, and still another utilizing the finest minds of both groups in a new council, not superimposed but growing out of previous work. If we know these things then we shall work all the more, journalist, novelist, Southern people in order that the rich diversity of Southern life may add to the richness of the Nation. There is so much to be done; there is so much that we have to offer. How can we go from where we are—on to next steps?

ANNA GREENE SMITH

University of North Carolina

BLACK GODS OF THE METROPOLIS. Negro Religious Cults of the Urban North. By Arthur Huff Fauset. Philadelphia: Publications of the Philadelphia Anthropological Society, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944. 126 pp. $2.00.

The emergence and growth of Negro religious cults in our northern cities has received considerable public notice. The Father Divine Peace Mission Movement in particular has often found its way into the public press. Mr. Fauset has chosen five such Negro cults for his study: the Mt. Sinai Holy Church of America, Inc.; the United House of Prayer for All People; the Church of God (Black Jews); the Moorish Science Temple of America; and the Father Divine Peace Mission Movement.

These particular cults were chosen because "they afford an opportunity to observe the range of contemporary cult practices among urban Negroes in the United States." They are also among the most important and best known cults of their respective types. Most of the data was collected by Mr. Fauset in Philadelphia, but in the case of the Father Divine Movement data were also collected in New York.

The origin, organization, membership, finances, sacred text, beliefs, ritual, and practices of each cult is briefly described. A comparative study is then made as to their points of conformity and nonconformity with orthodox evangelical patterns. A further comparison among the cults themselves is made to disclose their inter-cult similarities and differences.

The central interest of the study is broached with the problem: "Why the Cult Attracts?" The answer is found in "four compulsions": first, for contact with a supernatural being; second, the personality of the leader; third, relief from physical and mental illness; and fourth, race consciousness.

In his systematic analysis of his findings the author minimizes the influence of Africanisms upon these cults and takes the functional, sociological approach of Park, Wilson, and Frazier. He finds the "apparent over-emphasis" of religion by American Negroes to be a result of restrictions imposed upon their participation in other institutional forms of American culture. The secular, economic, political, social, and racial aspects of these "religious" cults are the manifestations of the Negroes' quest for the satisfaction of basic social urges and needs through the historically accessible religious channel.

Mr. Fauset has a considerate word for Mr. Herskovits' industry and fairness, but rejects the historical and psychological approach. This rejection, with a consequent overemphasis on the functional approach, and a provincial failure to make comparisons with Negro cults in the South, the West Indies, and the other Americas, are the most serious defects of a valuable study.

FLETCHER McCORD

University of Kansas

THE PASSING OF THE EUROPEAN AGE. By Eric Fischer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943. 214 pp. $2.50.

Speculation on the future position of Europe in the hierarchy of continents is not new, and but

few are likely to dispute the thesis that the age of European primacy is passing. Such an admission, however, opens the door upon many questions. How fast is that age passing? In what manner is it passing? What will fill the vacated position? These are but a few of the more interesting. In this short group of essays Dr. Fischer selects the manner of Europe's passing for his modest and pleasant attentions and gives to both the general reader and the professional student a fruitful study of a transfer of power and influence in the modern world.

The essence of this book is caught in its subtitle: a study of the transfer of western civilization and its renewal in other continents. As Professor Sidney B. Fay writes in the foreward (p. v) this is a "refreshingly new interpretation" of the cultural heritages taken from Europe by its migrating peoples, the experiences of those cultures in their new surroundings, and, most important of all, the subsequent influence exercised by the new cultural centers upon the countries of their origins. There is nothing abrupt or cataclysmic about this but rather the working out of mutual influence through several decades of recent history.

The arrangement of the books prevents the escape of such a large subject from the control of the author. Latin America is treated largely in its relationships with Spain, Portugal, and France; the British Commonwealth of Nations stands alone; Germany is portrayed as attempting, in the present war, the restoration of the world position of Europe; and the United States is depicted as an European offshoot that now returns to Europe with all of the prestige of its magnificent technical and material culture. The Soviet Union, in probably the most interesting chapter of the book, receives consideration as a country essentially non-European in its culture and development, concerned mainly with the settlement of its Asiatic portions, and now particularly sensitive to certain aspects of American developments, especially mass production. In all of these endeavors the author gives attention to the literary, artistic, and scientific influences of European culture at its periphery upon that of the center, as well as an excellent treatment of the political and economic forces that have shaped existing relationships.

The final chapter contains a brilliant and restrained analysis of the transition from Greek culture to that of the Hellenistic period, and finds that a great many of the tendencies of that time

are at work today transforming European culture into a new world form. This European culture in new centers, changed by the influence of environment and vitalized by the experiences of independence, can now stand alone. These outside centers need not share the fate of a European continent ravaged within one generation by two wars that are "but culminating climaxes in the one enormous crisis"—a crisis that was itself caused by this shift in the center of gravity for western culture.

It is a thoughtful book upon one of the larger themes of history.

JAMES L. GODFREY

University of North Carolina

ITALIAN OR AMERICAN. The Second Generation in Conflict. By Irving L. Child. New Haven: Institute of Human Relations, Yale University Press, 1944. 208 pp. $2.75.

With the decline in immigration the "problem" of the immigrant disappeared. Its passing has focused attention on a related matter which is almost as troublesome and perhaps of more significance than the first, namely, what is generally called "the problem of the second generation." It is frequently asserted by sociologists that members of the second generation are a "marginal" group and are likely, because of cultural conflict, to experience more psychological difficulties than the ordinary individual. Studies of delinquency and crime in America show a high rate of delinquency among second generation Americans. The peculiar behavior of the second generation lies, it is said, in the strange dualism of its environment and in the difficulty of living in two worlds at the same time.

This volume deals with these psychological problems as manifested by second generation Italians. Cultural differences pose psychological problems for the individual, and the purpose of the author is to show the significance of the "accultrative situation" for the Italian of the second generation in terms of his habits, his goals, his activities, and his beliefs. The author, after analyzing the inner conflict developed by these individuals, outlines three different ways by which the resolution of the conflict is achieved. These three types of reactions, called the "rebel," "in-group," and "apathetic," are differentiated on the basis of the gains and losses accruing to an individual according as he pursues one or another of these types.

This volume is a significant contribution to the growing literature on the second generation and its problems. It will also contribute to an understanding of the more general processes of cultural change and of interaction between groups.

ALEXANDER BRODY

College of the City of New York

GROUP WORK AND THE SOCIAL SCENE TODAY. Selected Papers for the Year 1943. Reports by Committees of the Association for 1942–1943. New York: American Association for the Study of Group Work, 1944. 96 pp. $0.75.

These selected papers taken from the program of the Group Work Section of the National Conference of Social Work in New York City in 1943 give a splendid birds'-eye view of current thinking among group workers.

Such problems as family disorganization; the needs of children of working mothers; the dilemma of the adolescent faced with job, money, and freedom before unknown and for which he is not ready; and the increasing need for volunteer workers and for their training, are all discussed realistically against a backdrop of intelligent group work philosophy and thinking. Emphasis is put on the importance and need for group workers to be flexible, to accept the changes that have and are coming about in our society and to meet these changes with a willingness to adjust group work techniques to the present needs. This does not mean that we must necessarily change our basic philosophy and techniques, but it does mean we must adapt them to the social scene today.

Mr. Slavson says in his article on "Next Steps for Group Workers" "That the courage needed to look at oneself objectively and to face ones virtues as well as one defects is a sign of strength." Granting this to be true, we may well say after reading this pamphlet that group workers are showing definite strengths in this present day and increased evidence of self-evaluation.

Also included in this pamphlet is the Annual Report of the Chairman and the committees of the National Association for the Study of Group Work. The particular significance of these reports is their emphasis on joint program planning among agencies, both public and private—a definitely cooperative effort.

This pamphlet is recommended for any who are interested in what is happening in group work today. These articles are concisely written and with a minimum of reading one is able to obtain a maximum of information.

RUTH DODD MORGAN

University of North Carolina

INSTITUTIONS SERVING CHILDREN. By Howard W. Hopkirk. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1944. 244 pp. $2.50.

Institutions Serving Children makes such interesting and helpful reading, it is difficult to lay it aside long enough to write a brief review. Unlike many books of this nature, *Institutions Serving Children* combines facts and material in such a way as to make it sparkle with style. The book is being released to the public at a time when it can be most helpful, not only to institutional employees, but to all who are interested in welfare work.

Some books on child care are so theoretical and visionary that the average institution finds it difficult, if not impossible, to apply their suggestions. Other books deal with facts in such a manner as to make uninteresting reading. This author, as a result of his experience in institutional work, and long research, has been able to combine the two. Without attempting to justify the institution, the author clearly demonstrates the fact that there is a group of children to whom the well regulated institution can render a better service than any other agency.

One of the most difficult problems confronting an institution is the securing of the right kind of staff. This book gives information and makes most helpful suggestions relative to the qualifications, salaries, training, and responsibilities, of institutional employees, especially the house parents. By pointing out the weaknesses in inadequately equipped and poorly regulated institutions, and at the same time by giving facts about the more progressive institutional care, the book becomes a safe barometer for all who seek improvement in this method of child care.

Best of all, the author leaves no question in the mind of the reader, that the important thing about the institution is the child and his social relationship. All who are interested in improving the condition of the dependent child are deeply indebted to the author for this most timely contribution.

I. G. GREER

Baptist Orphanage of North Carolina
Thomasville, North Carolina

NEW BOOKS RECEIVED

AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW. June, 1944. Recent Social Trends in the Soviet Union. Official Journal of the American Sociological Society. Vol. 9. Number 3. 344 pp. $1.00.

ANNUAL REPORT. Monroe County Children's Court. New York: New York State Department of Correction, Division of Probation, 1943. 15 pp.

PSYCHOLOGIC CARE DURING INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD. By Ruth Morris Bakwin and Harry Bakwin. New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1942. 317 pp.

REPORT ON WAR AND POST-WAR ADJUSTMENT POLICIES. By Bernard M. Baruch and John M. Hancock. Washington, D. C.: Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, February 15, 1944. 107 pp.

THE BEARDS' BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Charles A. and Mary R. Beard. New York: Garden City Publishing Company, 1944. 508 pp. $0.69. Maps and charts.

CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY. By John R. Beery. New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1943. 109 pp. $1.85. Tables, appendices, bibliography.

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